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The Concept of Action and Responsibility in Heidegger’s Early Thought
Christian Hans Pedersen
ABSTRACT
In his early thought (which for our purposes will be considered to be roughly the
time period from his first post World War I lecture course in 1919 to the publication of
Being and Time in 1927), Heidegger offers a rich description of our practical engagement
with the world. The aim of this project is to develop a Heideggerian conception of action
from these early, concrete descriptions of the practical dimension of human life. The
central feature of this Heideggerian conception of action is that action is understood as
involving interdependent aspects of passivity and activity (or receptivity and spontaneity,
in a more Kantian formulation). Considered in its entirety, my dissertation provides what
I take to be a fruitful interpretation of Heidegger’s early thought from the standpoint of
his understanding of action. It also provides the provisional basis and framework for the
further development of a general conception of human agency that can be extended
beyond Heidegger’s thought.

iv

PREFACE

I should perhaps preface the main body of this work with a short clarification of
the title, The Concept of Action and Responsibility in Heidegger’s Early Thought. This
title might justifiably lead the reader to expect an entirely historical work whose aim is
the interpretation and explication what Heidegger says about action and responsibility in
his early thought. My aim here is slightly different.
For centuries philosophers have been struggling with the problem of free will.
The problem, generally speaking, is that we typically hold two seemingly incompatible
beliefs about ourselves and the structure of nature as such. On the one hand, we believe
that we, as individuals have a significant degree of control over our actions and that our
actions for the most part are of our own making and not the product of external,
environmental influences. On the other hand, we tend to see the whole of nature as
governed by strict causal laws, which determine all actions and events that take place.
The sort of determinism assumed to be a threat to free will is often taken to be a
naturalistic determinism. That is, the worry is that our actions as human beings are
determined by natural laws at the physiological level, e.g. our genetic code makes us
determined to act the way we do. Alternatively, one could see a threat to our free will
posed by a sort of social determinism. The worry in this case is that our actions are
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completely determined by various social forces, e.g. the way we were raised, the norms
and expectations of our society, etc.
In Heidegger’s early thought, we find an analysis and description of human
agency that focuses on the fundamental role that our social and historical
contextualization plays in our actions. Because of this, Heidegger’s early thoughts on
what it means to be human agent also potentially generate a worry about social
determinism. Heidegger himself seems to be aware of this potential problem and seeks to
develop a solution that would allow us still to recognize the influence that social factors
have in our actions, but also open up the possibility that despite this influence, our actions
can still be free in some meaningful way. The aim of this project is to use Heidegger’s
analysis of action to develop a coherent and plausible conception of action that might
help us to resolve the problem of free will, at least when this problem is generated by the
worry about social determinism. This way of approaching Heidegger’s thought can be
seen as fruitful in two ways. First of all, this approach is not found in the vast amount of
secondary literature devoted to Heidegger’s thought, so I hope that my project provides
something of fresh way of interpreting Heidegger. Secondly, I hope to show that the
conception of action we find in Heidegger’s early thought can be useful when trying to
address the larger problem of freedom and social determinism broadly considered.
I would also like to take the time here to acknowledge some of those people
whose assistance has been invaluable over the course of my work on this project. The
comments, questions and suggestions from the members of my dissertation committee
(Rebecca Kukla, Ofelia Schutte, Stephen Turner and Joanne Waugh) have been
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immensely valuable in forcing me to clarify and refine my claims and arguments. It is to
my advisor, Charles Guignon, that I owe whatever clarity of thought and ability to write
with lucidity that I possess. Over the years he has spent enormous amounts of time and
energy editing, correcting and questioning my work in order to get me to say things as
clearly and straightforwardly as possible. My general approach to doing philosophy will
always be grounded in his tutelage. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Faye, for her
unflagging support through the years in which I have worked on this project and for her
selfless assistance with the formatting and editing of the final document.

vii

DISSERTATION INTRODUCTION

Heidegger’s rich description of our practical engagement with the world in his
early thought (which for our purposes will be considered to be roughly the time period
from his first post World War I lecture course in 1919 to the publication of Being and
Time in 1927) has drawn significant attention from scholars over the years. As is often
the case with the thought of complicated thinkers, there has been considerable difference
of opinion among scholars over Heidegger’s understanding of the practical and the
practical implications of Heidegger’s philosophy. These scholarly interpretations have
ranged from more or less positive assessments and appropriations of Heidegger’s thought
to fairly strong condemnations of Heidegger’s practical philosophy based on perceived
connections to Nazism. The current project is an attempt to once again assess the role of
the practical in Heidegger’s early thought and to determine what aspects of Heidegger’s
account of our practical activity are worth being appropriated and carried forward.
The focus here will specifically be the conception of action that can be gleaned
from Heidegger’s early thought. While there has been much written dealing with various
aspects of Heidegger’s practical philosophy, there has been little explicit treatment of
Heidegger’s conception of action. The one substantial work on Heidegger’s conception
of action, Reiner Schürmann’s Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to
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Anarchy1, focuses primarily on Heidegger’s later works, treating Heidegger’s early
descriptions of our practical being as still being overly loaded with the metaphysical and
existentialist concepts that the later Heidegger eschews.2

1

Reiner Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy, Christine-Marie Gros,
trans. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987).
2
This might lead one to ask the question of whether I should be focusing on Heidegger’s early thought
when attempting to develop a Heideggerian conception of action. Here I will attempt to give a brief
justification for my preference for the thought of the early Heidegger over that of the later Heidegger, at
least as far as developing a plausible theory of action is concerned. The conception of action that we find
in the later Heidegger, at least on Schürmann’s interpretation, is different from the conception of action we
find in the early Heidegger in two main ways. One of these main aspects of the early Heidegger’s account
of action that Schürmann denies is carried over to that of the later Heidegger is the focus on the individual
agent (cf. Heidegger on Being and Acting, 239-240). Schürmann views the earlier account of authentic
action as an existentialist side-path in Heidegger’s thinking that quickly drops out and is replaced by a
focus on action as a social, political and/or historical phenomenon.
The other main aspect of the early Heidegger’s account of action that Schürmann thinks the later
Heidegger actively argues against is the teleological nature of action as conceived by the early Heidegger
(cf. Heidegger on Being and Acting, 254-260). For Schürmann one of the most important projects for the
later Heidegger is undermining what he sees as the pervasive influence of the technological paradigm on
our understanding of being. This means that Heidegger must abandon and critique his own earlier
teleological understanding of action because it is derived, like all of Western metaphysics according to the
later Heidegger, from the Greek understanding of techne. It is the unfolding of this conception of techne
that leads to the complete domination of the technological understanding of being. The activity associated
with techne is poiesis, or making. The basic idea here is that in poiesis the craftsman has an idea of what
she wants to produce and then transforms the raw material so that it corresponds with the initial idea and
thus reaches its completion, or reaches its end (telos). It is the goal or telos of the project of production that
guides it throughout, so poiesis is said to be teleological. As we will see, it is evident that at least the early
Heidegger’s account of inauthentic action, in which our activity is guided by the projects and goals which
we have, very much fits into this poietic framework. Schürmann, along with the later Heidegger, advocates
the cultivation of a certain “goallessness” in action. We undermine the technological understanding of
being by acting without goals because we then allow the beings which appear in our engagement with the
world to appear in a way other than that of something to be used in order to accomplish some end.
I would argue that the early Heidegger’s account of action is more helpful in making sense of
human agency than that of the later Heidegger. The main reason for this is that the two elements that the
later account of action is concerned with eliminating, a notion of individual action and a teleological
understanding of action, seem to be necessary to making sense of our actions. Even if a total focus on the
individual agent may be a distortion, there does seem to be a non-eliminable sense of the individual agent
in most concrete actions. Completely rejecting this element of action seems to run counter to the
phenomenological tendency that gives the early Heidegger’s thought its grounding in our lived experience.
The same can be said for the rejection of the teleological understanding of action. It also is extremely
difficult to imagine completely goalless action taking place on a regular basis. Almost all of our actions are
intelligible because they take place within a context of significance that provides goals worthy of pursuing.
Finally, it seems that Schürmann and the later Heidegger make goalless action itself a goal, or at least as a
means by which the technological understanding of being can be undermined, thereby failing to really
escape the teleological understanding of action.

2

When it comes to giving an account of Heidegger’s early understanding of action,
there have been two main approaches. As part of his more general interpretation of
Heidegger’s thought, Hubert Dreyfus maintains that for Heidegger most of our everyday
actions are to be understood as skillful coping with our environment.3 The claim in
Dreyfus’s account of skillful coping is that in traditional theories of action, far too much
emphasis is placed on the role of explicit mental representations. Dreyfus argues, using
Heidegger’s analysis of everyday activities in Being and Time, that much of our everyday
behavior takes place without any explicit mental states associated with it at all. For
example, when opening a door or driving a car, we usually do not form explicit mental
representations that guide our actions. I do not always have to think to myself something
like “Turn the wheel now” to make a turn while driving. Dreyfus thinks proper
phenomenological analysis (like that provided by Heidegger) of many of our everyday
actions will reveal explicit mental representations only accompany our actions when
there is some sort of breakdown in the normally smooth flow of our activities. When, for
instance, I try to open a door and find myself unable to do so, I then would have to
engage in some sort of explicit deliberation about what I should do.
Drawing on Heidegger’s conception of das Man, or the One as Dreyfus translates
it, Dreyfus adds to his conception of skillful coping by incorporating Heidegger’s
analysis of the way in which and the extent to which our absorption in the social practices
of our time guides our everyday actions. According to Dreyfus, we can understand many
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Dreyfus gives this account of Heidegger’s understanding of action in many different articles and books.
Dreyfus connects his conception of skillful coping most directly to Heidegger’s thought in his Being-in-theWorld: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).
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of our more sophisticated actions, e.g. giving a lecture or attending a funeral, as ways in
which we enact various social roles and ways of understanding ourselves. For example, I
give lectures several times a week because I understand myself, at least to some extent, as
an instructor at a university. Again, Dreyfus argues that there are usually no explicit
mental states accompanying these everyday sorts of actions. These self-understandings
are largely tacit and guide our actions without any explicit reflection on our part.
There are two ways in which for Dreyfus’s Heideggerian conception of action is
problematic. There are several philosophical criticisms that can be brought against
Dreyfus’s conception of action considered in its own right, and there are questions that
can be raised about the adequacy of Dreyfus’s account as an interpretation of Heidegger.
Let us begin by considering the general philosophical objections. First of all, one might
find Dreyfus’s claim that explicit mental states accompany our actions only in the case of
some breakdown to be somewhat implausible.4 Even if Dreyfus is right in maintaining
that most traditional theories of action are too focused on the role of mental states in our
actions, his claim that mental states explicitly accompany actions only in cases of
breakdown seems to swing too far in the other direction. There are plenty of examples of
everyday actions that involve explicit mental representations that cannot be considered
breakdown scenarios. Consider again the example of giving a lecture and the preparation
that goes into that. While I may more or less automatically get to work on writing my
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This problem for Dreyfus’s account of skillful coping is pointed out in essays by John Searle in his “The
Limits of Phenomenology” in Heidegger, Coping, and Cognitive Science, eds. Mark Wrathall and Jeff
Malpas, 71-92 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000) and Theodore Schatzki in his “Coping with Others with
Folk Psychology” in Heidegger, Coping, and Cognitive Science, eds. Mark Wrathall and Jeff Malpas, 2952(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000).
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lecture when I arrive in my office, it is often the case that in the course of writing my
lecture I explicitly remind myself to mention a certain example or allow time for class
discussion. This sort of explicit reflection does not appear to be the product of a
breakdown in the process of preparing my lecture (as my computer crashing would be).
Rather, this sort of explicit reflection seems to be an integral part of the action of writing
the lecture itself.
The other philosophical problem with Dreyfus’s understanding of action as
skillful coping is that by de-emphasizing the role of mental states in action, Dreyfus has
removed one of the main ways of being able to understand what it means to be
responsible for our actions or to have ownership of our actions. When we say someone is
acting, we typically seem to mean that she is doing something or bringing something
about as opposed to having something happen to her. As Harry Frankfurt puts it, the
“problem of action is to explicate the contrast between what an agent does and what
merely happens to him, or between bodily movements that he makes and those that occur
without his making them.”5 When we call something an action, we usually seem to mean
that the agent has some control over what she is doing. Actions are then contrasted with
mere behavior or mere bodily movement, with the idea being that someone who is
brainwashed can still be doing things and moving about, but we would not want to say
she is actually performing actions. One of the main traditional ways of making sense of
something being an action as opposed to mere bodily movement, i.e. making sense of

5

Harry Frankfurt, “The Problem of Action” in The Philosophy of Action, ed. Alfred Mele, 42 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997).
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having responsibility for or ownership of our actions, is to focus on the role of mental
states in bringing about the movement in question. For example, we would say that
someone who has an intention to go swimming and then jumps into the pool is
performing an action in the proper sense, while someone who is pushed into the pool is
not. By maintaining that mental representations are not operative in this way when we
act (except in breakdown situations), Dreyfus would seem to be obligated to give an
alternate account of how we can be responsible for our actions or even how our actions
can be counted as actions. If he does not provide such an account, it seems that his
understanding as action as skillful coping ultimately conceives of human action as
primarily being reduced to the non-reflective living-out of socially prescribed norms and
habits, with explicit reflection on our actions emerging only in rare instances, leaving no
way to ascribe ownership of actions to individual agents. While I do not endorse a return
to the focus on accompanying mental states when ascribing ownership of an action, I do
think that Dreyfus’s conception of action fails to give a plausible alternative account of
how we can be responsible for our actions.
The philosophical problems for Dreyfus’s conception of action are in fact
connected with the interpretive problems for his account. Dreyfus is clear that initially
his interpretation of Heidegger is based primarily on Heidegger’s analysis of everyday
existence in Division I of Being and Time and that he avoids substantial discussion of
Division II of Being and Time because he considers it to be “much less carefully worked
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out” and “to have some errors so serious as to block any consistent reading”.6 It is in
Division II of Being and Time (among other places as we will see) that Heidegger tries to
provide a solution to the way in which the structure of our everyday actions seems to
leave no room for responsibility at the individual level. To Dreyfus’s credit, he appends
a section to his Being-in-the-World that addresses Division II of Being and Time, but
rather quickly abandons the Kierkegaardian interpretation he puts forward there. Dreyfus
later attempts to interpret Division II of Being and Time as providing an account of expert
skillful coping, in which the need for mental representations of intentions and guidelines
for action has completely disappeared, replaced by an intuitive sense of the exact action
called for by the given situation.7 This interpretation of Division II in terms of expert
action does not solve the problems for Dreyfus’s account—if anything, it exacerbates
them as it further marginalizes the role of mental states in our actions while still not
providing an alternative way of making sense of the individual ownership of actions.
The second main way of interpreting Heidegger’s early thought on action is the
decisionist interpretation. According to this reading, the sort of non-reflective, everyday
activity that is the central focus of Dreyfus’s conception of action as skillful coping is
really only half of the story. In Being and Time, Heidegger clearly states that the first
division of the work, which is the basis of Dreyfus’s interpretation, is concerned with
inauthentic existence, while the second division of the work is concerned with what

6

Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, viii.
See Dreyfus’s “What Could Be More Intelligible Than Everyday Intelligibility? Reinterpreting Division I
of Being and Time in the Light of Division II,” Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society 24, no. 3
(2004): 265-274.
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Heidegger calls authentic existence. On the decisionist reading of Being and Time, this
distinction between inauthentic existence and authentic existence runs roughly as follows.
When existing inauthentically, our actions are largely the product of non-reflective
conformity to social norms, so in a sense Dreyfus’s account of Heidegger’s
understanding of action is correct as far as it goes. However, according to the decisionist
interpretation, when existing authentically, we come to realize that the norms and rules
that guide our everyday actions are completely contingent. Authentic action comes to be
understood as acting with the recognition that all of us, as solitary individuals, are free to
reject traditional social norms and create for ourselves the guidelines for our actions. It is
from this that decisionist interpretation gets its name. This interpretation reads Heidegger
as endorsing the view that there are no criteria external to the individual agent that can be
used to make a choice. According to the decisionist interpretation of Heidegger, all
authentic actions stem from the unconstrained decision of the agent herself.
There have been a string of thinkers that have attributed this conception of
authentic action to Heidegger and find in it the philosophical roots of Heidegger’s
association with the Nazi party in the 1930s.8 In the words of Richard Wolin, one of the
most outspoken critics of Heidegger:
In its [Heidegger’s decisionism’s] rejection of “moral
convention”—which qua convention, proves inimical to
acts of heroic bravado—decisionism shows itself to be
distinctly nihilistic vis-à-vis the totality of inherited ethical
paradigms. For this reason, the implicit political theory of
Being and Time…remains devoid of fundamental “liberal

8

See for example the essays by Richard Wolin, Karl Löwith and Jürgen Habermas in Wolin’s The
Heidegger Controversy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993).
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convictions” that might have served as an ethicopolitical
bulwark against the enticement of fascism.9
Aside from the potential negative socio-political implications of this decisionist
understanding of action, this understanding of action also suffers from the same
philosophical defect as all other simplistic libertarian conceptions of free action. The
most general formulation of the libertarian position is that agents are able to determine
their own actions entirely through their own will, without the influence of any factors
external to the control of the agent. The problem is that there could conceivably be a
causal line traced from aspects of any decision we come to with regards to action to
factors that are outside the control of the agent. For instance, it could be argued that my
decision to go to the Thai restaurant for dinner instead of the Mexican restaurant can be
traced back to various factors that are outside my control, e.g. prior bad experiences with
Mexican food, a catchy advertisement for the Thai restaurant, etc. If the libertarian wants
to insist that the decision is made by me without the influence of any factors beyond my
control, then upon what grounds or reasons can I base my decision? When all such
factors are ruled out when making decisions, it seems that our decisions are left to
arbitrary whims and fleeting desires, resulting in no real sense of control or responsibility
on the part of the individual agent. If this is the case, it is hard to see how the authentic,
non-conformist agent can be anymore responsible for her actions than the inauthentic
agent who unreflectively enacted traditional social norms.

9

Richard Wolin, The Politics of Being (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 65.
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The textual problem for the decisionist interpretation is that this interpretation
generally relies heavily on several select passages from Division II of Being and Time.
When discussing authentic, resolute action, Heidegger does say: “On what is [Dasein] to
resolve? Only the resolution itself can give the answer” (BT 345/298). This statement
fits very well with the decisionist interpretation, but it also neglects other passages in
which Heidegger makes it clear that authentic action cannot be a complete rejection of
the norms that guide our everyday actions, but rather authentic action must be understood
as a modification of our everyday ways of acting (BT 312/267). Furthermore, if
Heidegger really did advocate a form of decisionism that endorses the wholesale rejection
of our everyday activities and the social norms that guide them, it seems unlikely that he
would dedicate so much of Being and Time and his early lectures to the careful analysis
of this everyday activity.
The general aim of this current project is to develop an interpretation of
Heidegger’s conception of action in his early thought that is both more faithful to
Heidegger’s own works and is a more plausible general theory of action than either the
Dreyfusian conception of skillful coping or the decisionist conception of authentic action.
Specifically, the approach that I am advocating here is the development of a
Heideggerian conception of agency that incorporates aspects of both the Dreyfusian and
decisionist readings of Heidegger while avoiding the pitfalls associated with both
interpretations. What would such a middle path between these two positions look like?
Heidegger provides in a clue in one of the rare passages in Being and Time in which he
uses the word action (Handeln) explicitly. Here Heidegger brings up the term ‘action’
10

merely to express his reservations about using the term, as he says that action “must be
taken so broadly that ‘activity’ will also embrace the passivity of resistance” (BT
347/300). For Heidegger, the term ‘action’ must be understood so broadly that it includes
passivity as well. When considered in light of the preceding discussion of the Dreyfusian
and decisionist interpretations of Heidegger’s conception of action, this means that a
properly Heideggerian conception of action will include both the way in which we are
unreflectively responsive to our practical and social environments (the key feature of
Dreyfus’s account of skillful coping) and the way in which we can still be seen to be
agents in the strong sense of term, i.e. how we can be understood to have responsibility
for or ownership of our actions (the main thrust of the decisionist interpretation of
authentic action).
My project is divided into five main chapters. The first chapter deals with
developing the general outline of this Heideggerian conception of action, now conceived
of as including aspects of both activity and passivity. In this chapter I will mainly draw
on Heidegger’s careful description and analysis of our everyday practical engagement
with the world in Division I of Being and Time. In addition to this, I will draw on
Heidegger’s interpretation and appropriation of certain aspects of Aristotle’s practical
philosophy in Heidegger’s early lecture courses of the 1920s in order to further explicate
and clarify the central features of the Heideggerian conception of action.
In Being and Time, Heidegger makes an important distinction between authentic
and inauthentic existence, or, for our purposes, between authentic and inauthentic agency.
Explaining this distinction is the focus of the second chapter. Briefly put, there are two
11

main distinctions to be drawn between authentic and inauthentic action. The first
distinction is that in authentic agency we come to take over or own our actions in a way
that we do not when acting inauthentically. In other words, when acting authentically we
become responsible for our actions in a way that we are not when acting inauthentically.
The second distinction between authentic and inauthentic agency is that in authentic
agency we disclose the structure of our being as agents in the proper way, while in
inauthentic agency, we do not. In other words, we achieve a sort of self-knowledge in
authentic action that is lacking when we act inauthentically. Understanding this
distinction between authentic and inauthentic action allows us to see that Heidegger
recognizes the potential problem for conceptions of action like that of Dreyfus, which
focus only on our unreflective coping with the situations in which we find ourselves on a
daily basis, and that Heidegger does propose a solution to this problem in his account of
authentic action.
In the third chapter, I will focus on Heidegger’s conception of inauthentic action.
Heidegger describes inauthentic action as a certain form of movement, which he calls
falling (Verfallen). We will begin our discussion of inauthentic action by considering the
structure of falling and showing how the structure of falling gives rise to the two
distinguishing characteristics of inauthentic action—the failure to be responsible for our
actions and the failure to properly understand the structure of our being. There are
several ways of acting identified as inauthentic in Division I of Being and Time. Using
my own nomenclature to describe these ways of acting, they are productive activity,
social interaction and “idle,” non-productive activities, e.g. watching television, “hanging
12

out” with friends, gossiping, etc. After the initial discussion of the structure of falling,
the rest of the chapter is dedicated to explaining why these activities exhibit the structure
of falling and how this makes them inauthentic.
The fourth and fifth chapters focus on developing a conception of authentic
agency that shows how we can become responsible for our actions, how we can act in
such a way that we reveal the structure of our being as agents and how these two
distinguishing features of authentic action are intimately connected. The fourth chapter
focuses on developing a conception of responsibility that is compatible with the
Heideggerian conception of action understood as involving both active and passive
aspects. To avoid falling into the empty, solipsistic decisionism of Wolin’s
interpretation, it must be shown how a plausible account of responsibility can be
developed that does not involve the complete overcoming of the passive aspect of action.
If being truly responsible for our actions required such an overcoming, then authentic
action would be the unconstrained decisionistic action of Wolin’s interpretation. In order
to develop this conception of responsibility that is compatible with the Heideggerian
conception of action developed in the earlier chapters, I analyze Heidegger’s
interpretation of Kant’s practical philosophy in Heidegger’s 1930 lecture course, The
Essence of Human Freedom, and then attempt to show how this later, Kantian
formulation of the conception of responsibility can be translated back into Heidegger’s
earlier conceptual framework in Being and Time.
The fifth and final main chapter builds on the work done in the fourth chapter by
showing how being responsible for our actions in the strongest sense of the term involves
13

acting with a certain sense of self-knowledge. Heidegger develops his account of how
we can achieve the appropriate form of self-knowledge through the experience of the
interconnected phenomena of death, anxiety, conscience and resoluteness, the analysis of
which makes up a large part of Division II of Being and Time.
The concluding chapter provides some preliminary consideration of the
contributions (if any) that the Heideggerian conception of action developed here can
make to the broader philosophical discussion of agency.
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CHAPTER 1. DEVELOPING A HEIDEGGERIAN CONCEPTION OF ACTION

The aim of this chapter is develop a general Heideggerian conception of action.
By this I mean that the aim is to lay out in very broad terms a characterization of the
structure of human agency that is grounded in Heidegger's early thought. Heidegger does
not explicitly give us a “theory of action,” even though much of his early thought is
concerned with the description and analysis of our concrete, practical existence as agents.
This makes it somewhat challenging to develop a Heideggerian conception of action or
even to figure out where to begin with this task. The general method employed here to
develop a Heideggerian conception of action will be to briefly trace the development of
Heidegger's analysis of the structure human action through his lecture courses of the early
to mid-1920s to the culmination of his existential analysis of human existence in Being
and Time. While the main focus of this chapter will be Being and Time, it has become
increasingly clear as more and more Heidegger’s early lectures are published that the
central ideas of Being and Time are developed gradually throughout Heidegger’s lecture
courses in the 1920s. In order to fully understand and to sometimes clarify Heidegger’s
characterization of human action in Being and Time, the conception of action found in
Being and Time must be understood as an outgrowth of these earlier lectures, particularly,
as I hope to show, as an outgrowth of Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle. In the final
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section of the chapter, we will consider some potential problems for the Heideggerian
conception of action and the potential responses to these problems.

Heidegger’s Interpretation of the Aristotelian Understanding of Human Life in Basic
Concepts of Ancient Philosophy
At the end of the 1926 lecture course Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy,
Heidegger briefly discusses Aristotle’s conception of life (zoē) in De Anima.10 This
lecture course provides a good starting place for understanding Heidegger's conception of
action in his early thought for two main reasons. The first one is the time period in which
these lectures were given. If Being and Time, which was published in 1927, is seen as the
culmination of Heidegger's early analysis of human agency, then it seems plausible to
think that many of the ideas and concepts being discussed by Heidegger in his lectures in
1926 are at least operative in the background of Being and Time. The second reason for
starting with this lecture course is the format of the text itself. The published version of
this lecture course is composed of Heidegger’s notes from which he gave the lectures and
students transcripts of the lectures themselves. This gives the text the feel of a very
succinct outline of Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle's understanding of life
(specifically human life) and action. In some ways this format is detrimental, but I
believe in this case it is actually helpful, as consideration of the few pages devoted to the

10

It should be noted that the published form of this lecture course consists of very rough notes made by
Heidegger himself and appendices of student transcriptions of the lectures. It is assumed that the student
transcriptions provide a reliable account of Heidegger’s interpretation of the matter under discussion.
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topic of life in this lecture allow us to very quickly and easily pick out the key aspects of
Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle on these issues. We will try to use these key
aspects of Heidegger’s interpretation as preliminary clues to develop a more detailed
conception of Heidegger’s understanding of human agency. In the following sections of
this chapter, we will then try to show how Heidegger develops and appropriates these
Aristotelian concepts, resulting finally in the existential analysis of human existence in
Being and Time.
In the Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy, Heidegger begins his discussion of
De Anima and Aristotle's understanding of life with the following general definition of a
living being: “We say something is living where we find that: it moves in an oriented
way, i.e., in a way oriented by perception; it moves itself and can stop itself; it was young
and ages; it takes in nourishment and grows; etc.” (BCA 228). Heidegger goes on to
further clarify what is meant by moving in an oriented way as he says that the motion of
living beings is “different than the change of place to which lifeless things are
subject…to move oneself toward something which matters to life in one way or another;
an oriented motion in the respective surrounding world” (BCA 228). Here the key
determination of life is oriented motion understood as motion toward something that
matters. This self-orienting ability possessed by living beings is referred to as krīnein in
the Greek or as the activity of distinguishing by Heidegger (BCA 228). The two main
modes of distinguishing are aīsthesis (perception) and noūs (understanding). While all
animals have the ability to perceive in some capacity, humans have perception and
understanding.
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Heidegger proceeds to discuss Aristotle’s consideration of the basis of motion
(archē kinēseos). For Aristotle, it is the object of desire (orektōn) that brings about the
motion of a living being.11 Aristotle’s conception of the movement of living beings can
be clarified by way of an example. Suppose a lion sees a gazelle and then proceeds to
chase it. According to Aristotle’s account, this is what happens. The gazelle is the object
of desire. Upon seeing the gazelle, the lion’s desire to eat the gazelle is stirred into
motion. The desire in turn causes the lion to start moving in pursuit of the gazelle. The
gazelle causes movement, but is itself unmoved.
What Heidegger chooses to highlight in this seemingly straightforward
understanding of the movement of living beings is the role of desire (ōrexis). For
Heidegger, one of the important and interesting things about Aristotle’s account is that
the “point of departure for the motion is not the pure and simple observation of a
desirable object” and that “[i]t is not the case that the living being first observes things
disinterestedly, merely looks about in a neutral attitude, and then moves toward
something; on the contrary, ōrexis is fundamental” (BCAP 228). What this shows is that
living beings have a fundamental openness to being affected by the world, which allows
things immediately to appear to them as desirable or undesirable. There is found in
ōrexis not only the urge towards the object of desire, but also the capacity to experience
things in the world as desirable or as mattering in some way. Heidegger expresses this
dual aspect of ōrexis when he describes it as “feeling oneself attuned in such and such a
way, feeling well and ill, and thus also being on the lookout for” (BCAP 156).
11

Cf. Aristotle’s De Anima (433a27 and 433b10) and De Motu Animalium (701b33).
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Now one may ask why Heidegger emphasizes the importance of distinguishing
(krīnein) for life, and hence, the motion of living beings. It is apparent that when a living
being moves towards an object of desire that the living being has distinguished that
particular object as something desirable. The capacity of ōrexis to reveal objects as
desirable is the capacity to distinguish objects from one another, at least insofar as their
desirability is concerned. Remember that for Aristotle the object of desire is the basis of
motion. However, living beings can only be moved by the desirable object if they take it
as something desirable. Returning to the example of the lion and the gazelle, the gazelle
does cause desire to move the lion, but the gazelle can only do this in the first place
because the lion sees the gazelle as something to be eaten.12
For animals, this distinguishing takes place through perception (aīsthesis).
Perception here is not to be thought of as a straightforward sensing of things in the world
in terms of their objective qualities, but rather “it exists in a context of pursuit and flight”
(BCAP 228). In other words, perception is always already oriented towards seeing things
as desirable (worthy of pursuit) or detrimental (worthy of being avoided).
For humans, motion has the same structure, but humans possess the ability to
make distinctions in more sophisticated ways than animals. In the case of human beings,
“krīnein is not limited to aīsthesis but is also found in noūs” (BCAP 229). Heidegger
here references the five intellectual virtues discussed by Aristotle in Book VI of the
icomachean Ethics (tēchne, epistēme, phrōnesis, noūs and sophīa) as being the five
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Martha Nussbaum argues for this view of Aristotle’s account of the movement of animals in her essay,
“The Role of Phantasia in Aristotle’s Explanation of Action” in her book Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), 221-269.
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modes of distinguishing specifically available to human beings. It might seem strange
that Heidegger here characterizes the intellectual virtues as modes of distinguishing.
Heidegger explains this interpretation of the virtues to some extent in his earlier 1924
lecture course titled Plato’s Sophist. Despite the title of this lecture course, Heidegger
begins it with an in-depth interpretation of Book VI of the icomachean Ethics, in which
Aristotle discusses the intellectual virtues. Heidegger’s interpretation of the intellectual
virtues in this lecture begins with and is guided by Aristotle’s characterization of the
intellectual virtues as “five states in which the soul grasps the truth in its affirmations and
denials” (NE 1139b15). In Heidegger’s words, the intellectual virtues are “five ways
human Dasein discloses beings in affirmation and denial” (PS 15). What Heidegger
means by this is that in Aristotle’s description of the intellectual virtues, Aristotle is
describing the various ways that we as human beings can understand things in the world
and ourselves. For example, the Aristotelian virtue of epistēme characterizes our ability
to understand things in the world as objects of theoretical, scientific inquiry.
Now we can return to the consideration of the connection between these
intellectual virtues and the movement of human beings. According to Heidegger, some
of the modes of distinguishing (i.e. intellectual virtues) correspond with certain types of
movement. For example, the movement of poīesis corresponds with the virtue of tēchne.
The virtue of tēchne characterizes the way in which we understand things in the world in
terms of their usefulness for our projects. Poīesis is the activity (or movement in a broad
sense) of making or producing something. We will discuss this productive activity in
more detail later in this chapter. Heidegger maintains that the movement of prāxis, or
20

properly human action, corresponds to the virtue of phrōnesis (BCAP 230).

With

respect to other intellectual virtues, Heidegger claims that no corresponding movement is
associated with them. According to Heidegger, there is no movement corresponding to
epistēme, “since epistēme is theory and simply beholds” (BCAP 229). The movement
associated with the virtue of noūs is “not attained by humans; it determines the first
mover” (BCAP 229). While Heidegger does not say so, there is presumably no
movement corresponding to sophīa, since the virtue of sophīa is a combination of
epistēme and noūs (NE 1141a16).
What are the more general aspects of human action that can be drawn out of
Heidegger’s brief interpretation of Aristotle’s conception of life? First of all, human life
is to be understood as movement directed towards things which matter in some way or
another. That which matters (the object of desire for Aristotle) is to be understood as the
initial basis for acting. We always already encounter things in the world as mattering to
us in some way before any decision on our part. In this way things in the world can be
said to affect us or exert a pull on us. However, things encountered in the world are only
able to do this on the basis of some articulation of the world that allows certain things to
appear as desirable. Human action has the two basic aspects of being affected by things
in the world (i.e. a passive aspect) and articulating the world in such a way that things are
able to affect us in this way (i.e. an active aspect).
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Tracing Heidegger’s Development of His Conception of Action in His Thought Leading
up to Being and Time
Before turning to the consideration of how this basic Heideggerian understanding
of human action as being constituted by active and passive aspects reaches its fullest
expression in Being and Time, let us first attempt to briefly outline the course of
Heidegger's development of this conception of action through some of his writings and
lectures from the early 1920s. By charting the gradual evolution of this way of
understanding action in Heidegger's thinking, we can better see the way in which
Heidegger appropriates the more biologically-oriented Aristotelian discourse and
translates it into his own more existential way of expressing things. This will allow us to
understand more clearly how the often opaque concepts and terminology employed in
Being and Time stem from a more concrete understanding of human life and action and,
importantly, how these concepts and terms can once again be employed in a concrete
analysis of the structure of human agency.
We can begin with the lecture course given by Heidegger in the winter of 19211922, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle. Despite the title of the course, there
are very few explicit discussions of Aristotle within the text itself. Nevertheless, it seems
clear that in this lecture course, Heidegger is beginning to try to formulate his
interpretation of Aristotle in his own terminology. The focus of Part III of the lecture
course is “factical life,” i.e. life considered not as an abstract concept but rather in its
phenomenological concreteness (PIA 61). There is an obvious parallel with Aristotle’s
De Anima even though Heidegger does not explicitly make the connection. Like
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Aristotle, in this lecture course, Heidegger describes life in terms of movement (PIA 70,
85, 87). Instead of talking about the role played by desire in the movement of human
beings, Heidegger uses the term care [Sorge], a term that will go on to play a prominent
role in Being and Time. “Living,” says Heidegger, “in its verbal meaning, is to be
interpreted according to its relational sense as caring: to care for and about something; to
live from [on the basis of] something, caring for it” (PIA 68). As human beings we care
about all sorts of different things: having food, finding employment, spending time with
our friends and families, etc. Where Aristotle characterizes life as movement towards the
object of the desire (or flight from that which is threatening), Heidegger characterizes life
as movement guided by the things and people about which we care. It is from care that
life gets its sense of directionality as Heidegger says that “caring always exists in a
determinate or indeterminate, secure or wavering, direction” (PIA 70).
Heidegger also provides some very vivid descriptions of the passive aspect of life,
i.e. the way in which things in the world can affect us and draw us towards them. In this
lecture course, Heidegger calls this aspect of life inclination (eigung), which “imparts to
life a peculiar weight, a direction of gravity, a pull toward something” (PIA 75). He
describes life as a “being-transported by the world” and says that this being transported is
“pull-like” (PIA 78). In other words, part of what it means to be a human being is to be
pulled towards those things that we care about and to have a tendency to immerse
ourselves in the activities of the world.
In Heidegger’s lecture course from the summer of 1925, History of the Concept of
Time, we can find the next stage of his translation of Aristotle’s concepts and
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terminology into his own. Here Heidegger again understands human being as care.
When analyzing the way in which we are drawn towards the things that we care about, he
changes his terminology slightly. Where in the earlier Phenomenological Interpretations
of Aristotle Heidegger calls this aspect of care inclination, in the History of the Concept
of Time, he uses the term disposition (Befindlichkeit), a term which he will still use in
Being and Time. This terminological transition is interesting and important because in
the History of the Concept of Time lecture course, Heidegger is still using language closer
to that of Aristotle to describe human being in conjunction with some of his own
terminology, the terminology that will become dominant by the time he writes Being and
Time. In this lecture course, Heidegger characterizes our caring about things as
“constantly being solicited by the world itself in this or that way” (HCT 254). In a way
that parallels Aristotle’s characterization of the movement of animals being structured
according to the possibilities of either pursuing something desirable or fleeing something
threatening, Heidegger says that “being-in-the-world is so to speak constantly being
summoned by the threatening and non-threatening character of the world” (HCT 254).
Heidegger then summarizes what he means by saying that disposition is a fundamental
aspect of our being as humans by stating that “in all of what we do and where we dwell,
we are in some sense—as we say—‘affected’” (HCT 256).
We also find another significant progression in the History of the Concept of Time
course. In his earlier explication of life in terms of caring about things and being drawn
towards things in the world, Heidegger does not discuss the sort of active articulation that
we found in his interpretation of Aristotle from the Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy
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course. In the History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger makes it clear that care cannot
be understood only in terms of disposition. Our being is also fundamentally
characterized by what Heidegger calls understanding (Verstehen). While Heidegger’s
description of understanding here is somewhat meager (a deficiency which he remedies
in Being and Time as we will see in the next section), Heidegger makes several important
points that allow us to see what he means by understanding and how this is connected to
his interpretation of Aristotle. As we saw in the previous section, Heidegger connects our
ability to interpret something as desirable or to articulate the situation of action with
Aristotle’s concept of noūs (noūs considered in the broad sense of intellectual capacities,
not in the narrow sense of noūs as a specific intellectual virtue). In the History of the
Concept of Time, Heidegger explicitly connects understanding with interpretation, saying
that the “cultivation of understanding is accomplished in expository interpretation” (HCT
260). Furthermore, the “primary form of all interpretation as the cultivation of
understanding is the consideration of something in term of its ‘as what,’ considering
something as something” (HCT 261). According to Heidegger, in interpretation we make
explicit our understanding of something as something, e.g. as something desirable.

The Culmination of Heidegger’s Early Understanding of Agency in Being and Time
At this point we have shown how Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's
conception of life and movement in his Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy lectures
can serve as the basis for developing a Heideggerian conception of action. We have also
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seen how this conception of agency as involving active and passive aspects is developed
and refined through his earlier lectures. Now we turn our attention to Being and Time, in
which we find Heidegger's most detailed analysis of the structure of human action. The
aim of this section is to show how Heidegger takes this conception of action as being
constituted by an active component (a capacity for articulating or distinguishing) and a
passive aspect (an openness to being affected by things we encounter in the world) and
develops it further in and through his existential analysis of the structure of human being.

Description of Our Everyday Activity Found in Heidegger’s Account of Worldhood
In Chapter III of Being and Time, Heidegger lays out his understanding of the
world and the importance of this concept for his larger ontological project. Heidegger
maintains that in order to understand what it means for entities in the world to be, we
should start by considering the way in which we encounter these entities and understand
their being in our everyday existence. To understand the being of entities encountered in
the world, “we will take as our clue our everyday being-in-the-world, which we also call
our ‘dealings’ [Umgang] in the world and with entities within-the-world” (BT 95/66).
Heidegger claims that our everyday interaction with things in the world is a “kind of
concern which manipulates things and puts them to use” (BT 95/67).
Entities in the world, at least insofar as they are encountered in our use and
manipulation of them, are understood as equipment (das Zeug) (BT 97/68). For
Heidegger, we can never encounter one isolated piece of equipment. The term equipment
always refers to a totality of equipment. This is because any individual thing encountered
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in terms of its usefulness is understood as something to be used in order to do something
else. In this way any individual piece of equipment refers beyond itself to something that
it is used to accomplish. This end product or goal in turn refers to a further goal beyond
it so that a total system of references is always implied by any single piece of equipment.
For example, a nail is understood as something to be used in order to hold together pieces
of wood. The pieces of wood are understood as things to be used in order to make a
house secure against the elements. A hammer is understood as something to be used in
order to pound the nails into the wood, etc.
In a parallel way, any of our individual activities involving equipment always take
place within the totality of the referential framework of these ‘in-order-to’ relations. For
example, someone cuts wood in order to have boards for siding. Someone pounds nail
into the wood boards in order to make the house secure against the elements, etc. Our
actions are generally directed towards some goal or end product. Heidegger calls these
goals and products the “towards-which” (das Wozu) of our activities.
Heidegger maintains that this web of ‘in-order-to’ and ‘towards-which’ relations
ultimately receives its structure from a ‘towards-which’ that does not refer to any further
goal. This ‘towards-which’ is called the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ (das Worumwillen),
since it is that for the sake of which we ultimately do the things we do (BT 116/84). Any
for-the-sake-of-which, according to Heidegger, “always pertains to the Being of Dasein”
(BT 116-117/84). The example that he gives here is that of securing a house against bad
weather. When we cut boards and use hammers and nails to fix the boards to the side of
a house, we are doing so for the sake of providing ourselves with shelter. There is no
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further aim towards which our activities are directed. In his commentary on Being and
Time, Dreyfus interprets for-the-sake-of-whichs as also including various social roles.13
This is a helpful extension of Heidegger’s thought here (especially since Heidegger
himself provides only one example). Dreyfus maintains that we also understand
ourselves in terms of the roles we play and positions we fill in our social context. For
instance, one could understand oneself as a teacher, daughter or politician. These are all
possible ways of being and possible ways of taking up the situations in which we find
ourselves.
That for the sake of which we are acting in any given case dictates the
intermediate goals towards which we direct our actions. We assign ourselves an “inorder-to”, i.e. we act in order to accomplish something, on the basis of a particular
understanding of ourselves that serves as that for the sake of which we are acting (BT
119/86). When we act in order to accomplish that for the sake of which we are acting, we
“prescribe” to ourselves intermediate goals towards which our actions must be directed if
we are to accomplish our ultimate objective (BT 119/86). For example, I understand
myself, at least in part, as a philosopher. This self-understanding serves as something for
the sake of which I act that does not refer beyond itself to any further goals. I act in
certain ways in order to accomplish or continually enact this self-understanding of being
a philosopher. In light of acting in order to be a philosopher, certain intermediate goals
(e.g. obtaining a PhD, writing a dissertation, publishing articles in journals, etc.) are
prescribed to me.
13

Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 94-96.
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Here we find the need to develop accounts of the two aspects of action discussed
above—the active articulation that allows certain goals and actions to stand out as
important or desirable to us and the passive capability of being affected by (i.e. drawn or
pulled towards) certain actions and projects. Our self-understanding for the sake of
which we act articulates the context of relations that is the world. Heidegger calls this
aspect of our being as agents understanding (Verstehen). Based on this articulation, we
then come to encounter certain things within the world as significant or important to us in
some way. Heidegger calls this way in which we are affected by the things encountered
in the world disposition (Befindlichkeit). He goes on to develop a more detailed account
of the structure of human agency through the further development of these two key
aspects of our being.

Disposition (Befindlichkeit)
In Being and Time (as in the History of the Concept of Time), Heidegger calls the
passive aspect of our being Befindlichkeit, which is translated as “state-of-mind” in the
Macquarrie and Robinson translation of Being and Time. Befindlichkeit is in fact not a
term used in everyday German. Literally, Befindlichkeit would mean something like
‘how one finds oneself in the world’. I will translate Befindlichkeit as disposition in
order to avoid the overly mental connotation of the ‘state-of-mind’ translation.14
Translating this term as disposition is meant to capture the sense in which we always find
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By translating Befindlichkeit in this way, I am following Theodore Kisiel’s practice in his translation of
the term in Heidegger’s History of the Concept of Time (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992).
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ourselves disposed towards the world in a certain way that goes beyond mental states and
is more of an all-encompassing state of being. While this translation itself is not
completely satisfactory, I think it more closely captures what Heidegger means by the
term than ‘state-of-mind’.
Heidegger makes his approach to analyzing disposition clear at the beginning of
page 29 of Being and Time when he states:
What we indicate ontologically by the term “disposition” is
ontically the most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our
mood [Stimmung], our Being-attuned [Gestimmtsein].
Prior to all psychology of moods…it is necessary to see this
phenomenon as a fundamental existentiale, and to outline
its structure (BT 172-173/134, translation modified).
In his analysis of Befindlichkeit, Heidegger starts from the ordinary of understanding of
what it is to be in a mood, or to put it in more colorful language, to be attuned to the
world. Mood here is not to be taken merely as a mental state of a subject. For Heidegger
moods are much broader than this. Taking this notion of being-attuned quite literally, we
can think of moods as the background tones operative in our existence that always
provide the backdrop for our understanding of the world. Heidegger wants to push
beyond our ordinary understanding of moods to the consideration of the underlying
structures of our existence that are indicated by the fact that we have moods.
Heidegger picks out three “essential characteristics” of having moods that point to
important underlying ontological aspects of our existence. The first essential
characteristic is thrownness (Geworfenheit) (BT 175/136). He clarifies what he means by
thrownness by stating that the “expression ‘thrownness’ is meant to suggest the facticity
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of [Dasein’s] being delivered over” (BT 174/135). Heidegger is trying to capture the
sense in which we have been thrown into a world and a life that we have not chosen and
to a large extent cannot really control. In this way, we can be said to be delivered over to
the world in which we find ourselves. Moods reveal this aspect of thrownness because
“[i]n having a mood, Dasein is always disclosed moodwise as that entity to which it has
been delivered over in its Being; and in this way it has been delivered over to the Being
which, in existing, it has to be” (BT 173/134). Heidegger's meaning seems to be that
when we find ourselves in a particular mood, this is an experience of the fact that we do
not and cannot completely control the situation in which we find ourselves or even our
reactions to this situation. We find corroboration when we consider moods as passions,
something which comes over us and something which to some extent we cannot control,
or as emotions, which move us in certain ways. What this shows, according to
Heidegger, is that we cannot understand ourselves as perfectly encapsulated, willful
subjects that are at least initially closed off from being affected by things in the world.
Heidegger is trying to emphasize that it is a fundamental aspect of our being that we are
open to being affected by things we encounter in the world. In other words, moods reveal
the fundamentally passive aspect of our existence.
It is not just the fact that we are open to being affected by the world around us that
Heidegger is pointing out here. When he says that Dasein “has been delivered over to the
Being which, in existing, it has to be,” he is also claiming that we always find ourselves
thrown into a certain way of being that we have to deal with in some way. To take a
more biological example, we all find ourselves as creatures that require food. We have
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been delivered over to this way of being, and our lives are to some extent conditioned and
controlled by this fact, even if we choose to reject this aspect of our being as animals by
refusing to eat. Similarly, we always find ourselves to have been thrown into certain
ways of understanding ourselves. For example, by being born when and where I was, I
have been thrown into the understanding of myself as an American living in the late
Twentieth- and early Twenty-First-Centuries. I can, of course, reject this way of
understanding myself, but this does not negate the fact that I must start from something
like this self-understanding.
The second essential characteristic of disposition is that having a mood always
discloses the world as a whole and “makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards
something” (BT 176/137). Remember that in his discussion of his conception of the
world Heidegger maintains that we do not create the relations of significance that guide
our activities and allow us to encounter things in their readiness-to-hand. Rather, we
disclose a relational context in which we find ourselves. Disclosing this relational
context is what first allows us to orient ourselves in whatever situation we find ourselves
and to direct ourselves towards something.
The third essential characteristic of disposition is that it allows things encountered
in the world to matter to us. In the course of going about our everyday activities, we are
affected by things we encounter because they can be “unserviceable, resistant, or
threatening” (BT 176/137). In other words, in trying to accomplish certain things, we can
run into obstacles. These obstacles affect us by giving rise to moods of frustration, anger,
fear, etc. For Heidegger, this signifies a deeper ontological component of our being,
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namely, being in such a way that entities encountered in the world can matter to us in one
way or another. For example, when considered in the context of building a house, a
broken hammer can affect the builder by giving rise to frustration or anger. That is to
say, the hammer matters to us in some way.
If we again shift these considerations to the level of the goals towards which our
actions are directed, we can discern a parallel structure. Depending on that for the sake
of which we act, certain intermediate goals and actions will affect us because they matter
to us. Returning to the example of being a philosopher, we can say that the activity of
submitting articles to journals matters to me because of my understanding of myself as a
philosopher. To say that this activity matters to me is to say that the activity and the goal
towards which it is directed are able to affect me. I am drawn towards this activity with
the aim of accomplishing the goal of publishing something. It is this basic openness to
being affected by or drawn towards certain goals and activities that Heidegger here
locates in his conception of disposition.
Putting these three essential characteristics together, Heidegger, by way of
summation, characterizes disposition as follows: “Existentially, disposition
[Befindlichkeit] implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can
encounter something that matters to us” (BT 177/137, translation modified). Disposition
is disclosive. This means that it reveals to us the world in which we find ourselves. This
disclosure of the world is also a submission to the world. We find ourselves in an
already-existent world whose dictates and demands we must accommodate. It is the
disclosure of this already-existent world that allows us to encounter something that
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matters to us. We find ourselves in a world that is already polarized in such a way that in
every situation we encounter things, actions or ways of existing that appear important and
worthwhile. Because we encounter these as already mattering to us and in terms of the
relational context of the world, we are able to direct ourselves towards those goals and
activities that matter to us.

Understanding (Verstehen)
Let us now turn to the active aspect of agency in Being and Time, which is
captured in Heidegger’s conception of understanding (Verstehen). He does not use the
term ‘understanding’ in the traditional sense, in which it has a cognitive connotation. In
fact, in his lecture course, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (which he gave in
1927, the same year as the publication of Being and Time), Heidegger claims that
understanding is the “authentic meaning of action” (BPP 277). In this section, we will
show how we can make sense of this claim.
As in his discussion of the existential significance of moods, Heidegger starts
from a very broad sense of understanding and then seeks to pick out the existential
structures that underlie this sense of the term. Heidegger says:
When we are talking ontically we sometimes use the
expression
‘understanding
something’
with
the
signification of ‘being able to manage something’, ‘being a
match for it’, ‘being competent to do something’ [etwas
können] (BT 183/143).
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It is this last sense of the term that Heidegger emphasizes. A key component of
our being as humans is that we are able to enact possible ways of being. Heidegger
makes this clearer by stating:
In understanding, as an existentiale, that which we have
competence over is not a “what”, but Being as existing.
The kind of Being which Dasein has, as being able to
[Seinkönnen], lies existentially in understanding. Dasein is
not something present-at-hand which possesses its
competence for something by way of an extra; it is
primarily Being-possible (BT 183/143).
The key term here is Seinkönnen, which literally means ‘being able to.’ What
Heidegger is claiming here is that being human is to be able. Taken at the level of a
formal structure of human being (i.e. as an existentiale) that ‘being able to’ does not refer
to a particular range of tasks, but rather refers to an essential general feature of being
human. This is what prompts Heidegger to claim that Dasein is primarily being-possible.
We can understand better what Heidegger means here by connecting his discussion of
understanding with the previous discussion of the for-the-sake-of-which. At the
beginning of his discussion of understanding, Heidegger reminds us that, “in the ‘for-thesake-of-which’, existing Being-in-the-world is disclosed as such, and this disclosedness
we have called ‘understanding’” (BT 182/143). He goes on to say that,
The Being-possible which is essential for Dasein, pertains
to the ways of its solicitude for Others and of its concern
with the ‘world’, as we have characterized them; and in all
these, and always, it pertains to Dasein’s ability for being
towards itself, for the sake of itself (BT 183/143).
When Heidegger says that we are being possible, he means that we are able to carry out
and enact the various self-understandings that serve as that for the sake of which we act.
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For example, we are able to enact various possible ways of being like being a
philosopher, being a mother, being a creature that needs shelter, etc. In other words, we
able to act for the sake of something, and it is this ability to enact these possible ways of
being that discloses the world in its structure of towards-which/in-order-to relations.
Heidegger deepens his conception of understanding by analyzing its structure in
terms of what he calls projection (Entwurf) (BT 185/145). We can get some clue about
what he means by this by looking at the word ‘Entwurf’. The noun ‘Entwurf’ is
connected to the verb ‘entwerfen’, which means literally to throw (werfen) away or off (a
directionality signified by the prefix ent-). Heidegger goes on to say that we project
ourselves upon a for-the-sake-of-which (BT 185/145). By this I take him to mean that
our being is such that we can be said to throw ourselves out towards certain ends. We are
able to be in different possible ways by directing ourselves out towards the enactment of
these possibilities. If we again return to the example of being a philosopher, we can say
that by understanding myself as a philosopher, I am projecting myself towards the
enactment of this particular way of being. This does not imply that being a philosopher is
a goal that is currently not actualized and thus must be striven after. I could very well
already be a philosopher, but in order to maintain this way of being, I must be continually
projecting myself towards this self-understanding and performing the intermediate tasks
and actions that constitute being a philosopher. Heidegger makes it clear as well that this
projection need not take place, and in fact does not originally take place, at a cognitive or
thematic level. Rather, this projection involves the whole of my being. Understanding
myself as a philosopher involves more than a mental decision to do so. It involves letting
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all aspects of my being (thoughts, emotions, social relations, etc.) be directed by this selfunderstanding.
It should be emphasized again that because understanding is the way in which we
direct ourselves towards some for-the-sake-of-which, it is understanding ourselves in
terms of these various possible ways of being that is going to disclose the relations of
significance that constitute the world. Heidegger will explicitly maintain, as mentioned
in our discussion of the History of the Concept of Time, that it is understanding that first
articulates the world and allows us to distinguish something as something useful,
threatening, detrimental, etc. (BT 190/149). Here we see Heidegger taking his
interpretation of Aristotle’s conception of noūs as the ability to distinguish things
encountered in the world as such and such (krīnein for Aristotle) and re-conceiving it at
the existential level of this projective self-understanding. We also find here the
existential appropriation of Aristotle’s basic understanding of life as self-directed. When
Heidegger characterizes understanding as projection, he is once again alluding to his
conception of human existence as being fundamentally directed out towards something,
in this case a possible way of being. When we project ourselves onto a for-the-sake-ofwhich, we are taking up a particular directionality. Our existence becomes oriented
towards the enactment of the possibility of being we take up.
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The Interdependence of Disposition and Understanding and the Resulting Conception of
Action
At this point we can begin to see how Heidegger conceives of the unity of
disposition and understanding. In order for things to matter to us, i.e. to be significant,
we must already have taken up a certain understanding of our being. But Heidegger also
maintains that in order for us to be able to direct ourselves towards something there must
first be something that matters to us. There is an interdependent, reciprocal relation
between understanding and disposition operative in human agency.
There seems to be a tension here. On the one hand, Heidegger seems to be saying
that we find ourselves thrown into a world in which things already matter to us and that
this is disclosed to us through our moods. This makes our actions appear to be dictated
by the situation in which we find ourselves. In other words, it makes human action seem
responsive and passive. On the other hand, Heidegger seems to be saying that we can in
fact control the relations of significance that dictate what matters to us and how we act
through our projection towards a possible way of being. In this sense, it seems Heidegger
is maintaining that we can willfully determine our actions through the choice of our selfunderstandings.
The way to resolve this tension is to remember the earlier discussion of
Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle and to mention another aspect of Heidegger
discussion of worldhood that we have neglected up to now. Remember that for Aristotle
it is the object of desire that initiates movement. There has to be some object or goal that
is seen as desirable for movement, or more specifically action, to occur. In a similar way,
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we can say that for Heidegger there must be something that matters to us in order for us
to act. Before any cognitive, abstract reflection, we already feel pulled towards certain
goals or activities because we feel that they matter to us in some way. Remember also
that for Aristotle, at least on Heidegger’s interpretation, an object of desire can only be
desirable, and thus initiate movement, if the object is seen as something desirable. Some
distinguishing or articulation must be performed in order for an object to be seen as
desirable. Similarly for Heidegger, for something to matter to us, there must be a
projection upon some for-the-sake-of-which that articulates the situation in which we find
ourselves and first allows an activity to matter to us insofar as it is something that we
should do in order to enact the possible way of being that we have taken up.
Crucially for Heidegger this does not mean that we can willfully and arbitrarily
fabricate these relations of significance, and thereby choose what should matter to us
without constraint. Rather, the articulation that occurs through our projective selfunderstandings lets things matter to us in a way that we cannot willfully and arbitrarily
change. Heidegger says something similar in regard to entities encountered in the world
as useful (ready-to-hand). In our everyday interaction with things in the world, we let
something that is ready-to-hand “be so-and-so as it is already and in order that it be such”
(BT 117/84). This means that “letting something ‘be’ does not mean that we must first
bring it into its Being and produce it; it means rather that something which is already an
‘entity’ must be discovered in its readiness-to-hand, and that we must thus let the entity
which has this Being be encountered” (BT 117/85). By using wood to build a house or
put siding on a house, we do not make the wood useful for building a house through our
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activity. Rather, it is through our activity that we let the being of the wood as something
useful for building appear or manifest itself.
We can find some useful clarification of what Heidegger means when he says that
we let entities be in John Haugeland’s essay “Letting Be.”15 As Haugeland points out,
the verb ‘let’ (or lassen in German) can be understood in several different ways.
Haugeland identifies four different ways of understanding what it means to let something
be.16 We can understand letting be as acquiescing or giving up. For example, when we
give up in a struggle with someone, we might say that we are letting her win the fight.
We can also understand letting as granting permission, e.g. “I let my friend borrow my
car.” A third way of understanding letting is effecting or causing something. To
illustrate this sense of letting Haugeland gives the example of “ball players,” e.g. players
organizing a game of backyard football, saying something like “Let this sidewalk be the
goal line.” Here the players could be thought of as causing the sidewalk to be the goal
line. Finally, letting can be understood as enabling in the sense of making possible. We
often hear it said of various high-level athletes that their natural athletic ability lets them
make incredible plays, i.e. their athletic ability makes it possible for them to make
incredible plays. Haugeland argues (persuasively in my opinion) that it is the final sense
of letting as enabling that best captures how Heidegger typically uses the term.
We can make use of this clarification of what it means to let something be to
clarify the Heideggerian account of the structure of action put forward here, particularly
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40

the way in which understanding and disposition are in fact interdependent. By projecting
ourselves towards various possible ways of being, we let certain activities matter to us.
In so doing, we make it possible for certain things to matter to us on the basis of already
established relations that we cannot arbitrarily change. When trying to use wood to build
a house, our using it for this purpose cannot change the fact of its suitability or
unsuitability for this project. In the same way, in my understanding of myself as
philosopher, I cannot arbitrarily decide which activities are important in order to enact
this possible way of being. Enacting the possibility of being a philosopher just entails
certain activities like finishing my dissertation or teaching Introduction to Philosophy
courses. I do not decide which activities are going to be important or are going to matter
to me, but my understanding of myself as a philosopher lets these things to matter to me
in a way that they would not for someone who did not understand herself in this way.
We can now give a preliminary general description of this Heideggerian
conception of the structure of human action. We are initially drawn towards some
activity or goal that matters to us in some way. This can be seen as the passive or
responsive side of agency. However, activities and goals can only matter to us if we let
them matter to us through the articulation of the situation in which we find ourselves that
comes from our projection towards a particular possible way of being. This can be seen
as the active aspect agency, albeit in a strange way. According to this Heideggerian
conception, the active aspect of agency is a letting or allowing.
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Potential Problem Cases for this Conception of Action
We can sharpen this conception of action and add more substance to it by
considering some examples that seem to be potentially problematic for this view. This is
not meant to be an exhaustive list of potential counter-examples, nor are the responses to
these counter-examples exhaustive. In this section I am aiming for the more modest
objective of refining and clarifying the Heideggerian conception of action put forth in this
chapter through some brief consideration of potential problem cases.

on-Productive Activity
It could be objected that the preceding conception of action is based solely on an
analysis of our concrete, productive activity that aims at the accomplishment of specific
goals, e.g. building a house. Can a conception of action based on our productive activity
also help us understand other forms of human activity that do not aim at the production of
something? There are two common types of action that could be seen as clear cases of
non-productive activity, and thus as counter-examples to the conception of action
developed here. To begin with, we normally do not consider all of our interaction with
other people to be productive activity in the same way that building a house or writing an
article is. Of course, we can and do interact with people in the course of our actions that
are aimed at producing something, but we tend to think that performing an action like
comforting a distraught friend is different from building a house. Secondly, we can think
of various activities that we engage in everyday that do not seem to be goal-directed at
all. For example, we often spend time surfing the internet or watching television, and
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when doing so, we often have no specific aim. Heidegger discusses both of these types
of actions and analyzes both of them in terms of the preceding conception of the structure
of action. In this section, we will consider what he says about our interaction with other
people. The discussion of the second type of non-productive action, actions that
seemingly have no specific aim, will be put off until the third chapter.
Heidegger maintains that we encounter other people in the course of our everyday
productive activities and that the way in which we understand other people differs from
the way in which we understand things encountered in the world. Returning to
Heidegger’s earlier interpretation of Aristotle’s intellectual virtues, we could say that
there are different modes of understanding, i.e. different ways of articulating things we
encounter in the world, that guide our actions. Productive activity, as we saw when
considering the Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy, is guided by the intellectual virtue
tēchne. Heidegger calls the mode of understanding that guides our productive activity
circumspection (Umsicht) (BT 186/146). He distinguishes this from the mode of
understanding that guides our interactions with other people—considerateness
(Rücksicht). Although considerateness does not appear to be a direct appropriation of one
of the Aristotelian intellectual virtues, Heidegger still seems to be following the general
contours of his reading of Aristotle.
Heidegger calls our interaction with other people solicitude (Fürsorge) (BT
157/121). He makes it explicit that solicitude, like our productive activity, must still be
understood in terms of care (BT 157/121). This means that our interactions with other
people can ultimately be understood in terms of the same structure of disposition and
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understanding that can be found in our productive activities. Heidegger provides the
following examples of solicitude: “Being for, against, or without one another, passing
one another by, not 'mattering' to one another” (BT 158/121). People and our interactions
with them matter to us, but not merely in terms of their usefulness in our productive
activity. Similarly, it is possible for us to understand ourselves as beings that are engaged
in actions other than purely productive actions. For example, we understand ourselves as
members of families or groups of friends. These self-understandings allow people and
activities to matter to us in a way that is different than what occurs in productive activity.
When I meet a friend for coffee to discuss her problems, we could say that it is the
understanding of myself as a good friend that allows that action to matter to me.

Actions that Involve Explicit Deliberation
This conception of action as described up to this point seems to be able to account
for things that we do with little or no deliberation. To repeat a prior example, I submit
articles to journals for publication because I allow this activity to matter to me based on
the way my understanding of myself as a philosopher articulates the situation of action.
There is no mention here of deliberation that takes places prior to the activity of
submitting articles. The potential problem is that many times when we do something, we
go through a fairly explicit deliberative process before we act. With regard to this
example, we could very easily alter it so that deliberation plays a greater role. For
instance, before submitting an article to a specific journal, I could deliberate about
whether in fact this journal is the best one for my article or whether it is best for me to
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submit an article at all or if I might be best served by concentrating all of my time and
energy on my dissertation. What is potentially problematic about these examples for the
Heideggerian conception of action outlined above is that when explicit deliberation is
involved in action, it seems like the action ultimately comes about as a result of the
deliberative process and that this way of conceiving agency as allowing things to matter
to us is a tangential, background issue at best. In other words, the claim could be made
that the best way to understand action would be to focus on the deliberative process, its
outcome and the way in which actions follow on from this. We find that this
Heideggerian conception of action as it has been construed up to this point still faces one
of the main problems for the Dreyfusian understanding of action discussed in the
Introduction. The challenge for this Heideggerian conception of action would not
necessarily be to show that deliberation is not important for understanding action, but
rather that explicitly deliberative action can be accounted for within the more general
conception of action laid out in the previous sections of this chapter.
Let me start by stating what I think would be the Heideggerian response to this
challenge in its general form. As we have seen, according to this Heideggerian
conception of action, it is our pre-thematic, pre-cognitive understanding of our existence
that articulates the world we live in and allows certain activities and goals to matter to us.
Explicit, cognitive deliberation can be fit into this conception of action if deliberation is
seen as a more abstract and explicit form of this basic articulation. We can understand
deliberation, from a Heideggerian perspective, as a way of refining particular aspects of
our self-understanding. When we deliberate, we are engaged in articulating the situation
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in such a way that a certain action will come to matter to us more than alternatives by the
end of the deliberative process. Deliberation will have allowed this action to matter most
to us. Seen in this way, explicitly deliberative action does not represent a serious
counter-example to the Heideggerian conception of action. Instead, explicitly
deliberative action can be understood as a special sub-species of action that still can be
understood within the general framework of the Heideggerian conception.
In order to understand how this response is grounded in Heidegger’s thought, we
can begin by considering what Heidegger has to say about the connection between
understanding and interpretation in Being and Time. Heidegger characterizes
interpretation as the possibility of understanding to develop itself (BT 188/148). By this
he means that interpretation is the further “working-out of possibilities projected in
understanding” (BT 189/148). Understanding is the initial projection of ourselves toward
some possible way of being that first structures the relations of significance that make up
the world. Interpretation is the process of further refining and articulating what is already
laid out in this initial projection. In interpretation we understand something as something
to be used or manipulated in a certain way given the tasks and activities in which we are
involved. Heidegger emphasizes the way explicit interpretation is grounded in his basic
conception of understanding by saying that in an explicit interpretation of something as
something, the “'as' does not turn up for the first time; it just gets expressed for the first
time, and this is possible only in that it lies before us as something expressible” (BT
190/149).
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Heidegger understands deliberation as a form of interpretation (BT 410/359). In
his earlier lecture course Plato's Sophist, Heidegger identifies two different types of
deliberation (PS 35). The first type of deliberation is associated with the virtue of tēchne,
the knowledge that guides our productive activity. Heidegger characterizes the form of
this deliberation as follows: “if such and such is to come to be, then this or that must
happen” (PS 35). This formulation is very close to the description of the structure of
deliberation found in Being and Time. There Heidegger describes deliberation as having
an 'if—then' structure, which generally takes the form of “if this or that, for instance, is to
be produced, put to use, or averted, then some ways and means, circumstances, or
opportunities will be needed” (BT 410/359). Returning to example of building a house,
we can see how this would work. What I want to produce is a house that is secure from
the elements. I might deliberate about whether or not wood siding or aluminum siding
would be best for achieving this desired result. This deliberation might take the form of
“if I want to build a house that is secure against the elements, then I need to have siding
that keeps out wind and rain”. Now I have provided the framework for understanding
wood and aluminum as materials that might be useful for this purpose. In the process of
deliberating, I let the wood and aluminum appear as useful.
As we have been doing prior to this point, we can easily find a parallel with the
structure of our actions themselves. Within the context of this same example, I could
deliberate about what specific action I should take. I could ask myself whether putting up
wood siding or aluminum siding would be better for keeping out wind and rain. I could
weigh the relative merits of each and come to the decision that I should use wood siding.
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This deliberative process results in the action of putting up wood siding as being more
desirable than the alternatives. What this deliberative process does is to allow, through a
more refined process of articulation, the action of putting up wood siding to have more
pull on me than the possible alternatives.
The second type of deliberation that Heidegger discusses in the Plato's Sophist
lecture is the deliberation associated with the Aristotelian virtue of phrōnesis or practical
wisdom. Heidegger has a little more difficulty in clarifying the structure of the
deliberation of phrōnesis. He says that the deliberation of phrōnesis has the following
structure: “if such and such is supposed to occur, if I am to behave and be in such and
such a way, then...” and “if I am to act in such and such a way, then this or that must
happen” (PS 35). In order to understand what is meant by this, Heidegger adds that the
deliberation of phrōnesis is always guided by some for-the-sake-of-which (which is his
translation of Aristotle's term hoū hēneka). What is different about the deliberation of
phrōnesis is that it is concerned not with the proper action required to produce or make
some external good (e.g. having a house that keeps wind and water out). The deliberation
of phrōnesis is concerned with acting in a way that is in line with some possible way of
being in terms of which the agent understands herself. The if/then structure of this type
of deliberation does not have the form of “if I want to do x, then I must first do y”.
Rather, it has the form of “if I understand myself as a person of type x, then I must do y”.
Returning to the example of understanding myself as a philosopher, we see that when I
deliberate about, for instance, whether or not I should devote more time to my
dissertation or to my class lectures, I am really deliberating about the best way to enact
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the possible way of being that is being a philosopher. In this deliberative process, I am
further refining my basic self-understanding of being a philosopher in such a way that the
world in which I find myself is articulated in a more fine-grained way. If I ultimately
decide that it is more important to devote time to my dissertation, then I have refined and
clarified my understanding of what it means to be a philosopher in such a way that
working on my dissertation matters to me more than preparing lectures for class. In this
way the process of deliberation allows working on my dissertation to matter to me.
More would have to be said about how exactly deliberative action would fit into
this Heideggerian conception of action, but I hope to have shown here the general way in
which this might be accomplished. I also would suggest that this manner of dealing with
deliberative action is more plausible than Dreyfus’s relegation of deliberative action to
those cases in which we experience a breakdown in the normal flow of our activity.

Having Different Self-understandings that Give Rise to Allowing Incompatible Things to
Matter to Us
The third type of situation that might be problematic for the Heideggerian
conception of action is similar to the second case considered. In the section above, we
discussed cases in which there may be two (or more) different things or two (or more)
possible ways of acting that matter to us, or in other words, situations which call for
explicit deliberation. The Heideggerian response to this sort of problem would be to see
deliberation as an explicit, abstract form of the basic articulation of the situation that
happens initially at a pre-thematic level. In other words, deliberation would be
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understood as fine-grained articulation taking place within the articulated context of
significance already established by the possible self-understanding that we have taken up.
Now suppose we vary the example slightly. Suppose that I were to receive a
phone call informing me that a fairly distant relative has died. I learn that the funeral is
in several days, but unfortunately, the funeral is scheduled to take place on the same day
that I am supposed to present a paper at a prestigious conference. I am faced with a
situation in which two conflicting actions matter to me. Attending the funeral matters to
me insofar as I understand myself as a supportive and dutiful family member. Presenting
the paper at the conference matters to me insofar as I understand myself as a philosopher.
This sort of example differs from the type considered in the last section because here we
have a case in which different things matter to us on the basis of two different selfunderstandings. The examples considered above dealt with alternative actions that were
all to be understood in terms of one self-understanding.
These cases in which we find two different self-understandings that allow two
conflicting actions to matter to us may very well prompt us to engage in explicit
deliberation to decide what we should do, but the Heideggerian response to these sorts of
examples will be different than the one discussed in the previous section. For Heidegger,
the self-understanding that is that for the sake of which we act is not a product of
deliberation, but rather is chosen in a decision (PS 101). In the Plato's Sophist lecture,
Heidegger explains Aristotle's claim that a doctor does not deliberate about whether or
not heal someone (NE 1112b11). Here Heidegger says that the doctor “does not
deliberate about whether he is going to heal; on the contrary, that belongs to the meaning
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of his existence itself, because as a doctor he has already resolved in favor of healing”
(PS 111). The self-understanding of being a doctor provides the basic articulation of the
world that first allows for meaningful deliberation, so this self-understanding cannot itself
have been the product of a deliberative process. We ultimately just have to choose
certain basic possible ways of understanding ourselves without being able to rely on a
deliberative process to guide our choice. Heidegger repeats this claim in his discussion
of resoluteness in Being and Time when he asks: “But on what basis does Dasein disclose
itself in resoluteness? On what is to resolve? Only the resolution itself can give the
answer” (BT 345/298).
Our initial reaction to this claim by Heidegger might be to think that it is just
obviously false. When considering the example given above, it seems clear that I can
deliberate about whether understanding myself as a philosopher or understanding myself
as a supportive family member is more important to me. Heidegger could respond to this
by saying that as long as deliberation is still possible, the possible self-understandings
being considered are not for-the-sake-of-whichs in the proper sense of the term. If we
reflect on the deliberation that might take place in the above example, we see that this
deliberation between understanding oneself as a philosopher or as a supportive family
member really is taking place in light of a more general self-understanding to which both
of these self-understandings are subordinate. Remember that for Heidegger, a for-thesake-of-which is supposed to be something for the sake of which we act that does not
refer further to anything else beyond it. If I can deliberate about whether to understand
myself as a philosopher or as a member of a family in this case, then I am doing so in
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light of some more general self-understanding to which both of these ways of
understanding myself refer. In this case, we might say that the most general, basic selfunderstanding operative here is that of understanding myself as a good person generally.
I would be deliberating about whether or not going to the funeral or going to the
conference would be the best way of being a good person. This understanding of myself
as a good person is, in this case, a for-the-sake-of-which in the strict sense in that it does
not refer to anything beyond itself. This type of deliberation then takes much the same
form as the deliberation discussed in the previous section. We allow one action to matter
more to us through the deliberative process by eventually deciding which way of
understanding myself (as a philosopher or as a family member) is most in line with my
basic understanding of myself as a good person.
It might seem that this resolution of the problem provides support for the
decisionist interpretation of Heidegger’s understanding of action. There are, however,
several important differences. The decisionist interpretation of Heidegger maintains that
Heidegger endorses a conception of authentic action that actively advocates the
abandonment of social norms and the deliberation that takes place within their
parameters. The type of example in question here merely acknowledges the fact that in
some (most likely rare) cases, we will simply have to choose one self-understanding over
another without recourse to a more general deliberative framework. In addition to this,
the decision between two possible self-understandings discussed in this section is not an
abandonment of the social norms that usually guide our actions in favor of a
determination of the guidelines for our actions at the purely individual level. Rather, the
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type of decision being discussed here is the decision between various possible selfunderstandings that could serve to guide our actions. There are norms and expectations
that go along with my understanding of myself as a philosopher or a family member. In
choosing one self-understanding over the other, I am choosing which sets of norms will
guide my actions, not rejecting all socially-based norms.

Actions that Do ot Seem to Involve Movement
Another potential problem for the Heideggerian conception of action is presented
by cases that we would normally consider to be actions, but that do not involve any overt
physical movement. It might seem that since this Heideggerian conception of action is
grounded in Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's conception of the movement of
living beings, there would be problems accounting for actions that do not involve
movement. For example, suppose that during a presidential election year I am equally
disgusted with all the candidates on the ballot. In order to demonstrate my disapproval of
all of the candidates, I stay home on election day and do not vote. If someone were to
ask me what I was doing, I could say that I was protesting against the potential
candidates. In other words, I was actively not voting. This seems to be an action that is
in fact characterized by a lack of activity or movement.
In a later paper in which he discusses Aristotle’s conception of nature17,
Heidegger makes it clear that rest, or the lack of movement, is still to be understood in
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terms of movement. When discussing Aristotle’s understanding of plants and animals in
terms of movement, Heidegger maintains that “[r]est is a kind of movement; only that
which is able to move can rest.”18 As Heidegger points out, it is “absurd to speak of the
number ‘3’ as resting.”19 Rest can only be understood as a cessation of movement or as a
pause in the midst of an ongoing motion.
What does this tell us about action, specifically action that involves no
movement? Suppose we consider the opposite of the above example. Suppose that
instead of not voting, I am very enthusiastic about one candidate, and I do in fact go to
the appropriate polling station and vote. We could analyze this positive action fairly
easily using the conception of action developed in this chapter. We could say that I have
an understanding of myself as a responsible citizen, which then allows the activities of
picking a preferred candidate and voting for that candidate to matter to me. There is
clearly movement involved with this action, e.g. driving to the polling station, registering
my vote on the voting machine, etc. Now let us return to the original example of not
voting. Here too we could say that it is my understanding of myself as a responsible
citizen that lets a certain action matter to me. The difference in this case is that I am
drawn towards expressing my dissatisfaction with the available candidates by not voting
(never mind whether or not this is an appropriate way of expressing the dissatisfaction).
Instead of my self-understanding allowing for me to be drawn into a particular
movement, here my self-understanding actually allows me to be drawn towards non-
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movement. When it is realized that this non-movement can be understood only as a
deficient sort of movement, we realize that these sorts of actions involving no movement
can still be understood using the Heideggerian conception of action developed here.

Conclusion
Let us now summarize the Heideggerian conception of action that has been
developed in this chapter. Agency in general is characterized by being pulled by various
things and activities encountered in the world (the passive aspect) and taking up a
particular self-understanding that lets these things and activities matter to us in a specific
way (the active aspect). In the following chapters, we will examine how this general
conception of action is carried into Heidegger's distinction between inauthentic and
authentic ways of acting and the way in which consideration of Heidegger's
understanding of inauthentic and authentic action can help us to further expand and
clarify this general conception of action.
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CHAPTER 2. UNDERSTANDING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN AUTHENTIC
AND INAUTHENTIC ACTION

In the previous chapter, I attempted to give a broad outline of a general
conception of action drawn from Heidegger's early thought. In his early thought, and
especially in Being and Time, Heidegger makes an important distinction between
inauthentic existence and authentic existence. In the following chapters, I intend to build
upon this general conception of action by considering Heidegger's distinction between
authentic and inauthentic action and what each mode of acting can add to the preceding
characterization of the general structure of action. Before turning to the more detailed
analysis of authentic and inauthentic actions in the following chapters, it is important to
briefly consider what exactly Heidegger means by the terms ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic,’
especially when these terms are used to describe action. It is this broader consideration
of how to understand Heidegger’s conceptions of authenticity and inauthenticity and the
distinction between them that is the focus of this chapter.
Heidegger's distinction between authentic and inauthentic ways of existing has
always been somewhat unclear and contentious. I will not pretend to solve all of the
difficulties associated with interpreting this distinction here. In this section I will focus
on two broad distinctions that can be drawn between authenticity and inauthenticity. The
first distinction is that in authentic agency we come to take over or own our actions in a
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way that we do not when acting inauthentically. In other words, when acting
authentically we become responsible for our actions in a way that we are not when acting
inauthentically. The second distinction between authentic and inauthentic agency is that
in authentic agency we disclose the structure of our being as agents in the proper way,
while in inauthentic agency, we do not. In other words, we achieve a sort of selfknowledge in authentic action that is lacking when we act inauthentically.
The general aim of this chapter is to provide a preliminary outline of what is
meant by each of these ways of distinguishing authentic and inauthentic action and to
briefly show that Heidegger does in fact distinguish between authentic action and
inauthentic action along these lines by considering some relevant passages from his texts
(specifically Being and Time). The detailed explanation of why exactly Heidegger thinks
certain ways of acting are inauthentic or authentic (e.g. why our everyday productive
activity is inauthentic) will be left to the following chapters. Similarly, a detailed
explanation of how Heidegger thinks different modes of acting accomplish what he says
they do (e.g. how the structure of our being is supposed to be revealed to us in authentic
action) will be left to the following chapters. Let us now consider both of these two
distinctions between authenticity and inauthenticity in greater detail.

The First Distinction between Authentic and Inauthentic Action: Responsibility
Before proceeding to consider what responsibility would look like within the
context of Heidegger’s thought, it might be helpful to first discuss what we mean by
responsibility generally. Ishtiyaque Haji provides a succinct description of the two main
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schools of thought about the nature of the responsibility. According to Haji the
traditional view of responsibility holds that in order for us to be responsible for our
actions, there must be the “availability, at various points in our lives, of genuinely
accessible alternative possibilities.”20 We might generally think that for someone to truly
be responsible for her actions, she had to have had the possibility of acting differently. A
second common way of understanding responsibility according to Haji is the view that
someone is “morally responsible for her behavior only if the antecedent actional
elements, like her values, desires, or beliefs that cause that behavior, are ‘truly her own’;
they are not, for example, the product of direct surreptitious implantation.”21 In other
words, we often think that in order for someone to be responsible for her actions, the
decision to perform that action, the desire to perform that action, etc. must stem from the
agent herself and cannot be the products of any external force.
It is something like this second understanding of responsibility that we find in
Heidegger’s thought. As we saw in the first chapter, on the Heideggerian conception of
action, it is the various self-understandings that we take up that articulate the situation of
action and let things matter to us. Responsibility on the Heideggerian conception of
action would then entail that the self-understandings that articulate the situation of action
are drawn from the agent herself in each case and not from some external source. This
very general characterization of what responsibility would be like on the Heideggerian
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conception of action will suffice for now, but we will have much more to say about it in
the following chapters.
This first distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity on the basis of
having or lacking responsibility comes from the existentialist reading of Heidegger.
Understanding the difference between Heidegger’s conceptions of authenticity and
inauthenticity in this way has probably been the most common way of interpreting this
distinction. As we saw in the Introduction, Richard Wolin characterizes Heidegger’s
conception of authentic action as advocating a sort of decisionism. Wolin describes
Heidegger’s conception of authentic action as the complete determination of an
individual’s action purely from the will of the individual agent that rejects all traditional
social norms as inauthentic. In Wolin’s words:
[O]nce the inauthenticity of all traditional social norms has
been existentially unmasked, the only remaining basis for
moral orientation is a decision ex nihilo, a radical assertion
of the will; a will, moreover, that is pure and unconstrained
by the impediments of social convention.”22
On this reading of Heidegger, when acting authentically, our actions are grounded purely
in our own will, while in inauthentic action we let our actions be determined by the
prevailing social norms. According to the criterion established above for responsibility,
this would mean that we are responsible for our actions when acting authentically, but not
when acting inauthentically.
Heidegger does indeed provide ample evidence for this reading of the distinction
between authenticity and inauthenticity. In various passages in Being and Time,
22

Richard Wolin, The Politics of Being (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 39.

59

Heidegger makes it clear that when acting inauthentically, we are not the agents of our
actions in a strict sense. He expresses this in several different ways. “When Dasein is
absorbed in the world of its concern,” says Heidegger, “it is not itself” (BT 163/125). In
our everyday performance of actions in the world, we are, according to Heidegger, not
really the ones acting. In fact, he goes on to claim that “in Dasein’s everydayness the
agency through which most things come about is one of which we must say that ‘it was
no one’” (BT 165/127), and that in our everyday activities “everyone is the other, and no
one is himself” (BT 165/128). This leads Heidegger to claim that since we are not the
agents of our own actions when acting inauthentically, we are deprived of responsibility
(Verantwortlichkeit) for our actions (BT 165/127, translation modified). If we are not
really the agents of our actions, i.e. if our actions are not really our own, then we cannot
really be said to be responsible for them.
Heidegger’s account of authentic action can be understood as his attempt to
develop a conception of that mode of acting in which we ourselves are the agents of our
actions and come to be responsible for our actions. Heidegger describes authentic action
as a “way of letting one’s ownmost Self take action in itself of its own accord” (BT
342/295). For Heidegger, guilt and a certain understanding of what it really means to be
guilty play a large role in his account of authentic action. When discussing the meaning
of being guilty, Heidegger points out that “‘Being-guilty’ also has the signification of
‘being responsible for’—that is, being the cause or author of something, or even ‘being
the occasion’ for something” (BT 327/282). He proceeds to say that generally, “to the
idea of ‘Guilty!’ belongs what is expressed without further differentiation in the
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conception of guilt as ‘having responsibility for’—that is, as being the ground
[Grundsein] for…” (BT 329/283, translation modified). When Heidegger claims that in
authentic action we really are the agents of our actions, i.e. that it is our own selves acting
here, not others, he is saying that in authentic action we are responsible for our actions
because we are the ground for our actions in a way that we are not when acting
inauthentically.
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the consideration of Heidegger’s
distinction between authentic and inauthentic action is supposed to help refine and
expand the general Heideggerian conception of action developed in the first chapter. As
we will explain more fully in the next chapter, one potential problem for this
Heideggerian conception of action as formulated up to this point (which Heidegger
himself clearly recognizes) is that it seems that in most (if not all) of our actions, the selfunderstanding that articulates the situation is drawn from the social context in which we
find ourselves. In other words, the self-understanding that is the active part of the action
comes not from the individual agent, but from an external source. If this is the case, then
it is difficult to see how we could be responsible for our actions.
This problem is further exacerbated when one takes into consideration the
meaning of human action or agency as such. Remembering Frankfurt’s statement of the
issue from the Introduction, the “problem of action is to explicate the contrast between
what an agent does and what merely happens to him, or between the bodily movements
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that he makes and those that occur without his making them.”23 If we are to have a
meaningful conception of action or agency, we have to be able to explain the difference
between those movements that are grounded in the agent herself, i.e. the movements that
the agent herself owns, and those movements whose ground is not in the agent herself. In
other words, the problem of action is the problem of explaining how we can have
responsibility for actions, at least if we have an understanding of responsibility like the
one outlined above. If Heidegger thinks that our everyday actions are for the most part
inauthentic in the sense described above, then the question of whether or not there is
some way of acting in which we are the agents of our actions, and thus are responsible for
our actions, becomes rather pressing.
The potential problem for developing an account of responsibility in the context
of the Heideggerian conception of action is that although in Being and Time Heidegger
makes it clear that responsibility for our actions is a concern and is a key distinction
between authentic and inauthentic action, there is little explicit discussion of
responsibility in Being and Time, and the limited discussion of the subject found there are
often rather opaque. In his 1930 lecture course, The Essence of Human Freedom,
Heidegger devotes the second half of the course to a detailed interpretation of specific
aspects of Kant’s practical philosophy, culminating with an account of what it means to
be truly responsible for our actions. In the fourth chapter, I will show how the questions
raised about our responsibility for our actions when Heidegger distinguishes between
authentic and inauthentic action in Being and Time can be answered by Heidegger’s later,
23
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Kantian account of responsibility in The Essence of Human Freedom. In the course of
this more detailed consideration of Heidegger’s understanding of responsibility, we will
see that the existentialist reading of Heidegger as described in this section is not quite
correct, even though it is a useful starting point.

The Second Distinction between Authentic and Inauthentic Action: Self-Knowledge
As stated above, the second distinction that I would like to draw between
authentic and inauthentic action is that in authentic action the structure of our being is
properly revealed to us, while in inauthentic action, the structure of our being is not
revealed to us. That is, we achieve a certain level of self-knowledge in authentic action
that is not attained in inauthentic action. This way of understanding the distinction
between authenticity and inauthenticity may seem somewhat strange and is admittedly
more difficult to see in Being and Time when compared to the first distinction between
authentic and inauthentic action based on whether or not we have responsibility for our
actions.
There are, however, a fair number of commentators that hold something like this
view of the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity. For example, in his
commentary on Being and Time, Michael Gelven maintains that “[a]uthentic existence is
characterized by an explicit awareness of what it means to be,” and “[i]nauthentic
existence is that mode of existence in which one has hidden or forgotten what it means to
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be.”24 Gelven adds that for Heidegger, “before it is possible to analyze what it means to
be, the interpretation of Dasein must also yield positively what it means to be authentic
Dasein,” which implies that authenticity involves self-knowledge.25 More recently,
Taylor Carman has argued that Heidegger’s aim in his development of his conception of
authenticity is to show that the traditional metaphysical understanding of the self is
inadequate and that the self is such that it can never be understood through third-person,
objective accounts of what it is to be a self.26 On Carman’s read we achieve a proper
understanding of the nature of the self in authentic existence insofar as we understand
that the first person view is irreducible, i.e. second- or third-person accounts of self-hood
can never adequately capture that first-person relation of the self to itself.
There is a good deal of textual support in Being and Time for this interpretation of
the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity. It is clear that Heidegger thinks
that we do not properly understand the structure of our being in our everyday existence.
According to Heidegger, in our everyday existence, we tend to cover over, distort or
generally misunderstand the structure of our being. Heidegger explicitly expresses this in
multiple passages like the following:
If Dasein discovers the world in its own way and brings it
close, if it discloses to itself its own authentic Being, then
this discovery of the ‘world’ and this disclosure of Dasein
are always accomplished as a clearing-away of
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concealments and obscurities, as a breaking up of the
disguises with which Dasein bars its own way (BT
167/129).
Here he characterizes our disclosing of our own being as clearing away “concealments
and obscurities.” He also frequently makes it clear that these distortions of our
understanding of our being stem from the everyday way in which we exist. According to
Heidegger, “our everyday environmental experiencing, which remains directed both
ontically and ontologically towards entities within-the-world, is not the sort of thing
which can present Dasein in an ontically primordial manner for ontological analysis” (BT
226/181). In other words, in our everyday existence we are directed towards the things in
the world with which we are concerned. This preoccupation with our worldly concerns
and projects does not allow for a proper understanding of our own existence. The
explanation of why exactly Heidegger thinks that our everyday activities do not allow us
to properly understand our being will come in the next chapter. For now, I just want to
make the point that one distinguishing characteristic of inauthentic action for Heidegger
is that when acting inauthentically, we fail to properly understand the structure of our
being.
There are also several passages in Being and Time in which Heidegger is fairly
clear that authentic existence is supposed to be that way of existing in which we reveal
the structure of our being to ourselves. We can find a first indication of this possibility of
disclosing the structure of our own being by considering Heidegger’s discussion of
understanding. When explaining what he means by understanding in Division I of Being
of Time, Heidegger says that we can think of understanding as a sort of sight (BT
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186/146). He lists three main types of sight: circumspection, which is the sight that
guides our productive activity, considerateness, which is the sight that guides our
interaction with other people and a type of sight that is “directed upon Being as such”
(BT 186/146). It is worth quoting Heidegger’s further description of this third type of
sight at length. Heidegger describes this third type of sight as follows:
The sight which is related primarily and on the whole to
existence we call ‘transparency’ [Durchsichtigkeit]. We
choose this term to designate ‘knowledge of the Self’ in a
sense which is well understood, so as to indicate that here it
is not a matter or perceptually tracking down and
inspecting a point called the ‘Self’, but rather one of seizing
upon the full disclosedness of Being-in-the-World
throughout all the constitutive items which are essential to
it (BT 186-187/146).
In this passage, Heidegger clearly indicates that there is a way of understanding ourselves
that makes our own being clear (i.e. transparent) to us.
He is also careful to say that this self-knowledge does not take the form of
traditional reflection on an ego or point of consciousness. Rather, the type of selfknowledge Heidegger is talking about here takes into consideration the fact that, as we
saw in the last chapter, our being is such that we are always pushing forward towards
possible ways of being and are simultaneously open to being affected by things in the
world. Heidegger goes on to make it clear that it is in authentic existence that we are able
to clearly and properly understand the structure of our being. Heidegger claims that in
authenticity, “Dasein is revealed to itself in its current factical potentiality-for-Being, and
in such a way that Dasein itself is this revealing and Being-revealed” (BT 355/307), and
that “we have reached a way of Being of Dasein in which it brings itself to itself and face
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to face with itself” (BT 357/309). I will leave the detailed explanation of how we are
supposed to reveal the structure of our being to ourselves in authentic existence until the
fifth chapter. It is enough here to establish that Heidegger thinks that one of the
distinctive aspects of authentic existence is that it is that way of existing in which our
being is revealed to us.
At this point it could very well be asked what this second distinction between
authenticity and inauthenticity has to do with action and what it could add to the
development of a Heideggerian conception of action. These questions can be answered
in two stages. First of all, we can show that there are reasons internal to the development
of Heidegger’s thought that lead him to conceive of authentic action as mode of acting in
which we achieve a proper knowledge of ourselves as agents. When Heidegger develops
an account of authenticity in Division II of Being and Time, he focuses on concepts that
are typically associated with action (e.g. guilt, conscience and resoluteness). Heidegger
focuses on the way in which the structure of our being is revealed to us in the experience
of these phenomena. His focus on the sort of self-knowledge that can be drawn from
these experiences stems from his rejection of the traditional philosophical method for
attaining knowledge of ourselves.
The traditional philosophical method for understanding our own being is to
cognitively reflect on the structures of consciousness that are typically taken to be
definitive for human beings. For our purposes, the most relevant instance of this method
is found in Husserl’s phenomenological methodology, which of course greatly influenced
Heidegger. Husserl’s main objective, at least in his early years at Freiburg when he
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worked closely with Heidegger, is to develop a philosophy that is a rigorous science.27
For Husserl, the way to make philosophy into a rigorous science is to focus on our
immanent experience of the structures of our consciousness as opposed to our
transcendent experience of things in the world. This understanding of the structures of
our consciousness is not something easily attained for Husserl. Rather, Husserl spends a
great deal of time trying to develop the proper way of focusing on the structures of our
consciousness and purifying our awareness of any focus on external objects. Husserl
calls the process of properly becoming aware of the structures of our consciousness the
phenomenological reduction. Husserl describes the reduction as follows:
The so-called phenomenological reduction can be effected
by modifying Descartes’s method, by carrying it through
purely and consequentially while disregarding all Cartesian
aims; phenomenological reduction is the method for
effecting radical purification of the phenomenological field
of consciousness from all obtrusions from Objective
actualities and keeping it pure of them.28
The Cartesian method to which Husserl is here referring is, of course, the radical
doubt of the existence of objects in the external world. Husserl modifies Descartes’s
radical skepticism by claiming that the phenomenologist is not doubting the existence of
objects in the world in any radical sense, but rather the phenomenologist is “bracketing”
or “putting out of action” her convictions concerning the objective existence of things in
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the world.29 When the objective existence of objects is bracketed, we are left with
“consciousness in itself” as a “residuum”.30 When we have performed this act of
bracketing, we can then focus on the structures of consciousness itself and the
phenomena as they present themselves to consciousness. We are no longer directed
outwardly towards objects in the external world, but rather we are brought back to the
structure and processes of our consciousness itself.
We can understand Heidegger’s opposition to this traditional philosophical
method, especially in the form of Husserl’s phenomenological methodology, and his
motivation for developing an alternative way of coming to understand our being by
briefly considering the objections to Husserlian phenomenology raised by Paul Natorp.31
Natorp’s two objections to phenomenology are that 1) by reflecting on our experience
and our cognitive acts, we necessarily hypostatize and still something that is
fundamentally dynamic, thereby distorting it and precluding any direct access to the
dynamic nature of our experience and 2) by using concepts to describe our immediate
experience, we are already objectifying it and interpreting it in terms of the mediation of
abstract concepts, thereby losing the immediate access to our experience that is supposed
to be the bedrock of phenomenological reflection. In order to develop a version of
phenomenology that avoids Natorp’s objections, Heidegger seeks to develop a mode of
understanding our own being that is itself fundamentally dynamic and pre-theoretical so
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that it can adequately capture the dynamic nature of our being without recourse to
abstract, theoretical concepts.
In Heidegger’s early lecture courses leading up to Being and Time, we can see
him beginning to develop this alternative way of coming to understand our being that
overcomes Natorp’s objection to Husserl’s phenomenology. In his 1921-1922 lecture
course, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, Heidegger describes philosophical
inquiry not as a static, conceptual and cognitive procedure, but rather as a sort of
movement arising out of life itself that counters our normal tendency to be absorbed in
the world of our practical concerns and to not endeavor to understand our own being.
Heidegger describes this countermovement as a “genuine questioning” that “consists in
living in the answer itself in a searching way” (PIA 114). Heidegger provides a more
detailed conception of his understanding of this way of acting in the 1924 lecture course,
Plato’s Sophist, when discussing Book VI of the icomachean Ethics and Aristotle’s
conception of the intellectual virtues. Heidegger considers the intellectual virtues to be
ways in which we disclose the world and our own being, paying particular attention to
phrōnesis. Heidegger maintains that phrōnesis is a “disposition of human Dasein such
that in it I have at my disposal my own transparency” and that phrōnesis “lives in action”
(PS 37). He notes pointedly that “understanding does not primarily mean just gazing at a
meaning, but rather understanding oneself in that potentiality-for-Being which reveals
itself in projection” (BT 307/263). In other words, Heidegger does not want to rely on
the sort of abstract theoretical reflection that is characteristic of philosophy. He does not
want to merely posit that human existence is constituted by disposition and
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understanding. Rather, he is seeking to develop a mode of existing in which we clearly
experience this constitution of our being in our lived existence as agents immersed in our
world of practical concerns.
If this then provides some explanation of why Heidegger connects the attainment
of the proper sort of self-knowledge with authentic action, we can move on to the second
question posed above—the question of what the consideration of this second distinction
between authenticity and inauthenticity can add to the development of a Heideggerian
conception of action. To answer this question, we will attempt to show how this second
distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity in terms of self-knowledge can be
connected to the first distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity in terms of
responsibility. We showed above why being able to explain when and how we can be
responsible for our actions is essential to the development of a conception of human
action. Now the aim is to show that acting with a certain degree of self-knowledge is
required in order to be truly responsible for our actions. Once again, the more detailed
consideration of this connection in Heidegger’s thought will have to wait until the later
chapters, but here we can at least try to show the plausibility of this connection through
some very general considerations.
In the previous section, we gave the very general characterization of responsibility
as acting in such a way that the action can be said to somehow be grounded in the agent
herself. That is, being responsible for an action means that the antecedent decision,
desire, belief, etc. (or self-understanding of the Heideggerian conception of action) that
brings about the action is the agent’s own, not the product of some external force. At a
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very general level, we can see how a certain self-knowledge could be important here. For
example, if while driving I were to hit a pedestrian crossing the street, the degree to
which I am held to be responsible for this action would depend at least in part on whether
I had knowingly made the decision to run over the unfortunate pedestrian or not. We
typically think that people are more responsible for those actions that stem from decisions
that they explicitly and knowingly make. The degree of self-knowledge people have
when acting does make a difference when it comes to determining to what degree they
are responsible for their actions.
This is not quite the connection that we want to make between self-knowledge
and responsibility on the Heideggerian conception of action. As we have seen,
Heidegger does not emphasize the role of mental states like desires and beliefs in his
conception of action, and he makes it clear that his conception of authentic selfknowledge is not an internal inspection of these mental states. Is there a way of finding a
connection between authentic self-knowledge in Heidegger’s sense and responsibility?
In other words, can we find a way of connecting acting with an understanding of the
structure of our being with being responsible for our actions? We can use the general
existentialist conception of freedom and action to see how this might work, even though
we will see that this connection cannot quite be made in the same way for Heidegger. At
least according to the superficial, pop-culture understanding of existentialism, we act
authentically and become fully responsible for our actions when we realize that the
social, religious and/or historical norms that typically guide our actions are completely
baseless and arbitrary and that we must create for ourselves the standards according to
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which we should live. When we recognize that we as human beings are “condemned to
freedom,” to use Sartre’s expression, then we become truly responsible for our actions.
The sort of self-knowledge involved here is knowledge of the essential nature of human
beings, not merely a sort of internal awareness of the mental states that we typically
associate with taking action.
Once again, these considerations are only used to show the general plausibility of
the connection between responsibility and self-knowledge. We are not here concerned
with the details of this connection within the context of the Heideggerian conception of
action being developed here. In the fifth chapter, I will show in more detail how
Heidegger finds the template for this dynamic, pre-conceptual mode of self-knowledge in
Aristotle’s conception of phrōnesis and how Heidegger uses his interpretation of
phrōnesis to develop his conception of authenticity as a way of acting in and through
which we reveal the structure of our being to ourselves, thereby becoming responsible for
our actions.

Conclusion
Let us summarize the most important results of this chapter. There are two main
distinctions between authentic action and inauthentic action for Heidegger. The first
distinction is that when acting authentically, we are responsible for our actions in a way
that we are not when acting inauthentically. We are responsible for our actions when
those actions stem from ourselves, when they are not determined by something else. The
second distinction between authentic and inauthentic action is that when acting
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authentically, we reveal the structure of our being to ourselves in the proper way, i.e. that
we achieve a particular form of self-knowledge.
As mentioned above, the more detailed discussion of authentic action will take
place in chapters four and five. In chapter four, we will show how we are able to become
responsible for our actions when acting authentically. The fifth chapter will then focus
on how Heidegger thinks that the structure of our being is revealed to us in authentic
action. The next chapter, chapter three, will discuss Heidegger’s understanding of
inauthentic action, specifically in terms of how inauthentic action prevents us from
understanding the structure of our being and taking responsibility for our actions.
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CHAPTER 3. INAUTHENTIC ACTION

Now that we have said something about how to understand the distinction
between authentic and inauthentic action generally, we can turn our attention to the main
focus of this chapter, Heidegger's analysis of inauthentic action. While Heidegger does
discuss this topic in his early lecture courses, it is again in Being and Time that we find
the fullest analysis of inauthentic action. Accordingly, most of our analysis here will
focus on Being and Time.
In the first chapter, we developed a general Heideggerian conception of action
using as a basis Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s understanding of the movement
of living things. Fittingly, Heidegger describes inauthentic action in terms of a certain
form of movement, which he calls falling (Verfallen). We will begin our discussion of
inauthentic action by considering the structure of falling and showing how the structure
of falling gives rise to the two distinguishing characteristics of inauthentic action
established in the last chapter—the failure to be responsible for our actions and the failure
to properly understand the structure of our being. From there we can move on to
consider the different general types of inauthentic action discussed by Heidegger in Being
and Time and show how these general types of inauthentic action exhibit the structure of
falling and the two distinguishing characteristics of inauthentic action.
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The Movement of Inauthentic Action—Falling
To begin with, it is important to point out that despite our inclination to do so,
Heidegger claims that we are not to understand his use of the term ‘falling’ as conveying
a “negative evaluation” of the type of action that has this structure (BT 220/175). Rather,
falling is meant to describe the way in which we are drawn or pulled into the world of our
concern. As we saw in the first chapter, Heidegger maintains that as human beings, we
are naturally drawn towards certain things and activities that matter to us. Most of the
time, we have a tendency to be drawn towards those activities that constitute our
everyday life in the world, e.g. doing the dishes, teaching classes, buying groceries, etc.
Additionally, the term ‘falling’ is meant to describe our tendency to become absorbed in
“Being-with-one-another” (BT 220/175), i.e. being drawn towards social interaction with
other people, having an interest in “public affairs”, etc.
One might then think that falling is just another term for disposition, the way in
which we characterized our general tendency to be pulled towards things that matter to us
in the first chapter. The difference between disposition and falling is that disposition is
an essential feature of all human movement or action, while falling is restricted to our
tendency to become completely absorbed in our worldly concerns. As we will see when
we consider the possibility of authentic action, Heidegger maintains that we can be drawn
towards a way of existing and acting that is not drawn from the world of our concerns or
our social world but rather stems from our own being.
Heidegger proposes to further elucidate the structure of the movement of falling
by considering four phenomena that are characteristic of this movement. The first of
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these phenomena is temptation (BT 221/177). With this term, Heidegger is again
describing the way in which the world of our everyday concerns and social interactions
always seems to beckon us or draw us towards it. Most of us have some sense of what
Heidegger is trying to get at here. We often find ourselves caught up in and in fact drawn
towards our various everyday activities like meeting friends for dinner, picking out a new
painting for the living room wall, etc.
The second phenomenon that Heidegger uses to characterize the movement of
falling is tranquility (BT 222/177). With the term tranquility, Heidegger is pointing to
the way that even (or perhaps especially) when we are caught up in the hectic flow of our
everyday activities, we have a sort of tranquility insofar as we do not have time to
question why it is that we do what we do and what it really means to be a human being.
When immersed in our everyday actions, we operate with an assurance that we are
“leading and sustaining a full and genuine ‘life’,” which “brings [us] a tranquility” (BT
222/177).
The third phenomenon characteristic of falling is alienation (BT 222/178). To
fully understand why Heidegger maintains that alienation is involved in the movement of
falling, we need to understand his conception of das Man (the “they” or the “One”). In
the first chapter, we discussed Heidegger’s analysis of solicitous activity, i.e. our
interaction with other people. We also saw how Heidegger comes to see being with other
people, i.e. being part of a social context, as a fundamental aspect of our being. Being a
part of a social context is essential for our being as agents, since it is from the social

77

context in which we find ourselves that we draw the self-understandings that allow things
to matter to us.
Now Heidegger is going say that “When Dasein is absorbed in the world of its
concern—that is, at the same time, in its Being-with towards Others—it is not itself” (BT
163/125). In other words, when we are engaged in our everyday activity (i.e. absorbed in
the world of our concern), we are not really ourselves. Why is this? We can begin to see
why Heidegger would say that we are not ourselves when engaged in our everyday
actions when we consider the following passage:
[P]roximally and for the most part everyday Dasein
understands itself in terms of that with which it is
customarily concerned. ‘One is’ what one does…Here one
Dasein can and must, within certain limits, ‘be’ another
Dasein” (BT 283-284/239-240).
How does this passage help? If we return to the general conception of action
developed in the first chapter, we can say that when we act, we are drawn towards things
that matter to us on the basis of the self-understanding(s) towards which we direct
ourselves. Another way of formulating this is to say that when we are acting, we are
doing what is prescribed by the self-understanding(s) that we have taken up. We might
then ask where these self-understandings come from, or from where do we draw these
self-understandings. As we discussed briefly in the first chapter, these selfunderstandings are drawn from the social and historical context in which we find
ourselves. When I understand myself as a philosopher and let things matter to me on the
basis of this self-understanding, I do not have complete control over everything that
matters to me as a philosopher. Rather, I have a general sense of what is required to be a
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philosopher in our current social/historical context. If we want to know more precisely
where this understanding of what is required of a philosopher comes from (i.e. who
exactly defines or has defined what it is to be a philosopher), the most we can say is that
if one wants to be a philosopher in our current historical situation, there are just certain
things that one must do. For example, it is understood that to be a philosopher today
more or less requires that one be affiliated with some sort of institution of higher
learning, publish papers in academic journals, attend academic conferences, etc. The
origin of these requirements is vague and ultimately cannot be pinned on one person or
even group of people.
This leads to Heidegger’s conception of das Man (the one, or “the they” in the
Macquarrie and Robinson translation of Being and Time). When answering the question
of who is really acting in our everyday actions, Heidegger says that, the “‘who’ is not this
one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, and not the sum of them all. The ‘who’ is
the neuter, the ‘one’ [das Man]” (BT 164/126, translation modified). We can understand
our everyday actions on this view not as the actions of discrete, autonomous agents, but
rather as the enactment of various social roles and behavioral norms. When understood
in this way, it can be said that in our “everydayness the agency through which most
things come about is one of which we must say that ‘it was no one’” (BT 165/127). In
our everyday actions, there is no real agent for Heidegger since we are “for the sake of
the ‘one’ in an everyday manner, and the ‘one’ itself Articulates the referential context of
significance” (BT 167/129).
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This makes sense when considered in light of the conception of action developed
in the previous chapter. Action is to be understood as letting things and activities have a
pull on us on the basis of our self-understandings (for the sake of which we act). These
self-understandings come from the social context in which we find ourselves.
Furthermore, we see that ultimately the particular actions required to enact these possible
self-understandings are determined by no one in particular, or put another way, they are
determined by das Man. Following the connections being made here, we can conclude
that ultimately, the active aspect of agency (i.e. letting things matter to us) is performed
by das Man, i.e. no one in particular. In this way we can be said to not really be
ourselves when engaged in our everyday activities. That is, our everyday actions exhibit
a movement of alienation in which we are drawn out towards various activities through
the articulation of the situation provided not by ourselves but rather by the social context
in which we find ourselves. Alienation is a movement away from ourselves that is not
even guided by ourselves.
Heidegger calls the fourth and final characteristic of falling entanglement (BT
223/178). By characterizing the movement of falling as entanglement, Heidegger seems
to be making sure that we do not misunderstand what he means by alienation. He says
that:
It [alienation] does not, however, surrender Dasein to an
entity which Dasein itself is not, but forces it into its
inauthenticity—into a possible kind of Being of itself. The
alienation of falling—at once tempting and tranquilizing—
leads by its own movement to Dasein’s getting entangled in
itself (BT 222-223/178).
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Here Heidegger is saying that alienation is indeed part of our being as humans. In a
sense, we are ourselves in our very tendency to become alienated from ourselves. The
term ‘entanglement’ is meant to capture the seemingly paradoxical nature of falling.
Now that we have seen how Heidegger describes the movement of inauthentic
action, we can show why action exhibiting this structure is considered to be inauthentic
based on the two distinguishing characteristics of inauthenticity discussed in the last
chapter. The first distinguishing characteristic of inauthentic action is that when acting
inauthentically, we are not responsible for our actions. We stated that at a general level,
an agent is not responsible for her actions when the actions do not stem from the agent
herself. According to the Heideggerian conception of action developed in the first
chapter, for an agent not to be responsible for her actions, the articulation of the situation
that allows things to matter to her would not really be performed by her. As we have
seen here, this is exactly what happens in the movement of falling. We have a tendency
to be absorbed in the world of our everyday concerns and social interactions. The
determination of which everyday activities matter to us is performed not by us as
individual agents but rather by the impersonal social norms that make up the various
possible ways of understanding ourselves.
The second distinguishing characteristic of inauthentic action is that when acting
inauthentically, we fail to properly understand the structure of our own being. When our
actions have the structure of falling, we are drawn out into and absorbed by the world of
our concerns. We are concerned with the tasks we are to accomplish, not the structure of
our being as agents. We also become tranquilized insofar as we are content with being
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absorbed in our everyday activities, leaving little time or energy to attempt to cultivate
the proper understanding of the structure of our being.

The Three General Types of Inauthentic Action
Let us now look at the various types of inauthentic action found in Being and
Time. By looking at these types of inauthentic action, we can gain a more concrete
understanding of the movement of falling and can better understand why Heidegger
considers most of our everyday activities to be inauthentic. There are three basic types of
everyday activities discussed in Being and Time. Two of these types of everyday action
have been discussed in the first chapter in the course of the development of the general
Heideggerian conception of action. In that first chapter, we saw that Heidegger draws
most of his examples from what can be called productive activity, i.e. actions directed
toward the accomplishment of some specific goal or task. We also showed how the
general analysis of action drawn from productive activity also can be applied to our
interactions with other people, a type of action that is not aimed at producing anything.
Productive activity and interaction with other people will be considered in the first and
second sections of this chapter, respectively.
There was also a third type of activity at which we hinted in the first chapter, but
whose discussion was postponed until this chapter. In addition to productive activity and
interactions with other people, we might also want to say that we perform actions that are
directed neither towards any specific goal (as is the case in productive activity) nor
towards the enactment of any specific self-understanding (as may be the case in our non-
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productive interactions with others). Here I am thinking of activities like surfing the
internet, watching television, chatting with friends, etc. We will consider this third type
of activity in the third section of this chapter.

Productive Activity
As we have already seen, the first sort of activity discussed by Heidegger in Being
and Time is productive activity. The question to be considered here is why this type of
activity would be considered inauthentic. In other words, we must show how productive
activity exhibits the movement that is characteristic of falling and how, when engaged in
productive activity, we fail to properly understand our own being and to be responsible
for our actions.
We already have shown how this type of activity can be understood in terms of
the general conception of action developed in the first chapter. Productive action
involves a passive aspect through which we encounter things and actions as mattering to
us in some way and an active aspect through which we let these things matter to us by
taking up various ways of understanding ourselves. For example, my understanding of
myself as a philosopher lets the action of writing my dissertation matter to me in such a
way that I am drawn towards this action.
How does productive activity exhibit the movement of falling? We can say that
in general we are drawn towards various productive activities, even if they are as
mundane as mowing the lawn or making the bed. We typically have a feeling that there
are many “thing to be done”. It seems to be a bit of stretch to say that mowing the lawn
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is “tempting”, but it makes sense when we consider Heidegger’s characterization of
temptation as the tendency to get caught up in all the various everyday activities that we
feel need to be done.
For this reason productive activity is also tranquilizing in the sense discussed
above. When someone undergoes a traumatic emotional experience in her life, e.g. the
death of a close friend or the end of a long relationship, the advice often given is to get
back to work, to get involved in some sort of activity. When we are engaged in
productive activity, we tend to get absorbed in the activity, and concern for our own
being fades into the background. Heidegger makes this point by analyzing Aristotle’s
account of poīesis (productive activity) and tēchne (the knowledge that guides productive
activity). “In tēchne,” says Heidegger, “the know-how is directed toward the poieton,
toward what is to be first produced” (PS 28). In productive activity we are directed
toward what is to be produced, something which is external (parā) to the process of
acting itself. Heidegger contrasts productive activity and tēchne with genuine action
(prāxis), which is guided by phrōnesis. Heidegger maintains that phrōnesis is directed
towards the being of the agent herself, since phrōnesis is concerned with “what is
conducive to the right mode of Being of Dasein as such” (PS 34). However, “in the case
of poīesis, the tēlos is something other, a worldly being over and against Dasein” (PS 36).
We can also see why productive activity would be alienating. When engaged in
productive activity, our movement is out into the world of our concern and away from the
consideration of ourselves. In addition to this, most of the self-understandings that we
take up that let things matter to us are drawn from the social context in which we find
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ourselves. Because of this, our productive activity cannot even be seen as an expression
of ourselves in our actions, but rather is to be understood as our enactment of the
impersonal social norms that guide our activities. For instance, we can say that it matters
to me that I mow my lawn because I understand myself at least in part as a responsible
homeowner, and part of what it means to be a responsible homeowner is to have a wellmaintained lawn. This requirement has not been determined by me or any other specific
individual, but instead is one of those social norms that is just understood and accepted.
Given these considerations, it is easy to see why productive activity is inauthentic
according to the criteria established in the last chapter. When engaged in productive
activities, we are not responsible for our actions because the articulation of the situation
that lets us be drawn towards certain activities stems not from us as individual agents but
rather from the impersonal norms of the socially derived self-understandings that we take
up. In this type of activity, we also fail to properly understand the structure of our own
being. This is not because we engage in any willful distortion or inadequate reflective
technique. Rather, as we have seen, when we are busy doing all the things that we do on
a daily basis, the structure of our own being is just not an issue for us at all. We are
directed out towards the accomplishment of various tasks and not towards achieving a
proper understanding of what it means to be human.

Interaction with Other People
Our consideration of this type of action can be fairly brief. In the first chapter, we
showed how our interactions with other people can be understood in terms of the general
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conception of agency worked out there. The difference between productive activity and
our interaction with other people is that when interacting with other people, we are not
necessarily directed towards completing a specific task like writing a dissertation.
Rather, when interacting with others, our actions can often be better described as being
directed towards the enactment of an understanding of ourselves that we hold. For
example, if I am traveling and call periodically to check in with my wife, my action can
be understood not as an action merely aimed at producing in my wife a sense of ease and
assurance. We can perhaps better understand this action as mattering to me insofar as I
understand myself as a good husband and try continually to enact this possible way of
being.
Why does Heidegger consider this form of action to be inauthentic for the most
part, and how does our social interaction with other people exhibit the movement of
falling? The answers to these questions are fairly clear given the discussion of the
preceding section. Instead of characterizing the world of our everyday tasks and
activities as tempting, here we can characterize social interaction with other people as
tempting. We have a tendency to get caught up in various forms of social interaction.
We feel that we need to stay in touch with friends and family, meet friends for dinner,
post comments on internet message boards, etc. Our social interaction is also
tranquilizing in much the same way that productive activity is. When involved in our
many social activities, the structure of our own being is simply not an issue for us, and
when engaged in these activities, we usually have a sense of assurance that this is what
life is all about. For example, we often hear the opinion, repeated until it becomes
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unquestionable, that spending time with one’s family is the most important thing in life.
We typically accept and repeat this view and others like it without really reflecting on
what it is about being human that might make this statement true. Finally, we can see
why interaction with other people is alienating in the same way that productive activity
is. When interacting with other people, we are directed out towards the people with
whom we are interacting and out towards the enactment of a certain self-understanding
that is drawn from the social context.
We can also easily see why Heidegger would think that we are not really
responsible for our actions when interacting with others based on our prior discussion of
productive activity. When interacting with others, the self-understandings that allow
certain activities to matter to us are drawn from the social context in which we find
ourselves. For example, when I meet my friend at a bar to discuss his problems, I am
letting this action matter to me on the basis of my understanding of what it is to be a
friend. My understanding of myself as his friend prescribes this action to me. Who has
decided that being someone’s friend involves comforting him when he is distraught?
Heidegger, as we saw when considering productive activity, can again answer that it is
impossible to really pin this understanding of friendship on any single person or group of
people. We can merely say something like “That’s what friends do,” or to phrase it in a
way more in keeping with Heidegger’s terminology, that is what one does when one is
someone’s friend. The articulation of the situation that allows the action of comforting
my friend to matter to me is really performed by the vague general understanding of
friendship. This articulation is not performed by me. Once again, we can see that, given
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the conception of action worked out in the first chapter, this means that we are not really
performing the active part of agency. This in turn means that we are not really
responsible for our everyday interactions with others.
We can also see why we fail to properly understand the structure of our own
being when interacting with other people. As in the case of productive active, when
engaged in social activity, we do not usually engage in willful neglect of proper reflection
on what it means to be human, but rather we are so immersed in our activity that the
structure of our being is simply not an issue for us.

on-Goal-Directed Action
In the first chapter, we briefly discussed the potential problem for the
Heideggerian conception of action that it seems to be based exclusively on Heidegger’s
analysis of productive activity. If this is the case, one might ask whether this conception
of action can be applied to different types of action. In the first chapter, we discussed
how social interaction can be understood according to the same conception of action.
Both productive activity and social interaction share the characteristic of being directed
towards something, either the accomplishment of a specific task (e.g. writing a
dissertation) or the enactment of a particular self-understanding (e.g. being a good
friend). At that time we postponed the consideration of any actions that might not share
this characteristic of being directed towards something.
Now we are in a position to consider actions that do not seem to be directed
towards any clear goal or enactment of some self-understanding. These actions do not
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comfortably fit into the categories of productive actions or interactions with others.
Suppose that after coming home from class, I spend an hour surfing the internet, visiting
various news and sports websites. How are we to analyze this sort of action given what
has been said so far concerning the general structure of action? We could say that I
understand myself as a sports fan or someone concerned with current events, and it is this
self-understanding that allows the action of reading these websites to matter to me. Or
perhaps we could say that these activities matter to me insofar as I understand myself as
someone who works hard and therefore requires some relaxing activities, which are not
aimed at accomplishing anything in particular. These analyses, however, seem somewhat
inadequate.
We can see how to analyze activities of this sort according to the Heideggerian
conception of action by further considering Heidegger’s characterization of das Man and
our tendency to be absorbed into the world of our everyday concerns and social
interactions, specifically his discussions of curiosity, idle talk and ambiguity. There is a
potential problem with limiting the scope of the phenomena of curiosity, idle talk and
ambiguity to non-goal directed activity. Heidegger seems to want to say that these
phenomena are characteristic of all inauthentic activity, not just what we are calling nongoal directed activity. For instance, Heidegger maintains that the structure of the
movement of falling is revealed by the consideration of the interconnections between
curiosity, idle talk and ambiguity (BT 219/175). If the movement of falling is
characteristic of all inauthentic action (as we have attempted to demonstrate here), then
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this implies that curiosity, idle talk and ambiguity are characteristic of all inauthentic
action.
However, as we have also seen, Heidegger maintains that in our everyday
activities, different types of understanding are operative. He seems to want to make a
distinction between the types of understanding that guide productive activity and social
interaction and curiosity. As we have seen, our productive activity is guided by a
practical understanding of things and actions in terms of tasks to be accomplished and
goals to be met. Heidegger calls this type of understanding circumspection (Umsicht).
Our interaction with other people is guided by a type of understanding that Heidegger
calls considerateness (Rücksicht). At times, making use of the German stem -sicht,
Heidegger describes these different types of understanding as types of sight. Heidegger
also considers what sort of sight is operative when we are not engaged in productive
activity or interaction with others (although Heidegger does not explicitly mention the
latter type of action). He states that “[i]n rest, concern does not disappear;
circumspection, however, becomes free and is no longer bound to the world of work”
(BT 216/172). It is this form of sight that is operative when we are not engaged in
productive activity that Heidegger calls curiosity (BT 214/170). Heidegger further
describes curiosity as follows:
When curiosity has become free, however, it concerns itself
with seeing, not in order to understand what is seen…but
just in order to see. It seeks novelty only in order to leap
from it anew to another novelty. In this kind of seeing, that
which is an issue for care does not lie in grasping
something and being knowingly in truth; it lies rather in its
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possibilities of abandoning itself to the world (BT
216/172).
It seems that curiosity as described here is something quite different than the type
of sight or understanding operative in productive activity and social interaction.
Describing the carpenter’s understanding of a nail in light of its usability for his projects
in terms of curiosity does not seem quite right. For this reason, we will treat the
phenomena of curiosity, idle talk and ambiguity as being characteristic of non-goal
directed activity but not productive activity or social interaction with others.
With this in mind, we can now move on to consider how non-goal directed
activity can be understood in terms of the Heideggerian conception of action developed
in the first chapter and in terms of the movement of falling. We can begin by further
considering curiosity. As we have said above, when we are no longer concerned with our
productive activities, we shift to looking at things and activities not in terms of their
usefulness for reaching some further end, but rather we look just to look. This tendency
we have to want to experience and see new things can help explain activities like
aimlessly surfing the internet or flipping through television channels. Heidegger
maintains that we are just drawn towards these sorts of activities because we have a
tendency to always want to know the latest news and to be abreast of the latest trends. If
we reflect on the general conception of action developed in the first chapter, we can see
that this tendency to be curious accounts for the passive aspect of these sorts of non-goaldirected activities. These activities matter because as human beings we have a tendency
to be curious.
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We can expect to find some way of articulating the situation in which we find
ourselves that allows these activities to matter to us. The articulation that guides our
tendency to be curious is what Heidegger calls idle talk (Gerede). “Idle talk,” says
Heidegger, “controls even the ways in which one may be curious” (BT 217/173). It is
idle talk that “says what one ‘must’ have read and seen” (BT 217/173). Heidegger
maintains that we necessarily, due to the very nature of our being as creatures that are
fundamentally social and open to being affected by our social context, understand
ourselves and the world in terms of the public ways of interpreting things that are
deposited like sediments in language itself (BT 211/168). When Heidegger says that idle
talk controls the ways in which we are curious, he means that our curiosity is aroused and
guided by what is currently held to be interesting and important in the court of public
opinion. If I am aimlessly surfing the internet, I find myself looking at things that are
deemed currently to be important by public opinion. For instance, I might end up looking
at election results or the latest sports scores not because I have any real interest in these
topics, but rather because they are simply what one talks about and what public opinion
deems to be interesting. In this way idle talk articulates our situation and lets us be drawn
towards seeing what is going on with regards to the latest news and trends.
We can then characterize non-goal-directed actions as having the same general
structure as the other types of action discussed. The way in which things matter to us in
these non-goal-directed activities is explained by Heidegger’s conception of curiosity,
which is understood in the sense of the desire to seek out and see new things. The
articulation of the world around that guides curiosity and lets it be directed towards
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specific things is performed by idle talk, which can be understood as our immersion in
the public opinions about what is currently important and interesting.
We can see easily enough how non-goal directed activity exhibits the movement
of falling. The tendency to get caught in up whatever is new and interesting, captured in
the phenomenon of curiosity, exhibits the movement of temptation that is characteristic
of falling. We often find ourselves tempted to check up on the latest news and be up on
the latest gossip. Non-goal directed activity also exhibits the movement of alienation.
When engaged in this sort of activity, we are drawn away from ourselves and become
immersed in whatever is determined to be interesting and important by the general public.
Following our program for this chapter, the next task is to show how this nongoal-directed type of action is inauthentic on the basis of the two distinctive
characteristics of inauthentic action. This distinctive characteristic of inauthentic action
is, again, that when acting inauthentically, we are not responsible for our actions. We
have already seen why Heidegger thinks that we are not responsible for our actions when
we are engaged in productive activity or when we are interacting with other people. In
the cases of productive activity or social interaction, the self-understandings that
articulate the situation in which we find ourselves and allow things to matter to us are
drawn from the social context in which we are immersed, so that Heidegger thinks we
must ultimately conclude that the One (das Man) ultimately is responsible for allowing
things to matter to us. In other words, the real agent in these forms of everyday action is
no one in particular.
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Based on this it is easy enough to see why Heidegger would also maintain that
when engaged in non-goal-directed activities like surfing the internet or gossiping with
friends, we are not responsible for our actions. Remember that when we are engaged in
these non-goal-directed activities, we are drawn by curiosity towards seeing and
experiencing new things that are commonly considered to be interesting and worthwhile.
As individual agents, we do not determine what is interesting and worthwhile. Rather,
we are drawn towards those things that public opinion, or idle talk in Heidegger’s
terminology, has deemed to be interesting and important. In this case the articulation that
guides the activity and allows certain things to arouse our curiosity comes directly from
the vague, non-descript zeitgeist and is not located in any single individual or group of
individuals. For Heidegger, this means that we are not responsible for actions when
engaged in non-goal-directed activities.
Again, the second distinctive feature of inauthentic action is that when acting
inauthentically we fail to properly understand the structure of our own being. How is
non-goal-directed action inauthentic in this way? For Heidegger, this sort of action by its
very nature tends to constantly move from one subject to another, never dwelling on one
issue long to gain anything more than a superficial understanding of it. Curiosity has the
character of “never dwelling anywhere” (BT 217/173) and is “concerned with the
constant possibility of distraction” (BT 216/172), so that curiosity “concerns itself with
knowing, but just in order to have known” (BT 217/172). Similarly, idle talk by its very
nature is superficial and fails to provide any deeper understanding of the subject being
discussed. Idle talk takes the form of “gossiping and passing the word along”, which
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“spreads in wider circles and takes on an authoritative character” (BT 212/168). This
leads Heidegger to maintain that curiosity and idle talk are always accompanied by
ambiguity. “Everything,” says Heidegger, “looks as if it were genuinely understood,
genuinely taken hold of, genuinely spoken, though at bottom it is not; or else it does not
look so, and yet at bottom it is” (BT 217/173). When we constantly move from one
subject to another, relying primarily on what is said about that subject for our
understanding of it, we lose the ability to discern the difference between a genuine
understanding of something and a superficial understanding of something.
With regards to our understanding of our own being, this means that we are drawn
by our curiosity towards currently interesting, yet superficial ways of understanding of
our own being. For instance, we find in the “metaphysics” section of any large bookstore
a variety of books that expound on the nature of the human soul and our “higher selves”
without engaging in any sort of rigorous reflection on the subject. Worse still, we tend to
lose the ability to understand the difference between these vague, superficial accounts of
what it is to be human and more rigorous attempts to grasp the structure of our being.
This is again reflected in the common absence of a distinction between popular
“metaphysics” and rigorous philosophical reflection on the same topics. When we are
engaged in these non-goal-directed activities like watching television or chatting with
friends in a café, to the extent that we do concern ourselves with the structure of our own
being, we are drawn toward superficial understandings of our being and furthermore, fail
to differentiate between superficial and genuine attempts to understand what it is to be
human.
95

Conclusion
Now we have shown how productive activity, social interaction and non-goaldirected activity exhibit the movement of falling that is characteristic of all inauthentic
action. We have also shown how non-goal-directed activities can be understood in terms
of the general conception of action developed in the first chapter and why Heidegger
considers these three types of action to be inauthentic based on the two distinctions
between authentic and inauthentic action that were discussed in the second chapter. In
addition to this, our analysis of non-goal-directed activities has expanded the number of
different types of action that can be understood in terms of the general conception of
action from the first chapter and has shown why non-goal-directed activities are not
counter-examples to this general way of understanding action. The challenge for the next
two chapters has now been made clear. In those two chapters, we will attempt to show
how Heidegger develops an account of authentic agency in which we transform our
action in such a way that we not only become responsible for our actions, but also reveal
the structure of our being.
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CHAPTER 4. THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR OUR ACTIONS

Perhaps the main problem for the Heideggerian conception of action that we have
been developing here is that it seems to leave no way in which we can be responsible for
our actions. It is the task of this chapter is to show how it is possible to be responsible for
our actions on the Heideggerian conception of action developed in the preceding
chapters.
To begin with we should review the reasons for not thinking that we are
responsible for our actions when acting inauthentically. Remember that on the general
conception of action developed in the first chapter, human action can be understood as
having interdependent passive and active aspects. The passive aspect of action is that we
are drawn to certain goals and activities available to us in the situation in which we find
ourselves. The active aspect of action is that we take up certain ways of understanding
ourselves that articulate the situation and allow things to matter to us. These ways of
understanding ourselves are drawn from the social context in which we find ourselves
(e.g. understanding oneself as a philosopher). The problem then is that in either case it
seems that the self-understandings that articulate the situation of action do not stem from
the person acting. If this is the case, it seems that the so-called active aspect of action is
not actually performed by the agent herself. This calls into question the possibility of
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being responsible for our actions, or even the possibility of acting in the true sense of the
term.
The structure of the problem for the Heideggerian conception of action is similar
to that of the traditional conception of the problem of free will. On the traditional
formulation of the problem of free will, the threat to free will comes from the possibility
of a physicalistic or naturalistic determinism. The problem then becomes how to
incorporate freely determined actions into what seems like a causally-closed physical
system. A common solution to the free will problem (compatibilism) is to maintain that
determinism is true, but that there is also a meaningful sense of freedom that is
compatible with determinism. For Heidegger, the problem is not naturalistic determinism,
but rather the possibility that all of our actions are ultimately determined by the norms
and practices of the social context in which we find ourselves. The Heideggerian
solution to the problem is similar to that of compatibilism in that Heidegger would want
to show how we can have a meaningful sense of responsibility for our actions that is
compatible with Heidegger’s view that all possible ways of articulating the situation of
action are drawn for the impersonal norms and practices of das Man.
In order to see how a Heideggerian response to this problem can be developed, we
will turn to Heidegger’s 1930 lecture course, The Essence of Human Freedom, in which
he gives a lengthy interpretation of Kant’s practical philosophy, culminating in an
analysis of responsibility.32 There are two objectives to be achieved by the consideration

32

This strategy of turning to Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant to develop a way to account for
responsibility on the Heideggerian conception of action involves its own difficulties. In the beginning of
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of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant in this lecture course. The first, as mentioned
above, is to give an account of how we can be understood as responsible for our actions
while still maintaining that are actions are determined by the fundamentally social selfunderstandings that guide our actions. We will develop this account of a Heideggerian
“compatibilism” through discussion of some of the central aspects of Heidegger’s
interpretation of Kant’s treatment of the third antinomy in the Critique of Pure Reason.
The second objective is show how the Heidegger seeks to go beyond merely establishing
how we can be responsible for our everyday actions to develop an account of authentic
action in which we are responsible for our actions in a stronger sense. We will develop
this Heideggerian conception of what I will call the strong sense of responsibility by
considering the second part of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant from The Essence of
Human Freedom, which focuses on Kant’s discussion of practical freedom in the
Critique of Practical Reason and The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.

our development of a Heideggerian conception of action, we endeavored to show how Heidegger’s
understanding of action comes about through his early interpretation and appropriation of certain
Aristotelian concepts. These Aristotelian concepts are transformed into Heidegger’s distinctive
terminology in Being and Time and in the lecture courses leading up to its publication. In this
terminological transformation, Heidegger is explicitly trying to distance himself from the traditional ways
in which philosophers have understood and described human existence. When giving an interpretation of
Kant’s practical philosophy in The Essence of Human Freedom, Heidegger employs many of the Kantian
terms and concepts that are paradigmatic examples of the sort of traditional philosophical discourse that
Heidegger eschews in Being and Time. The danger here for us is that in relying on Heidegger’s
interpretation of Kant for an understanding of Heidegger conception of responsibility, we will be misled
into transforming the Heideggerian conception of action developed here into a conception of action that is
based on the exact way of understanding human agency that Heidegger is trying to avoid. To avoid this
potential problem, we will attempt to show (in this chapter and the following chapter) how the conceptual
moves made by Heidegger within his interpretation of Kant can be translated back into the concepts and
terminology of the Heideggerian conception of action that stems from his early interpretation of Aristotle
and Being and Time.
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Specifically, we will focus on Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s conception of
autonomy, i.e. the way in which we are subject to and authors of the moral law.

Developing a Heideggerian Version of Compatibilism
Before beginning to discuss the details of Kant’s conception of freedom as it is
developed in Kant’s analysis of the third antinomy, Heidegger provides some background
information that helps to set up and clarify the antinomies in general and the third
antinomy in particular. Heidegger reminds us that all of Kant’s antinomies are discussed
in the section of the first Critique dedicated to the consideration of the cosmological ideas
(EHF 144). According to Kant, our faculty of reason is such that we always are
compelled to attempt to intellectually unify our experience of the world as whole. In
attempting to bring about this unification of experience, we are compelled to employ
concepts beyond the realm of experience, which is their proper domain. This compulsion
of our faculty of reason gives rise to four antinomies, i.e. four ways in which our
compulsion to unify our experience leads to us to hold two antithetical positions.
The third antinomy, which is the one that interests Heidegger, deals with the way
we experience the world in terms of causality. What exactly is meant here by world?
Heidegger begins with Kant’s definition of nature as the totality of appearances and uses
the term ‘world’ synonymously with Kant’s term ‘nature’ (EHF 144). To be more
precise, Heidegger adds to this definition by saying that the world is the totality of
appearances in their temporal succession (EHF 145). In other words, the world is the
totality of things as they come to appear to us, change into other things or disappear.
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What does it mean to say that we experience the world in terms of causality? When we
say that we experience the world in terms of causality, this means that we experience
every present appearance as having been determined by some prior thing or event. If we
experience every appearance in the world as having some prior thing or event as its
cause, we are forced to think of an infinite string of cause and effects. In order to put a
stop to this infinite regress, we are compelled to think of there being something or some
event that has no prior condition as its cause. Our faculty of reason is forced to think of
there being some unconditioned cause that is the beginning of the whole string of
appearances of things.
It is from this idea of an unconditioned cause that we first begin to develop a
conception of freedom. Heidegger is able to explain Kant’s point here by reminding us
of Kant’s general definition of action. For Kant action is first understood in the very
broad sense of bringing about an effect in general (EHF 137). An action that brings
about an effect but is not itself caused, i.e. an action that originates a causal sequence,
would be a free action (EHF 147). Freedom comes to be thought of as a special type of
causality—an ability to originate a causal sequence. Kant refers to freedom understood
in this way as transcendental freedom. Our idea of freedom as an uncaused cause is
transcendental because it makes it possible for us to intellectually unify our experience of
the world (EHF 147). From this point on, we can distinguish natural causality, i.e. the
causality operative in our experience of the temporal succession of appearances, from the
causality of freedom, i.e. the idea of an uncaused cause that makes it possible for us to
unify our experience of the world. Heidegger is careful to point out that up to this point,
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Kant has not proven that there are beings in the world that have freedom (EHF 151).
Rather, Kant has proven that it is necessary for us to think of there being some being or
beings that have freedom. This means that Kant has only established the possibility that
human beings have freedom and has shown in a general, theoretical way the structure of
this possible freedom.
This, in brief, is the argument for the thesis of the third antinomy, i.e. the
argument for why we must think that freedom is possible. The problem is that it is
equally necessary for us to think that it is impossible for freedom to be operative in the
natural world. To see why this is so, let us begin by assuming that the causality of
freedom is operative in the natural world. The causality of freedom is the ability to bring
about an effect without any prior cause. The world is the totality of things as they appear
in accordance with causal laws. If something is brought about through the causality of
freedom, there is no cause prior to this originating cause. That means that this originating
causation is not itself governed by the laws of causality. Therefore, this sort of causality
can never be part of the natural world. (EHF 152, CPR A 445, B 473)
Kant tries to resolve this problem in what Heidegger terms a negative way (EHF
156). What Heidegger means by this is that Kant’s solution is to show how and why we
get caught in this antinomy rather than showing how we can in fact think of the two types
of causality being operative simultaneously. Heidegger wants to go beyond Kant here
and show that a positive solution to the third antinomy is possible. That is, Heidegger
wants to show how both types of causality can be thought of as operating simultaneously.
In order to provide a positive solution, we have to consider the possibility that an event in
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the natural world can be determined by both natural and transcendental causality (EHF
164).
At this point we should pause to point out that the way in which Heidegger tries to
extend Kant’s conception of transcendental causality seems to contradict what Kant
explicitly says in the development of the third antinomy. It is precisely Kant’s point in
the explanation of the antithesis of the third antinomy that transcendental causality can
never be operative in the phenomenal realm. In order for it to be possible to unify our
experience of the phenomenal world, we must think of there being some a cause that
itself has no prior cause. It seems that Heidegger wants to collapse the Kantian
distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal by attempting to show that the
causality of freedom, which according to Kant is strictly noumenal in the sense that it can
only be thought and not experienced at the phenomenal, is somehow operative at the
phenomenal level. However, it is this separation of the phenomenal and noumenal that
allows Kant to satisfactorily solve the problem posed by naturalistic determinism.
Heidegger would appear to lose the justification for using the concept of transcendental
causality if he seeks to employ this concept in such a clear perversion of its role in Kant’s
thought.
Is there anything to be said in defense of Heidegger’s reading of Kant here?
While it seems clear in this case that Heidegger violates Kant’s basic intention and gets
something fundamental about Kant’s thought wrong, it should be pointed out that
Heidegger is never particularly concerned with getting philosophers “right” in his
interpretations of them. Instead, Heidegger seems to employ figures from the history of
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philosophy as interlocutors whose thought he selectively uses as a springboard to the
development of his own ideas. In this case, Heidegger is interested in exploring the
possibility of there being a mode of causality other than the traditional understanding of
efficient causality that is also operative in our experience of the world. While Kant’s
discussion of causality in the first Critique does not give Heidegger the solution he wants,
Kant’s thought does provide the impetus and background for Heidegger’s attempt to say
something about what this other type of causality might be, even if Heidegger distorts
Kant’s thought in the process.
With this caveat in mind, we can move to the consideration of how we can
understand that an event in the world can be determined by a natural cause and a
transcendental cause. Heidegger maintains that the answer can be found in Kant’s
thought, even if Kant himself does not proceed towards a solution in this way. According
to Heidegger, if we accept Kant’s separation of the phenomenal and noumenal, we see
that two types of causality are at work in all appearances of things in the natural world.
All events in the world are conditioned by prior events. This is natural causality.
However, events in the natural world are not things in themselves, but rather appearances.
We have to think of there being some noumenal object or thing-in-itself that is the ground
for the appearance of things in the natural world. This is intelligible or transcendental
causality. This is the sort of unconditioned causality that we are looking for. Since the
thing-in-itself is outside the succession of appearances that is the natural world, we are
not forced to think of there being some prior state that is the cause of it. If this is the
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case, then we see how we can think of there being two types of causality operative in the
world, at least within the context of Kant’s thought.
Although there is no evidence to suggest that Heidegger himself was particularly
concerned with showing how it might still be possible to have a weak sense of
responsibility for our everyday actions (he seems only to have been interested in what I
am calling the strong sense of responsibility achieved in authentic action), we can provide
an account of how we can be seen to have responsibility for our everyday actions by
using some of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant. The use of the qualifier ‘weak’ is
simply meant to distinguish this sort of everyday responsibility from the stronger sense of
responsibility developed in the next section.
To see how we can find a weak sense of responsibility in our everyday actions,
we can begin by considering the way in which Heidegger tries to show how two types of
causality are operative in the occurrence of events in the world. Remember that for Kant,
the problem is to show how freedom is possible even though we have to experience
events in the world as being determined by prior events, i.e. as subject to natural
causality. According to Heidegger, Kant provides us with an outline of what the
causality of freedom would have to look like, but Kant does not do enough to show how
the causality of freedom could actually be operative in the natural world. Heidegger tries
to resolve this issue in a more satisfactory way by using Kant’s conception of the thingin-itself as the ground for all appearances to show how we can think of a transcendental
causality being operative at the same time as natural causality.
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We can use Heidegger’s illustration of the operation of these two types of
causality in human action to further clarify the Heideggerian conception of action
developed in the first chapter and to develop a Heideggerian version of compatibilism.
There are also two types of causality operative in the Heideggerian conception of action,
or to use a more neutral term, there are two components that determine our actions. As
we have seen, on the Heideggerian conception of action, our actions can be understood as
involving a passive aspect (being drawn towards things and activities that matter to us)
and an active aspect (the articulation of the situation of action that makes it possible for
these things to matter to us). Here we find a parallel to the Kantian distinction between
natural causality and transcendental causality and the connection between the two types
of causality. On the Heideggerian conception of action, we are affected by things and
people that we encounter in our environment. This is similar to the way in which Kant
maintains that we are subject to natural causality insofar as we are beings that appear in
the realm of nature. The active aspect of the Heideggerian conception of action can be
understood as similar to transcendental causality. The articulation of the situation of
action through taking up various possible self-understandings makes it possible for things
in the environment to affect us.33 Our actions are always co-determined by these two
aspects of our being.

33

It is instructive here to remember our discussion of Haugeland’s interpretation of Heidegger’s use of the
verb ‘lassen’ in the first chapter. Haugeland argues that the best way to understand Heidegger’s use of
lassen (or the English ‘to let’) is as enabling or making possible. When we say that our self-understandings
let things matter to us, we mean that these self-understanding make it possible for things to matter to us.
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As is obvious from our prior discussions of inauthentic action, simply showing
how transcendental and natural causality can be operative simultaneously is not enough
to show how we can be responsible for our actions on the Heideggerian conception of
action. Heidegger maintains that the self-understandings that articulate the situations in
which we find ourselves in our everyday activities are all drawn from the social context
in which we are immersed. This means that for any given action, the situation of action
has been articulated not by the individual agent, but rather by nebulous and impersonal
social norms. Because of this, it still appears that we as individuals cannot be responsible
for our actions. What is supposed to be the active part of action, the articulation that
makes it possible for things to matter to us, still is not grounded in the individual agent.
To solve this problem for the Heideggerian conception of action, we would need
to show that the possibility of articulating any situation, i.e. the possibility of taking up
any self-understanding whatsoever, is grounded in the individual agent. In effect, we
would be moving our consideration back to a second transcendental level by asking what
it is that in general makes possible the articulation of the particular situation of action by
das Man that makes it possible for certain things, people and activities to matter to us. In
order for us to be responsible for our inauthentic actions, this second-order transcendental
causality must be shown to be grounded in the individual agent. We find the solution we
are seeking in Heidegger’s discussion of death in Division II of Being and Time. The
analysis of death reveals to us that our being is such that we always transcend any
particular, concrete way of understanding ourselves and that our being is fundamentally
constituted by projecting out towards possible ways of existing right up to the very
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instant of death. Moreover, for Heidegger death is that one possible way of being that
completely individualizes us and pulls us out of all the possible self-understandings
available in our social context.
Before saying more about the features of Heidegger’s analysis of death that are
especially relevant to our concerns here, it is important to discuss how Heidegger’s
conception of death differs from our normal ways of understanding death. The initial
problem that confronts Heidegger is the difficulty associated with actually experiencing
death. At the individual level, we can never experience our own death. At the very
moment of death, we cease to exist and thereby lose the ability to really experience what
death is. In Heidegger’s words: “When Dasein reaches its wholeness in death, it
simultaneously loses the Being of its ‘there’. By its transition to no-longer-Dasein, it gets
lifted right out of the possibility of experiencing this transition and of understanding it as
something experienced” (BT 281/237). Heidegger’s subsequent analysis of death is
initially oriented by the need to overcome this seeming impossibility of truly grasping
what death is.
The first potential solution considered by Heidegger is that we can come to
understand death by experiencing the death of other people (BT 281/237-285/241).
However, experiencing the death of others does not allow us to really grasp what it is like
to make the transition from life to death. Heidegger states:
Death does indeed reveal itself as a loss, but a loss such as
is experienced by those who remain. In suffering this loss,
however, we have no way of access to the loss-of-Being as
such which the dying man ‘suffers’. The dying of Others is
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not something which we experience in a genuine sense; at
most we are always just ‘there alongside’ (BT 282/239).
If we cannot experience our own death and we cannot truly experience the death
of others, what possibilities of understanding death remain open to us? Because of the
above considerations, Heidegger determines that we cannot think of death as our lives
being at an end if we are ever to really understand it. Rather, death must be thought of as
being towards the end (BT 289/245). “Death,” according to Heidegger, “is a way to be,
which Dasein takes over as soon as it is” (BT 289/245). Being-towards-death means that
we are being-towards the possibility of death. As we saw in the first chapter, Heidegger
makes it clear that we are always projecting ourselves towards some possible way of
existing. We always understand ourselves in terms of one or more possible ways of
being that we are enacting at any moment. As we have also seen, these possible ways of
being can be rooted in our biological existence. For example, when Heidegger discusses
the activity of hammering in order to make a dwelling secure against inclement weather,
he claims this activity is guided by our possible understanding of ourselves as beings that
require shelter. Being-towards-death as a possibility can be thought of as understanding
our existence in terms of the fact that we are mortal beings who will die. In other words,
being-towards-death is Heidegger’s expression used to signify that way in which we
understand ourselves as mortal beings as opposed to the other possible selfunderstandings that we have discussed earlier, e.g. being a philosopher, being a husband,
etc.
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Now that we have some understanding of why Heidegger talks about death in
terms of being-towards-death and what this might mean, we can return to the
consideration of the two most important aspects of being-towards-death for our
discussion of responsibility. First we must consider how being-towards-death as a
possible way of understanding ourselves is supposed to show that our existence is such
that we always transcend any particular, concrete way of understanding ourselves. This
would show that it is our fundamental ability to project ourselves towards possible ways
of existing that makes possible the articulation of any situation of action whatsoever, and
indeed, makes possible the anonymous, impersonal articulation of das Man.
Heidegger characterizes death as a possibility. In fact, Heidegger maintains that
dying is a unique possible way of existing. Unlike all other possible ways of existing that
we might take up, the possibility of dying gives us nothing to actualize. Heidegger says
that normally “‘Being towards’ a possibility—that is to say, towards something
possible—may signify ‘Being out for’ something possible, as in concerning ourselves
with its actualization” (BT 305/261). In our everyday existence we are constantly
directed towards the actualization of the projects in which we are engaged. We are also
directed towards actualizing or enacting the various self-understandings that we take up,
e.g. one might be directed toward being a student, which would mean doing all those
things that serve to actualize or enact this possible way of being. When we are directed
towards the actualization of possibilities, we are directed towards concrete actions in the
world and come to understand entities and ourselves in terms of our worldly projects.
However, Heidegger states that the possibility of dying gives us nothing to actualize. He
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says, “[d]eath, as possibility, gives Dasein nothing to be ‘actualized’, nothing which
Dasein, as actual, could itself be” (BT 307/262). Death is the complete annihilation of
our existence. There is no positive state of existence associated with it that we can expect
to be actualized.
This leads Heidegger to make a distinction between our normal mode of
comportment towards our possibilities that is focused upon their actualization and the
mode of comportment we take up in authentic being-towards-death that is focused not on
the actualization of possibilities, but rather on our pushing forward into possibilities as
such. He calls the first mode of comportment expecting (Erwarten) and the second mode
of comportment running ahead (Vorlaufen). Expecting is not “just an occasional lookingaway from the possible to its possible actualization, but is essentially a waiting for that
actualization” (BT 306/262). With the term Vorlaufen, Heidegger seeks to capture the
sense in which, in authentic being-towards-death, we concretely experience how it is
constitutive for our being that we are always existing out beyond ourselves (i.e. running
ahead of ourselves), a fact that is obscured by our normal focus on actualization. The
possibility of death “offers no support for becoming intent on something, ‘picturing’ to
oneself the actuality which is possible, and so forgetting its possibility” (BT 307/262).
In authentic being-towards-death, we experience the projective aspect of our
existence in its pure form. We realize that even when all other possibilities have become
unavailable to us, we still project towards the possibility of death. It is this projective
aspect of our existence that makes possible any self-understanding whatsoever. The
articulation of the situation of action is made possible in each particular case by our
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essential ontological characteristic of projecting ourselves towards some possibility.
Because our ability to project ourselves towards possibilities is always what makes any
particular action possible, we are responsible for all of our actions, even the inauthentic
actions. Even in the most irresolute actions in which we merely do what one does and
avoid making any decisions on our own, we are still responsible for our actions in the
weak sense because it is the projective aspect of our existence that makes that articulation
of the situation by das Man possible. Our ability to project ourselves out towards
possibilities always transcends any particular possibility.
Furthermore, it is from the fact that we are finite beings who will die that we get a
sense that we are unified, individual selves, engaged in action. Heidegger refers to death
as our ownmost possibility and as non-relational (BT 307/263-308/264). These two
characteristics of death are connected insofar as they both stem from Heidegger’s
discussion of our ability to be represented (vertretet werden) by others in our everyday
existence. As discussed in the previous chapters, Heidegger maintains that in our
everyday existence, we primarily understand ourselves in terms of our projects and the
social roles and responsibilities that we fulfill. In our everyday existence, “Dasein
understands itself in terms of that with which it is customarily concerned. ‘One is’ what
one does” (BT 283/239). From this it follows, according to Heidegger, that
“representability [Vertretbarkeit] is not only quite possible but is even constitutive for our
being with one another. Here one Dasein can and must, within certain limits, ‘be’
another Dasein” (BT 283/239-284/240).
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It is easy enough to follow Heidegger’s line of thought here. If, in our everyday
existence, I am what I do, e.g. I can teach, drive, cook, etc., which makes me a teacher,
driver, cook, etc., then anyone who performs the same activities I perform can, in a sense,
be me. That is, anyone who performs the same role as me and does the same things as
me can effectively represent me or stand in for me. When we understand our being in
terms of what we do, we do not really understand our own being. Rather, we always
understand our being insofar as we can represented by another person. Death, however,
is that one possibility in which we cannot be represented by another person. Death is
always individualized—no one can stand in for us when we are about to die. Beingtowards-death authentically then forces us to understand our being without recourse to
our everyday understanding of ourselves in terms of our roles and activities, i.e. it makes
our own being the issue, not our being in which we can be another person. We can also
see why Heidegger would characterize being-towards-death as a possible way of being
that is non-relational. When we grasp that in dying we cannot be represented by someone
else, we are individualized. That is, I experience acutely my existence as an individual
when I understand that when I die, it is I alone who am dying. No one can take my place,
and no one can accompany me. When dying, one’s career and worldly ambitions are no
longer of any import—death comes all the same.
We can consider an example here to show how we can understand ourselves as
being responsible in a weak sense for everyday, inauthentic actions. Consider your
average undergraduate student. She probably is only marginally interested in the material
presented in her courses and puts forward the minimum effort required to earn
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respectable (but not outstanding) grades. She probably never spent much time
considering whether or not to go to college. It was just understood that if one is an
American high school student from a certain socio-economic bracket, one goes to college
after high school in order to earn a degree, which is in turn supposed to secure
respectable future employment. The student’s actions are guided by her understanding of
herself as a certain sort of person. This self-understanding allows certain things like
going to college and earning a degree to matter to her. We might claim that her actions
are determined by the social norms that prescribe to her what a person of a certain sort
ought to be doing. However, what we have attempted to show in this section is that in
order for these social norms to hold any sway with her, the student must, if even at a
completely tacit level, understand herself as a person of a particular section of society.
That is, the student must be projecting herself towards the enactment of this particular
way of being. It is this individualized projective capacity that makes it possible for any
social norms to have any influence on her at all. In this way, we can see her actions as
socially determined, and yet maintain that the student, as an individual agent, is still
responsible for her actions, at least in a weak sense.

Achieving Responsibility in the Strong Sense in Authentic Action
Now we can consider what it would be like to be responsible for our actions in the
strong sense. If the student in the previous example, who goes about doing what a
college student does without any explicit commitment to the enactment of this selfunderstanding, is responsible for her actions in the weak sense, we can ask what it would

114

look like for a student to be responsible for her actions in the strong sense. One option
would be to claim that she would be responsible for her actions in the strong sense if she
were to reject the social norms guiding her actions and base her actions completely on her
own decisions and preferences. This would be something like the decisionistic
interpretation of Heidegger’s account of authentic action. As we discussed in the
Introduction, this interpretation is neither philosophically viable nor textually supported.
The other option would be to imagine a student who makes an explicit commitment to
understanding herself as a college student. In this case the student is not rejecting the
social norms that prescribe her actions as a student to her. Rather, she is actively taking
on or owning these norms. In other words, she is actively giving herself over to being
bound by certain social norms rather than passively letting her life be dictated by these
norms while avoiding any explicit personal commitment.
We can flesh out this rather intuitive portrayal of responsibility in the strong sense
by considering Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s practical philosophy in The Essence
of Human Freedom. Specifically, we want to focus on Heidegger’s discussion of Kant’s
conception of autonomy. On Heidegger’s reading of Kant, it is in the performative act of
putting oneself under the legislation of the moral law that we achieve true selfresponsibility (EHF 201). By considering Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant on this
point, we can see how responsibility in the strong sense for Heidegger can be understood
as the performative act of explicitly committing oneself to a certain self-understanding,
which entails committing oneself to be bound by certain social norms.
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We can begin by considering Heidegger’s brief outline of the structure of human
action as found in Kant’s second Critique and the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of
Morals. Heidegger begins by examining Kant’s conception of will-governed action. He
reminds us that action in the general sense for Kant is the “relation of a subject of
causality to the effect” (EHF 189). When we are talking about specifically human action,
we call this praxis. Praxis is the “particular kind of action made possible by a will, i.e.
such that the relation of the subject of the causation, the determining instance, to the
effect, occurs through will” (EHF 189). In other words, praxis, i.e. human action, is
distinguished by the fact that the will determines the action. Heidegger then proceeds to
Kant’s definition of the will as a “power to act according to concepts” (EHF 189). What
is meant by acting according to concepts here? “A concept,” says Heidegger, “is the
representation of something, being able and willing to act according to what is thus
represented” (EHF 189-190). Will-governed action is action that is determined by a
representation of something. Heidegger gives us a somewhat unhelpful example of willgoverned action (EHF 190). He says that we could have a representation of the
“scientific education of humans [des Mensches]” (translation modified), and this
representation can determine an action. What Heidegger seems to mean by this is that we
could have an idea of how to educate people in a “scientific” manner (or alternatively, an
idea of how to teach people science). When our actions are determined by this idea, we
act in such a way that our actions are aimed at educating people in a scientific way.
Heidegger goes on to explain what Kant means by practical reason and how
Kant’s concept of practical reason is connected to will-governed action. Reason is
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involved in will-governed action because, whenever our representations are the
“determining instance” of an action, reason is involved. In will-governed action, our
action is determined by a conceptual representation. Since a conceptual representation is
involved in will-governed action, the faculty of reason must be involved in some way.
For Kant, practical reason just is the will because practical reason provides the principles
that are the determining grounds for human action, which is exactly the function
performed by the will.
As Heidegger points out, on this Kantian conception of action, our actions are
often determined by conceptual representations that are drawn from the realm of our
empirical experience (EHF 190). For instance, we could say that when I am teaching a
class, my action is determined by my representation of what it means to be an instructor.
However, it is also possible for our actions to be determined by representations drawn
purely from practical reason itself. On Heidegger’s reading of Kant, the only
representation that can be drawn from pure practical reason is the representation of the
moral law, which, as we know, is the categorical imperative (EHF 193). When our
actions are determined by the categorical imperative, we understand our actions to be
determined (by the moral law), but we also understand this determining ground for our
actions to be the essence of practical reason itself.
This performative act of letting one’s actions be determined by the moral law,
while simultaneously understanding that the moral law is grounded in the structure of
one’s own faculty of reason is, for Heidegger, the essence of being responsible for one’s
actions in the strong sense. In his words, “self-responsibility” is “to bind oneself to
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oneself” (EHF 201). Acting with self-responsibility is binding oneself to act according to
the moral law. It is this act of representing to oneself the moral law and placing oneself
under the moral law that is a free action, or the action that is determined purely from the
agent herself. The achievement of responsibility in the strong sense for Heidegger is not
about overcoming or rejecting normative constraints, but rather it is about explicitly
placing oneself under normative constraints.
We must exercise some caution when applying these aspects of Heidegger’s
interpretation of Kant to the Heideggerian conception of action we have been developing
here. The role of conceptual representations in the Kantian and Heideggerian
conceptions of action is very different. On the Kantian conception of human action,
conceptual representations provide the determining grounds for actions. That is, on
Kant’s view we form conceptual representations that provide us with the goal of our
action or the desired effect to be brought about. On the Heideggerian conception of
human action, we take up various ways of understanding ourselves that allow goals and
activities to matter to us. This need not take place at the conceptual level. In fact, as we
have seen, Heidegger claims that these self-understandings are operative at a preconceptual level more often than not. When compared to Kant, Heidegger downplays the
explicit operation of reason in human action. It is also important to note that Heidegger
is fairly dismissive of Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative34,
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“So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same as the principle of universal
legislation” (EHF 196, Critique of Practical Reason V, 31).
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maintaining that this specific formulation as a relic of the thinking of the Enlightenment
(EHF 197).
Even while bearing these important differences in mind, we can, at this point,
draw a parallel between the initial intuitive conception of what responsibility in the
strong sense would be like on the Heideggerian conception of action and Heidegger’s
interpretation of Kant. The student considered in the example at the beginning of this
section who actively commits herself to the self-understanding of being a student is
binding herself to certain public norms. Insofar as she performs the performative act of
binding herself in this way, she can be seen as being responsible for her actions in the
strong sense. In effect, Heidegger substitutes the normative constraints of the moral law
under which one places oneself on the Kantian conception of action with the normative
constraints placed on one’s actions by the situation in which one finds oneself.
It is important to point out that the particulars of the actions of the student who is
weakly responsible for her actions might be very similar or even identical to the actions
of the student who is strongly responsible for her actions. One way of explicating the
difference between the weak and strong senses of responsibility might be to say that the
first-order choices of the student who is weakly responsible for her actions might be the
same as the first-order choices of the student who is strongly responsible, but the student
who is strongly responsible for her actions has made a second-order choice, while the
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student who is weakly responsible has not.35 Both the student who is weakly responsible
and the student who is strongly responsible might make the choice to go to class or study
for a test, but the student who is strongly responsible has also made the second-order
choice to commit to this understanding of herself as a student. The student who is
weakly responsible has not made any second-order choice whatsoever. It is perhaps
something like this that Heidegger has in mind when he characterizes authentic action as
“choosing to choose” (BT 313/268). In other words, for Heidegger, the important choice
is not the first-order choice of which particular action one should undertake, but rather it
is the second-order choice of choosing to take ownership of one’s actions.
Another important point should be considered here. We mentioned in the Second
Chapter that, for Heidegger, the existence of viable alternative courses of action is not a
requirement for responsibility. Now we are in a position to clarify and further explain
this claim. We can do this by considering the example of Martin Luther, particularly his
famous proclamation at the Diet of Worms, “Here I stand. I can do no other.” Various
philosophers have made use of this example to show that we can be responsible for our
actions even when there are no viable alternatives, which is presumably the case with
Luther if we take him at his word.36 We can analyze Luther’s situation using the
Heideggerian conception of action as follows. We could say that Luther understands
himself as a Christian of a certain sort. This self-understanding articulates the situation in
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Here I am drawing on Harry Frankfurt’s distinction between first-order and second-order volitions in his
“Freedom of the will and the concept of a person” in The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988), 11-25.
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For example, see Frankfurt’s “The Importance of What We Care About” in The Importance of What We
Care About, 80-94.
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which he finds himself in such a way that he sees no other choice but to stand firm at the
Diet of Worms. In this way the combination of the situation of action and Luther’s
particular self-understanding demand a certain action from Luther. On the Heideggerian
conception of action, there could very well be cases like that of Luther in which there
really are no viable alternative actions. This would mean that there is really no first-order
choice, i.e. the choice of which course of action to take, to be made. However, on the
Heideggerian conception of action we could maintain that Luther can still be responsible
for his actions in the strong sense if he makes the second-order choice of explicitly
committing himself to this understanding of himself as a Christian of a certain sort. In
making this choice, Luther binds himself to have his actions determined by the demands
of the situation.
We can now add a further consideration concerning what is required for
responsibility in the strong sense, a consideration which also serves as a connection to the
following chapter. The focus of the following chapter will be the explanation of how we
achieve a certain sort of self-knowledge when acting authentically. From our
consideration of strong responsibility in this chapter, we can see that acting in such a way
that one is responsible for one’s actions in the strong sense requires the agent to act with
a certain sort of knowledge.
To see why this is, we can begin by returning to Heidegger’s interpretation of
Kant. At the very end of his interpretation of Kant, Heidegger suggests that for Kant the
self-consciousness of practical reason is identical with acting with responsibility (EHF
203). Without going into too much detail, we can provide some general explanation of
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Heidegger’s claim. From what we have already discussed, it seems clear that action in
the strong sense requires some degree of self-awareness on the part of the agent. On
Heidegger’s interpretation of the Kantian conception of action, we are responsible in the
strong sense when we bind ourselves to ourselves, i.e. when we place ourselves under the
legislation of the moral law of which we ourselves are the authors. There are several
things of which we must be aware for this self-binding to take place. We must have some
knowledge of what the moral law actually is if we are to place ourselves under its
legislation. We must also have some understanding of the structure of our being as
rational agents in order to understand that we are the type of beings that can (and should)
determine their actions through reason. Additionally, we must have some knowledge of
how the moral law is in fact grounded in our own faculty of reason so that placing
ourselves under the moral law is truly understood an autonomous action.
We can again find some parallels in the Heideggerian conception of actions. The
previously mentioned points of difference between the two conceptions of action of
course still apply. Most importantly in this case, Heidegger will insist that there is nontheoretical form of knowledge operative in action itself. Heidegger maintains that willing
itself is a form of knowing. He states:
Knowledge of the determining ground of action belongs to
willing as effecting through representation of what is
willed. Actual willing is always clear about its determining
grounds. Actual willing is a specific kind of actual
knowing and understanding. It is a kind of knowing that
cannot be replaced by anything else, least of all through
(e.g. psychological) knowledge of human beings (EHF
198).
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We can see what Heidegger means by this and why he might make this claim by
returning to the example of Luther. In order for Luther to be responsible for his actions
in the strong sense, he has to act with knowledge of certain things. Luther must have
some knowledge of the self-understanding, e.g. being a Christian of certain sort, to which
he is committing himself. He must also have knowledge of the situation in which he
finds himself, particularly knowledge of the situation as articulated by Luther’s
understanding of himself as a Christian of a certain sort. That is, in order for Luther to
understand the demands placed on him by his situation, he must understand what is
required of a Christian of a certain sort who finds himself in this situation. Finally,
Luther must act with some understanding of what it means to be a human agent. This last
point is perhaps a little more difficult to see. Luther could see himself as being helplessly
determined in his actions by larger social and historical forces. In this case he could not
ever be responsible for his actions in the strong sense, since it would never occur to him
that he could make the second-order choice to take ownership of his actions. In other
words, Luther would have to have some understanding of the way in which our ability to
understand ourselves in certain ways allows for the demands of the situation to hold any
sway with us.
It is admittedly rather implausible to suppose that Luther acted with any explicit
knowledge of any these of things, especially explicit knowledge of the Heideggerian
conception of action. Heidegger, however, is going to maintain that we all act with this
sort of knowledge. He is going to maintain that a careful examination of our experience
of familiar phenomena like death, conscience and guilt will reveal that in these
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phenomena there is a pre-conceptual knowledge of the structure of human agency, the
situation of action and the self-understanding that guides one’s action. In the course of
our everyday (or inauthentic) actions, this knowledge remains at the tacit level. It is in
authentic action that we come to achieve the clear and explicit level of self-knowledge
required for being strongly responsible for our actions. It is to the consideration of
Heidegger’s account of how we achieve this self-knowledge in authentic action that we
now turn.
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CHAPTER 5. BECOMING RESPONSIBLE IN THE STRONG SENSE—
REVEALING OUR BEING IN AUTHENTIC ACTION

In the last chapter, we showed how Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s practical
philosophy can lead to an understanding of how we can be responsible for our actions
achieved when acting authentically. We saw that according to Heidegger’s reading of
Kant, self-responsibility in the sense of pure willing can be understood as acting with the
proper sort of self-knowledge, specifically knowledge of being bound by the moral law
and the fact that one is also the author of this law. In the second chapter, there were two
main distinctions drawn between authentic and inauthentic action. It was maintained that
when acting authentically, we are responsible for our actions and we reveal the structure
of our being to ourselves.
In this chapter we will be in a position to see the interconnection of these two
distinctions between authentic and inauthentic action. We will see that on the
Heideggerian conception of action, in order to achieve responsibility for our actions, we
need to act with the proper knowledge of our own being. In the last chapter, we
established that responsibility is achieved when the self-understanding taken up by the
agent that articulates the situation of action is drawn from the agent’s own being as
opposed to the social context. At least according to Heidegger, the only possibility that is
drawn purely from our being as individual agents is the possibility of death. We become
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responsible for our actions in the strong sense when we authentically take up the
possibility of understanding ourselves as being-towards-death. In this chapter we will
endeavor to show that authentic being-towards-death is a way of existing in which we
properly reveal the structure of our being to ourselves. Our “ownmost” possibility, i.e.
death, comes to be understood as the possibility of achieving a clear and ontologically
appropriate understanding of our own being.
We can orient ourselves with respect to this analysis of authentic action by first
briefly reminding ourselves of the ways in which we fail to properly understand our being
when acting inauthentically. When engaged in productive activity or when interacting
with other people, we are directed out towards the completion of the tasks with which we
are engaged or the people with whom we are interacting. In these types of activities, our
own being does not become an issue for us at all because our actions have this direction
out towards things and people in the world. When engaged in non-goal-directed
activities, we are drawn towards whatever is new and interesting and do not develop
anything more than superficial understandings of ourselves and things in the world,
merely relying on what is commonly said about things.
We might then think that we should extricate ourselves from all of these types of
activity and attempt to engage in pure theoretical reflection on the structure of our being.
However, as we have shown in the second chapter, Heidegger, taking seriously Natorp’s
critiques of Husserlian phenomenology, maintains that theoretical reflection will
inevitably distort our understanding of our being by attempting to grasp our being as
something static and present-at-hand and by attempting to describe the structure of our
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being through the use of concepts (e.g. soul, mind, consciousness, etc.) that inevitably
carry with them unfounded presuppositions.
If we are able to reveal the structure of our being to ourselves when acting
authentically, i.e. when authentically being-towards-death, authentic action must
overcome all of these obstacles to properly understanding our being. This means that
authentic action must have the following characteristics:
1. When engaged in authentic action, our being itself must be the focus of our
actions. Authentic action cannot be directed solely towards things that are external to the
acting itself as is the case with productive activity and interaction with others.
2. When engaged in authentic action, our understanding of our being cannot be
drawn from the superficial ways of understanding our being as is the case in our nongoal-directed activity, which is directed by idle talk.
3. Authentic action must provide with a way of understanding our being that
adequately captures the essentially dynamic and temporal structure of our being and does
so without the use of conceptual description.
At this point it is not at all clear how we reveal our being to ourselves in this way
in authentic being-towards-death, nor is it at all clear how authentic being-towards-death
has anything to do with action. In the first section of this chapter, we will consider how
Heidegger thinks we come to properly understand the structure of our own being in
authentic being-towards-death. Heidegger himself is aware that his account of authentic
being-towards-death might seem overly abstract and disconnected from our concrete,
phenomenological experience, as he asks, “What can death and the ‘concrete Situation' of
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taking action have in common” (BT 349/302)? That is why, in the sections of Being and
Time immediately following his account of being-towards-death, Heidegger attempts to
show how his account of being-towards-death can be concretized in the experience of the
conscience when engaged in resolute action. Accordingly, the second section of this
chapter will be dedicated to an interpretation of Heidegger’s conceptions of conscience
and resoluteness. In the third section of this chapter, we will show how Heidegger’s
understanding of authentic being-towards-death and the experience of conscience in
resolute action can be combined to give an account of how we achieve the selfknowledge of our own being in action that makes us responsible for our actions in the
strong sense.

Revealing the Structure of Our Being in Authentic Being-Towards-Death
When discussing Heidegger’s analysis of death in the last chapter, we did so for
the reason that death is the one possibility that is grounded completely in the being and
individual agent and thus provided us with the possibility of understanding how we could
be responsible for our actions. In other words, death was approached from the standpoint
of responsibility. The approach in this chapter is different. Here we are considering
Heidegger’s analysis of death to see how he thinks it is possible for us to come to
properly grasp our own being in authentic action. This means that the first question to be
considered here is the general question of why Heidegger thinks death is at all relevant
when it comes to grasping the structure of our being. We can answer this question by
remembering some of our considerations from earlier chapters. As we discussed in the
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first chapter, one of the essential aspects of our being is that we always are projecting
ourselves out towards the completion of some project or the enactment of some
possibility more generally. In the third chapter, we discussed how our being directed out
towards possible goals and possible ways of being makes us fail to focus on the structure
of our own being when acting inauthentically.
When first discussing death, Heidegger brings up the same problem in slightly
different terms. If we really are to understand our being, we need to be able to grasp our
being in its totality (BT 275/232). However, if one aspect of our being is that we are
always directed out towards something, it seems difficult, if not impossible, to really
grasp our being in its totality because we are always on the way to doing something or
being something. In Heidegger’s words:
“[I]f existence is definitive for Dasein’s Being and if its
essence is constituted in part by potentiality-for-Being,
then, as long as Dasein exists, it must in each case, as such
a potentiality, not yet be something. Any entity whose
Essence is made up of existence, is essentially opposed to
the possibility of our getting it in our grasp as an entity
which is whole” (BT 276/233).
We typically understand the end of our existence to be death. By understanding
what it means to come to an end and what it means to die, we can come to grasp our
being in its totality. As we saw in the last chapter, when it comes to grasping what death
really means, we face the problem of the seeming impossibility of ever experiencing
death. To overcome this problem, Heidegger proposes that we understand death as a
possible way of being, which he calls being-towards-death.
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For Heidegger, we can take up being-towards-death as a possible way of existing
authentically or inauthentically. Based on our previous discussion of the differences
between authenticity and inauthenticity and the character of inauthentic action, we can
already see what inauthentic being-towards-death would be like for Heidegger. When
being-towards-death in an inauthentic way, we have a tendency to understand death and
the fact that we are mortal in terms of the prevailing public ways of interpreting death,
e.g. by acknowledging the certainty of death, but not ever believing that death is
imminent or by maintaining that thinking about death is pointless and perhaps even
cowardly. These inauthentic ways of being-towards-death serve to distort our
understanding of the phenomenon of death and divert our attention from it.
Here we are interested in how the structure of our being is revealed to us in
authentic being-towards-death. In the previous chapter, we mentioned Heidegger’s
characterization of authentic being-towards-death as a running ahead (Vorlaufen), in
which we understand that our projective capacity transcends the actualization of any
particular possibility. This is Heidegger’s general conception of authentic being-towardsdeath—existing in such a way that we are given nothing to actualize. Heidegger then
proceeds, in ¶ 53 of Being and Time, to lay out the “concrete structure” of authentic
being-towards-death. In other words, he sets out to more fully describe the different
aspects of this more general conception of authentic being-towards-death and attempts to
ground it in our normal understanding of death (BT 307/263-310/266). This further
analysis of authentic being-towards-death also shows how we are able to disclose our
own being in this mode of existence. Let us first list these different aspects or ways of
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characterizing death and then proceed to analyze the way in which each of them
contributes to the disclosing of our being in authentic being-towards-death. The list is as
follows:
1.) Death as Dasein’s ownmost (eigenste) possibility
2.) Death as non-relational (unbezüglich)
3.) Death as the possibility that cannot be overtaken (unüberholbar)
4.) Death as certain (gewiss)
5.) Death as indefinite (unbestimmt)
We discussed the first two characteristics, death as our ownmost possibility and
death as non-relational, in the last chapter, specifically with regard to how we can get an
understanding of a unified self that makes it possible to be responsible for our everyday
actions. Now we can say a little more about these two characteristics of authentic beingtowards-death with respect to the way in which they contribute to our attaining a proper
understanding of the structure of our being. Heidegger says that authentic being-towardsdeath “discloses to Dasein its ownmost ability-to-be [Seinkönnen], in which its very
Being is the issue” (BT 307/263). The key point here is that in authentic being-towardsdeath, our own being becomes an issue for us. It is tempting to understand Heidegger as
advocating the cultivation of a reflection on one’s life and achievements in light of the
fact that everyone will at some point die, thus motivating ourselves to seize the moment
and live life to the fullest. This, however, is not Heidegger’s intention here. As we have
seen in the previous chapters, Heidegger maintains that in our everyday existence, we
primarily understand ourselves in terms of our projects and the social roles and
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responsibilities that we fulfill. When we understand our being in terms of what we do,
we do not really understand our own being. Rather, we always understand our being
insofar as we can be represented by another person. Death, however, is that one
possibility in which we cannot be represented by another person. Death is always
individualized—no one can stand in for us when we are about to die. Being-towardsdeath authentically then forces us to understand our being without recourse to our
everyday understanding of ourselves in terms of our roles and activities, i.e. it makes our
own being the issue, not our being in which we can be another person.
When we grasp that in dying we cannot be represented by someone else, we are
individualized. That is, I experience acutely my existence as an individual when I
understand that when I die, it is I alone who am dying. No one can take my place, and no
one can accompany me. When dying, one’s career and worldly ambitions are no longer
of any import—death comes all the same. As morbid and common as this consideration
might be, Heidegger tries to emphasize the positive methodological aspect of this
experience. He maintains that death “makes manifest that all Being-alongside the things
with which we concern ourselves, and all Being-with Others, will fail us when our
ownmost ability-to-be [Seinkönnen] is the issue” (BT 308/263). By understanding
ourselves in terms of this non-relational possibility, we see that our everyday
understanding of ourselves in terms of our activities, projects and the idle talk of das Man
is ultimately of no help when it comes to understanding our own being.
The next characteristic of death that Heidegger considers is that death is the one
possibility that cannot be overtaken or outrun, i.e. death is unüberholbar. Heidegger here
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is making use of the common understanding of death as something that no one can
escape. There are two methodological consequences to be drawn from this characteristic.
The first consequence is that in authentic being-towards-death we are able to grasp the
whole being of Dasein. As mentioned above, this is a problem for Heidegger because he
has already established that a central feature of Dasein’s being is that it always is aheadof-itself (sichvorweg). As we have discussed above, in our everyday existence, we are
directed out towards the accomplishment of projects and the achievement of goals. In
other words, in our present state we are always directed out towards bringing about some
future actualization. This is problematic because it seems to make it impossible for us to
ever grasp our whole being, since our being is fundamentally constituted by always being
beyond itself. In authentic being-towards-death, Heidegger finds his solution to this
problem. It is precisely because death gives us nothing to actualize that being-towardsdeath allows us to grasp our being in its entirety. Death is of course something that is still
impending as long as we are alive, but by understanding ourselves in terms of this
possibility, our tendency to always be directed towards the eventual actualization of our
possibilities, and thus not be able to completely grasp our being, is thwarted. This does
not mean that in authentic being-towards-death our being loses that quality of beingahead-of-itself and becomes something completely present before us. Rather, in
authentic being-towards-death, the pure pushing forward into possibilities that is
constitutive of our being is experienced, not the directedness towards the actualization of
these possibilities, which always leaves something beyond our grasp. In authentic being-
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towards-death, there is literally nothing beyond this possibility into which we can thrust
ourselves.
The second consequence of our inability to outrun death is that in authentic beingtowards-death, we come to realize that our existence ultimately leads to us surrendering
ourselves to the fact of our own mortality. Again, Heidegger takes a fairly common and
morbid consideration and seeks to bring out what is methodologically beneficial. He
states that “running ahead [Vorlaufen] discloses to existence that its uttermost possibility
lies in giving itself up, and thus it shatters all one’s tenaciousness to whatever existence
one has reached” (BT 308/264, translation modified).
To see the importance of this idea for Heidegger, we must recall his earlier
interest in the concept of Hingabe in the work of Emil Lask.37 The idea, insofar as
Heidegger appropriates it from Lask, is that phenomenological research must be guided
by a giving of oneself to the subject matter under investigation. In other words, we must
attempt to cultivate a “pure and undivided dedication to the subject matter.”38 In
authentic being-towards-death, we disclose to ourselves the arbitrary and unfounded
nature of our ordinary ways of understanding ourselves and open up the possibility of
completely giving ourselves over to the subject matter under investigation, which is in
this case our own being. In this way, we allow the being of the subject matter itself to
guide our inquiry rather than attempting to force our experience of the subject matter into
preconceived and/or inappropriate modes of disclosure. Heidegger comes close to saying
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this when discussing the next characteristic of death, namely, certainty, when he says:
“One mode of certainty is conviction [Überzeugung]. In conviction, Dasein lets the
testimony [Zeugnis] of the thing itself which has been uncovered (the true thing itself) be
the sole determinant for its Being towards that thing understandingly” (BT 300/256).
This brings us to Heidegger’s consideration of death as certain. Of course,
everyone will die at some point. In this sense death is certain. However, Heidegger finds
a different sort of certainty in authentic being-towards-death. He defines the sort of
certainty he is talking about as follows:
To be certain of an entity means to hold it for true as
something true. But ‘truth’ signifies the uncoveredness
[Entdecktheit] of some entity, and all uncoveredness is
grounded ontologically in the most primordial truth, the
disclosedness [Erschlossenheit] of Dasein...The expression
‘certainty’ like the term ‘truth’ has a double signification.
Primordially ‘truth’ means the same as ‘Being-disclosive’,
as a way in which Dasein behaves. From this comes the
derivative signification: ‘the uncoveredness of entities’.
Correspondingly,
‘certainty’,
in
its
primordial
[ursprünglich] signification, is tantamount to ‘Beingcertain’, as a kind of Being which belongs to Dasein.
However, in a derivative signification, any entity of which
Dasein can be certain will also get called something
‘certain’ (BT 300/256).
Heidegger goes on to say that the certainty associated with death “will in the end
present us with a distinctive certainty of Dasein” (BT 300/256). These passages,
combined with Heidegger’s conception of conviction as cited above, provide us with the
necessary clues for understanding the type of certainty Heidegger finds in authentic
being-towards-death. Certainty in the basic sense refers to a mode of our being in which
we hold an entity as true. Holding an entity as true means to hold it in its uncoveredness.
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When this is done in conviction, we let the being of the entity under investigation
determine the way in which we understand it. The entity under investigation here is
Dasein, so in authentic being-towards-death, Heidegger is saying that we achieve a mode
of disclosing that is particularly suited to disclosing our own being, insofar as we let our
being itself determine how we understand it. This means that we do not employ
inappropriate ways of understanding of our being, e.g. understanding our being through
conceptual, theoretical reflection or the prevailing superficial ideas of what it is to be
human.
To show more precisely what this means, Heidegger compares the certainty
achieved in authentic being-towards-death with the traditional paradigm for certainty,
namely, the kind of certainty that is attained when we reflect on our own consciousness.
He states:
[T]he evidential character which belongs to the immediate
givenness of Experiences, of the “I”, or of consciousness,
must necessarily lag behind the certainty which running
ahead [Vorlaufen] includes. Yet this is not because the way
in which these are grasped would not be a rigorous one, but
because in principle such a way of grasping them cannot
hold for true (disclosed) something which at bottom it
insists upon ‘having there’ as true: namely, Dasein itself,
which I myself am, and which, as a potentiality-for-Being, I
can be authentically only by running ahead [Vorlaufen] (BT
310/265, translation modified).
Remember that Heidegger earlier demonstrates the inadequacy of the traditional
philosophical method of reflection upon the subject or consciousness for understanding
our being. This mode of reflection and its supposed certainty cannot yield certainty in the
sense in which Heidegger is now using the term since this reflection presupposes that our
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being is already completely laid out and completely present for our inspection. It is only
in authentic being-towards-death that we can grasp our being in its wholeness, and thus it
is only in authentic being-towards-death that we achieve a mode of disclosure that is
appropriate for our being. We achieve our grasp on the whole of our being not through
positing it as something present before us, but rather by existing in and running ahead
into the possibility of death. It is this appropriateness of the disclosure of our being in
authentic being-towards-death that yields certainty with respect to our own being.
The final characteristic of death is its indefiniteness. Death is often thought of as
an indefinite possibility because one can die at any time. Death is indefinite in regards to
when it can happen. This aspect of aspect of death reveals to us that our very existence
contains within itself the threat of its own extinction. In Heidegger’s words, in “running
ahead of the indefinite certainty of death, Dasein opens itself to a constant threat arising
out of its own ‘there’” (BT 310/265). We can understand the import of this more clearly
through Heidegger’s connection of this aspect of death with anxiety (Angst). Heidegger
distinguishes anxiety from fear (Furcht) on the basis of the object towards which each
mood is directed (BT 228/184-235/191). Fear is always directed towards some definite
entity or state-of-affairs encountered (or potentially to be encountered) in the world.
Anxiety, on the other hand, has nothing definite towards which it is directed. That which
is threatening in anxiety is being-in-the-world as such. What this reveals to us about our
being is that we are essentially and constantly open to being affected by the world in
which we find ourselves. It is not only occasionally or contingently that we happen to be
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open to being affected by the world, rather our being essentially involved this openness to
the world, which is experienced most acutely in anxiety and being-towards-death.
Let us then summarize and clarify the results of the preceding interpretation of
being-towards-death. For Heidegger, in our everyday existence, we are directed out
towards the completion of various projects and the fulfillment of certain ends. In beingtowards-death, we are given nothing to actualize, and thus we are brought back to our
own being and are able to reveal to ourselves the structures of our being in an
ontologically appropriate (i.e. certain) way.
How is the structure of our being as agents revealed in authentic being-towardsdeath? As discussed in previous chapters, Heidegger analyzes our being in terms of the
tri-partite structure of disposition (Befindlichkeit), understanding (Verstehen) and falling
(Verfallen). In the first chapter, we established that action for Heidegger is to be
understood as essentially containing an active and a passive aspect, which developed
from his discussion of understanding and disposition, respectively. In the third chapter,
we saw how our everyday, inauthentic action contains within it a tendency to fall into the
prevalent ways of acting and various non-goal-directed activities. In his analysis of
death, Heidegger is seeking to ground this prior conception of our being and the structure
of human agency in our phenomenological experience. He notes pointedly that
“understanding does not primarily mean just gazing at a meaning, but rather
understanding oneself in that potentiality-for-Being which reveals itself in projection”
(BT 307/263). In other words, Heidegger does not want to rely on the sort of abstract
theoretical reflection that is characteristic of philosophy. He does not want to merely
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posit that human existence is constituted by disposition, understanding and falling.
Rather, he is seeking to develop a mode of existing in which we clearly experience this
tri-partite constitution of our being in our lived existence. In being-towards-death, we
experience our existence as fundamentally and constantly pressing on ahead of itself, a
fact that is normally obscured by our focus on the actualization of the possibilities that we
take up, rather than the nature of our existence as being possible. Heidegger states that
“[t]his item in the structure of care [Dasein’s being-ahead-of-itself] has its most basic
concretion in Being-towards-death” (BT 294/251). Similarly, in our everyday existence,
the fact that we are fundamentally and constantly open to being affected by the world, i.e.
that our being is partially constituted by disposition is covered up. This too is
experienced concretely in anxiety and being-towards-death through the experience of the
threatening character of being-in-the-world as such. Finally, Heidegger maintains that
our tendency to fall into the ways of understanding ourselves and the world provided by
das Man is also revealed in being-towards-death. When we realize the individualizing
and non-relational nature of death, our everyday absorption in das Man is revealed.
Now we can make some connections between the way in which we reveal the
structure of our being to ourselves in being-towards-death and being responsible for our
actions in the strong sense discussed in the last chapter. Remember that in the last
chapter, we developed an understanding of what it would mean to be responsible for our
actions in the strong sense on the Heideggerian conception of action based on
Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s practical philosophy. Specifically, responsibility in
the strong sense (in Kantian terms) is achieved in the act of representing the moral law to
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oneself and placing oneself under this law. We can find some parallels to this conception
of responsibility in Heidegger’s understanding of authentic being-towards-death. As we
have seen, authentic being-towards-death is a form of self-knowledge, even if Heidegger
maintains that it is a different form of self-knowledge than the traditional paradigm of
mental self-reflection. In authentic being-towards-death, in a way that parallels the
consciousness of being bound by the moral law, the extent to which we are subject to
world in which we find ourselves is revealed to us, whether this subjection is understood
as a subjection to the biological and physiological constraints on our being or as a
subjection to the larger social and historical forces under whose sway we live. In this
state of existence, we come to understand the essentially limited nature of our being. One
might think that this understanding, when applied to our conception of ourselves as
agents, would lead us to accepting a thorough-going determinism in which responsibility
for our actions is ultimately impossible. However, in authentic being-towards-death, we
also reveal to ourselves that it is an equally essential aspect of our existence that we
project out towards some possible way of existing, even when all possibilities other than
death have become unavailable. When connected to the Heideggerian conception of
action, this means that no matter the circumstances in which we find ourselves and
regardless of the impossibility of alternative ways of acting, we must always understand
ourselves as being responsible for our actions as individual agents, since it is this
fundamental, individualized projective capacity that allows anything at all to matter to us.
When acting, we are giving ourselves over to situation in which we find ourselves and
letting our actions be constrained by what the situation itself demands from us. This is
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what is meant by the expression “taking responsibility” on the Heideggerian conception
of action—acting with the clear understanding that even the situation in which we find
ourselves places constraints upon our actions, it is we ourselves as individual agents that
allows these factors to constrain us.

Conscience and Resoluteness
The problem for Heidegger is that it is still hard to conceive of how we could ever
exist in such a way that we are authentically being-towards-death. That is, it is still hard
to conceive of what authentic being-towards-death would look like in an actual situation
of action. Heidegger has argued that ordinary ways of thinking of death and possible
ways of experiencing death are not adequate when it comes to truly grasping and
understanding our being. What sort of concrete way of existing can authentic beingtowards-death be? How can we actually practice or enact authentic being-towards-death?
As discussed above, we cannot experience our own death, and we cannot really
experience the death of others. Authentic being-towards-death cannot be our dying or
witnessing the death of others. Heidegger also makes it clear that authentic beingtowards-death is not a morbid brooding over one’s own mortality (BT 305/261). As
Heidegger himself admits, authentic being-towards-death as initially described seems to
be too abstract and to have no ground in our phenomenological experience. In
Heidegger’s words:
[T]his existentially ‘possible’ Being-towards-death
remains, from the existentiell point of view, a fantastical
exaction. The fact that an authentic potentiality-for-Beinga-whole is ontologically possible for Dasein, signifies
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nothing, so long as a corresponding ontical potentiality-forBeing has not been demonstrated in Dasein itself. Does
Dasein ever factically throw itself into such a Beingtowards-death (BT 311/266)?
Here is Heidegger is pointing out the need for finding some concrete experience
or way of existing in which we see something like authentic being-towards-death as he
describes it in its abstract sense.
At the end of his analysis of death, Heidegger states:
[W]e must investigate whether to any extent and in any
way Dasein gives testimony, from its ownmost potentialityfor-Being, as to a possible authenticity of its existence, so
that it not only makes known that in an existentiell manner
such authenticity is possible, but demands this of itself (BT
311/267).
In the beginning of the next chapter in Being and Time, he makes it clear that we
come to the concrete experience of authentic being-towards-death, i.e. our ownmost
potentiality-for-being, in the experience of conscience (BT 313/268). The aim of the
present section will be to explain how the experience of conscience is supposed to reveal
the structure of our being to ourselves in the way laid out by Heidegger in the
development of his account of authentic being-towards-death.
We will use as our clue the somewhat strange claim that phrōnesis is the
conscience made by Heidegger in his winter semester lecture course in 1924-1925,
Plato’s Sophist, in which he dedicates the first part of the course to an in-depth
interpretation of Book VI of Aristotle’s icomachean Ethics (PS 39). He does not
provide much justification or explanation of this claim in either this lecture course or any
of his other works. However, Heidegger’s conception of conscience in Being and Time
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bears some striking and important similarities to the understanding of phrōnesis that
Heidegger lays out in the Plato’s Sophist lecture. The general strategy in this section will
be to examine Heidegger’s interpretation of phrōnesis in the Plato’s Sophist lecture
course and see how it can be connected to our ordinary conception of conscience and
then proceed to consider how Heidegger transforms this ordinary conception of
conscience/phrōnesis into his own distinctive conceptions of conscience and resoluteness
that are found in Being and Time.

Heidegger’s Discussion of Phrōnesis in the Plato’s Sophist Lectures
Before turning to Heidegger’s examination of phrōnesis in the Plato’s Sophist
lecture course, let us first consider the broader context of Heidegger’s discussion of Book
VI of Aristotle’s icomachean Ethics and what are traditionally referred to as the
intellectual virtues (epistēme, tēchne, phrōnesis, sophīa and noūs). As we briefly
discussed in the Introduction, the central theme of Heidegger’s interpretation of these
virtues is to understand them all as modes of disclosing or revealing (aletheūein)
something (PS 15). Heidegger, following Aristotle, proposes to distinguish between the
different modes of disclosing on the basis of the type of thing that is disclosed in each.
The main distinction to be made is between those modes of disclosing that disclose things
that cannot be otherwise (epistēme, sophīa and noūs), i.e. those modes of disclosing
concerned with necessary truths and beings, and those modes of disclosing that disclose
things that can be otherwise (tēchne and phrōnesis), i.e. those modes of disclosing
concerned with things that are contingent and in flux.
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Heidegger’s interpretation of phrōnesis is then oriented by the consideration of
phrōnesis as a mode of disclosing that discloses something that can be otherwise. What
is it that is disclosed by phrōnesis? Heidegger maintains that, “phrōnesis aims at and
makes transparent [durchsichtig] precisely…the Being of human Dasein” (PS 43). This
is because the “being disclosed by phrōnesis is prāxis”, and “[i]n this [prāxis] resides
human Dasein” (PS 100). In other words, phrōnesis discloses the structure of prāxis
(action), and the being of humans is prāxis, i.e. to be human is to be an agent, to be
engaged in action. Phrōnesis can be said then, on Heidegger’s interpretation, to disclose
what it is to be human, specifically what it means to be a human agent.
There are, according to Heidegger, three main aspects of action disclosed by
phrōnesis: (1) the agathōn, the good toward which the action is directed, (2) the concrete
situation of the action and (3) the interconnection of the agathōn and the situation of
action, i.e. the manner in which we, as agents, articulate and disclose the situation of
action through our choice of the good towards which the action is directed.39 We will
consider how phrōnesis discloses these aspects of action one by one and consider, at each
step, how we can find a similar disclosure operative in our ordinary conception of
conscience.
There are two different, but connected, senses of the agathōn that are disclosed in
phrōnesis. At the more general level, phrōnesis discloses what the agent takes to be the
best way to live as a whole. At the more concrete level, phrōnesis discloses the particular
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good that is aimed at in any given action. Heidegger finds the disclosure of what it is to
live well in general in Aristotle’s initial discussion of phrōnesis in Book VI of the
icomachean Ethics (NE 1140a25-b25) and the disclosure of the particular good in what
Heidegger calls the “more radical conception of phrōnesis” (PS 95) in Aristotle’s later
discussion of phrōnesis in Book VI. These two different senses of the agathōn of action
disclosed by phrōnesis are, of course, connected on Aristotle’s view, since all particular
goods aimed at in action ultimately refer back to a highest good (NE 1094a17) that turns
out to be living well in general, i.e. to live in such a way that one is eudaīmon.
Heidegger begins by discussing Aristotle’s initial characterization of someone
who possesses the virtue of phrōnesis as someone who “deliberates in the right way poīa
prōs tō eū zēn hōlos, regarding ‘what is conducive to the right mode of Being of Dasein
as such and as a whole’” (PS 34). A standard English translation of this Greek phrase is
“what promotes living well in general” (NE 1140a25). Traditional interpretations of
phrōnesis see this aspect of virtue as the ability to deliberate correctly concerning which
course of action in any given situation are in accord with the agent’s understanding of
what it is to lead a good life in general. For instance, Richard Sorabji describes the role
of phrōnesis in the following way: “It enables a man, in light of his conception of the
good life in general, to perceive what generosity requires of him, or more generally what
virtue and to kalon require of him, in the particular case, and it instructs him to act
accordingly.”40 David Wiggins offers the following similar characterization of the person
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who possesses phrōnesis: “It is the mark of the man of practical wisdom on this account
to be able to select from an infinite number of features of a situation those features that
bear upon the notion or ideal of existence which it is his standing aim to make real.”41
This implies that if the deliberation of phrōnesis is concerned with those actions that are
required to realize the good life, then in phrōnesis there is always some understanding of
what it means to live a good life.
To see how phrōnesis discloses the particular good aimed at in a given action, we
must consider in more detail how the structure of action is disclosed by phrōnesis.
Phrōnesis reveals the full being of any given action from its archē (beginning, basis) to
its tēlos (end) (PS 101-102). The archē of action is the “hoū hēneka, the ‘for the sake of
which’” (PS 101). Every action begins from and continually takes its direction from the
end at which it aims. It is important to keep this equivalence of terms in mind. The good
aimed at by an action is the archē of the action, which in turn can be thought of as the
hoū hēneka of the action, that for the sake of which the agent acts. Heidegger, and
perhaps Aristotle, has a very specific understanding of the archē of an action as the “for
the sake of which” of action. As we have already seen in the first chapter, that for the
sake of which we act is in each case always a “possibility of Dasein’s Being”, or in other
words, a possible way of understanding ourselves (BT 116/84). What Heidegger means
by this is made apparent by his discussion of Aristotle’s example of the actions of the
doctor and the orator (NE 1112b12). Here Aristotle claims that, “[w]e deliberate not
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about ends, but about what promotes ends.” For example, the doctor does not deliberate
about whether or not to heal a patient. Instead, the doctor deliberates about how best to
heal a patient. According to Heidegger, this is because the practice of healing is
constitutive for being a doctor, which means that healing “belongs to the meaning of his
[the doctor’s] existence itself” (PS 111). Again, as we have already seen, the “for the
sake of which” of an action is the enactment or the realization of the self-understanding
of the agent as being a person of a particular sort or embodying a particular role. The
ultimate basis of the actions of the doctor is her understanding of herself as a doctor and
her understanding of the actions that are entailed by that conception of herself.
How does phrōnesis disclose the archē of action? Heidegger (and Aristotle)
maintain throughout that phrōnesis is carried out in deliberation (bouleūesthai).
However, as mentioned above, the archē of an action (thought of as that possibility of
being for which the agent acts) is not subject to deliberation. The archē or the “for the
sake of which” is always chosen in a decision (prohaīresis) or resolution (boulē) (PS 101,
103, 109). The self-understanding that guides any particular action is always already in
place prior to deliberation and provides the framework out of which any deliberation can
orient itself. Since phrōnesis is always essentially euboulīa (deliberating well), it
constantly operates with a grasp or view of the archē of the action. The question is how
phrōnesis has this view of the archē if not through deliberation. To answer this,
Heidegger turns to Aristotle’s conception of noūs, which, “in the proper sense, aims at
the archaī and discloses them” (PS 98). oūs in general is an “apprehension pure and
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simple” of the archaī.42 In phrōnesis, this means that noūs is a pure and simple
apprehending of that for the sake of which the agent acts in any given case. This pure
and simple apprehension of the archē of the action always guides and informs the
deliberation of phrōnesis.
Before moving on to consider the further elements of action and how phrōnesis
reveals them, let us pause and make some preliminary connections between Heidegger’s
interpretation of phrōnesis and conscience. When we think of having a conscience, we
normally think of having a bad conscience. This expression typically means that
someone has done something that she now feels she perhaps should not have done.
Having a bad conscience is feeling guilty about having done something wrong. Feeling
guilty is generally associated with having done something that breaks a rule or law, or
something that signifies a failure to do a duty, or perhaps just something that fails to live
up to one’s ideals. There does not seem to be any explicit revealing of the proper way to
live in general. In other words, there does not seem to be any immediate connection
between conscience and the agathōn in the general sense. However, it does seem to be
the case that all ethical rules or moral guidelines, at least in principle, are there to guide
our actions so that we do live the best life possible in ethical terms, i.e. live in the way
that is most proper for humans. A certain conception of what it means to live well lies
behind any system of rules to live by. A bad conscience then would tell us that our
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actions were not in line with living a good life in general. When acting in such a way that
we “feel the pangs of conscience”, conscience not only reveals to us that the particular
action in question is wrong, but also, at least implicitly, conscience discloses to us what
we take to be the right action in this case, and by extension, conscience reveals to us what
we take to be the proper way of being human.
Furthermore, when we pay attention to the phenomenological experience of
conscience, we see that the disclosure of our understanding of living well does not take
place (at least initially) at a theoretical level. Rather, we have an experiential or lived
understanding of the fact that our actions are not in line with what we take to be the right
way to live. This initial pre-theoretical understanding can of course be analyzed after the
fact, and we can attempt to articulate it at the theoretical level, but the initial
understanding is akin to the pure and simple grasping that Heidegger finds in noūs as it
operates in phrōnesis.
Perhaps we can better see how this would work by way of a concrete example.
Consider the following scenario. Suppose a married man is having a few drinks at a bar
after work. He begins talking to a female colleague. At first the conversation is innocent
and collegial. At some point, the man realizes that their conversation has become more
suggestive and flirtatious in nature, and he begins to feel guilty. In this feeling of guilt, a
certain “for the sake of which” is revealed here. When he feels guilty, the man’s
understanding of himself as a devoted, considerate husband is revealed to him. This does
not primarily take place at a theoretical level. Rather, this feeling of guilt and the
inappropriateness (or impending inappropriateness) of his actions in light of his
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understanding of himself as a good husband are first felt at an experiential or even bodily
level (perhaps as weight in the pit of his stomach). In this sense, it is a simple grasping of
the good aimed at in his actions that transcend words. Assuming the man pays attention
to this “pang of conscience,” he lets himself be guided by his conscience into acting in
such a way that he brings his actions into line with that particular good that is relevant
here, namely, being a good husband. This would lead him to perhaps break off the
conversation, steer it back towards more innocent territory, leave the bar, etc.
We can also see how the particular good under consideration here (being a good
husband) in turn refers even further to the man’s conception of what it means to live well
in general. In letting himself be guided in his action by his understanding of himself as a
good husband, he is also revealing that being a good husband is more important to him
than other possible roles that he could choose (e.g. that of a dashing, care-free
womanizer). In effect, his conscience is revealing to him what he takes to be living well
in general, something that is at least partly constituted by being a good husband.
Now we can turn our attention to the other end of action, the tēlos of the action.
The tēlos of action (here thought of specifically as prāxis) is the “action itself, namely the
carried out”, specifically eupraxīa, acting well (PS 102). The goal of action here is not
the accomplishment of some concrete task or the completion of a specific product as it is
in poīesis. Rather, the goal of action (prāxis) is acting well, acting in a way that is in line
with and guided by the archē of the action. Acting well is only possible when the agent
has a clear grasp of that for the sake of which she is acting. This grasp of the archē of the
action, however, is not sufficient to bring about eupraxīa by itself. Heidegger makes this
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clear through his consideration of Aristotle’s practical syllogism (PS 109). The first
premise of the syllogism is the good at which the action aims. The second premise is that
the “circumstances and the situation of the action are such and such” (PS 109). The
conclusion is acting, specifically acting in such a way that, given the particular situation
in which the agent finds herself, the action is in line with the agent’s self-understanding
that serves as the archē of the action. In other words, in order to act well, the agent must
not only have a clear grasp of the good towards which the action is directed, but she must
also have a clear understanding of the situation in which she acting.
We must now ask how phrōnesis discloses the situation of acting. Again we find
that the situation of acting is not disclosed through deliberation. Heidegger identifies
disclosing the situation of acting with finding the ēschaton, which is the “outermost limit
of the deliberation and in that way is the presentifying of the state of affairs with which
the action begins” (PS 108). When acting, we always reach a point at which deliberation
can shed no more light on things, and we must simply act based on a grasping of the
situation in which we find ourselves that, once again, transcends words. Heidegger again
maintains that noūs is operative here is this direct disclosure of the ēschaton. “All
deliberating,” Heidegger says, “ends in an aīsthesis [perceiving]. This straightforward
perceiving within phrōnesis is noūs” (PS 110). The aīsthesis operative here is not
directed towards some particular object, but rather, it perceives the situation as a whole in
its particularity and transience (PS 110). In Heidegger’s words, aīsthesis in phrōnesis is
the “inspection of the this here now, the inspection of the concrete momentariness of the
transient situation” (PS 112).
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We can again attempt to see how something like the disclosure of the concrete
situation of action is operative in our normal conception of conscience. Consider again
the previously described scenario of the man in the bar. In addition to his understanding
of himself as a devoted husband, his feeling of guilt also reveals the inappropriateness of
his action with regards to the particular situation in which he finds himself. What makes
his behavior inappropriate is the specific way he is acting with a specific person in a
specific setting. If the woman to whom he is talking were his wife, he would not feel
guilty, or if his conversation had not taken on flirtatious overtones, he would not feel
guilty. Feeling guilty reveals something about his relation to the woman to whom he is
talking and the sort of conversation they are having. More generally, the feeling of guilt
reveals something about the tone of the situation as a whole—a situation that has
suddenly changed from innocuous collegiality to something different. Again, this
grasping of the change in tone of the situation is not primarily at the linguistic or
theoretical level. This change is first encountered and grasped at an experiential level.
Now we have examined two aspects of action and how they are disclosed by
phrōnesis. We have seen that both the archē of the action (that for the sake of which the
agent acts or the good towards which the action is aimed) and the concrete situation of
action (the ēschaton) are disclosed in phrōnesis by the direct and simple apprehension of
noūs. It seems difficult then to see why and how Heidegger maintains Aristotle’s
emphasis on the importance of deliberation in phrōnesis. I would like to suggest that the
function of deliberation in Heidegger’s interpretation of phrōnesis is to provide and
maintain the connection between the archē of the action and the perception of the
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situation of action that will allow the agent to act well, i.e. to act in a way that is
consistent with her conception of the good. Putting this in Aristotelian terms, the
deliberation of phrōnesis would take the form of the practical syllogism.43
In order for deliberation to perform this role, deliberation must involve an
understanding of the connection between the archē of the action and the situation of
action.

According to Heidegger, what is revealed in phrōnesis is that the disclosure of

the situation of action is always performed in light of some specific for the sake of which
that has been chosen in a prohaīresis. Heidegger is clear in maintaining that the aīsthesis
involved with phrōnesis is not a “mere inspection”, but rather a “circumspection,” which
grasps objects in terms of their usefulness (i.e. insofar as the objects encountered are
sumphēron) (PS 112). This means that objects and other aspects of the situation are not
observed disinterestedly, but rather always in terms of the ultimate aim of the agent in
any situation of acting. “Precisely out of the constant regard toward that which I have
resolved,” says Heidegger, “the situation should become transparent” (PS 102). It is the
role of good deliberation to maintain that “constant regard” toward the archē of the action
and make sure that the situation is disclosed on the basis of that. This allows Heidegger
to interpret Aristotle’s emphasis on orthōs lōgos as deliberation that is always guided by
the archē of the action and is always directed towards acting in the particular situation in
a way that is consistent with the archē.
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This conception of deliberation still does not seem to resemble any normal
conception of deliberation. We can understand why this is by briefly considering
Heidegger’s conception of lōgos (speech, discussion) as it appears in the context of his
interpretation of phrōnesis. Deliberation is ultimately to be understood as a form of
lōgos. Lōgos here, says Heidegger, is “to be grasped as the asserting of something about
something” (PS 99). To assert something about something is to “articulate what is
spoken about” (PS 99). This asserting is done with an “intention to disclose it [the object
of the assertion] in this asserting” (PS 99). Lōgos in this very basic, minimal sense is to
make an assertion that discloses and articulates the object of the assertion. This is exactly
what happens in the lōgos of the practical syllogism. The situation of action is disclosed
and articulated on the basis of the for the sake of which of the action. This very
connection between the hoū hēneka and the situation is a form of lōgos. A more common
understanding of the deliberation associated with action, i.e. deliberation as a
consideration and discussion of what is to be done, is a more sophisticated and abstract
form of this basic sense of lōgos. Heidegger characterizes the deliberation of phrōnesis
in this normal sense as a “certain drawing of conclusions” that takes the form “if I am to
behave in such and such a way, then...” (PS 35). In this form of deliberation, what is
discussed is whether or not the action or way of behaving under consideration is in line
with the hoū hēneka. This discussion is a way of letting the situation be disclosed and
articulated in terms of the hoū hēneka.
We can return to our example of the man in the bar to see how this might work.
In order for him to act correctly, i.e. in order for him to act in accord with his conception
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of the good life, he must not only have a grasp of what it means to live well and a grasp
of the situation. He must also be able to disclose the situation on the basis of his
understanding of himself as a good husband, not on the basis of some other
understanding of himself. His feeling guilty is a result of his particular understanding of
himself as a good husband being brought to bear on the situation at hand and letting the
situation be understood from this basis. The man could conceivably fail to understand
himself as a good husband in this situation, which would not result in his feeling guilty
and would (at least potentially) not lead to his acting correctly. All of this can occur at an
intuitive, pre-theoretical level and still be a form of lōgos in the minimal sense outlined
above. Alternatively, we could imagine the man engaging in deliberation in a more
normal sense and saying to himself something like, “If I continue talking to this woman
in this way, then I am not acting in accord with my understanding of myself as a good
husband.” This can be understood as a way of making the pre-linguistic articulation and
disclosure in the basic sense of lōgos explicit.

Conscience and Resoluteness in Being and Time
Let us now turn to Heidegger’s discussion of conscience and resoluteness in
Being and Time. We have shown above how Heidegger’s interpretation of phrōnesis and
its connection with conscience can be seen as providing a pre-theoretical understanding
of the structure of any given action and how this understanding of action takes place in
action itself without having to still the movement of action (thereby providing an
alternative to distorting theoretical reflection on our being) . Furthermore, we have seen
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that when engaged in genuine action, praxis, as opposed to productive activity, poīesis,
the aim of acting is the action itself, not something external to the action. This way of
acting also then provides an alternative to the inauthentic ways of acting of productive
activity and interaction with other people, as both of these modes of action are directed
towards something beyond the action itself.
The aim of this section will be to show how Heidegger uses his interpretation of
phrōnesis as conscience to develop his account of conscience and resoluteness in Being
and Time as a way of dynamically and pre-conceptually revealing not only the structure
of a given particular action, but also the formal structure of human existence and agency
as such. In addition, we need to show how Heidegger’s account of conscience and
resoluteness overcomes the obstacles to properly revealing our being—our direction out
towards things external to our actions and our tendency to fall into the superficial ways of
understanding our being found in the public realm in a way that parallels the disclosure of
our being in authentic being-towards-death.
We find that Heidegger’s development of his conceptions of conscience and
resoluteness proceeds in a manner similar to that of his interpretation of phrōnesis in the
Plato’s Sophist course. He begins by stating that, like phrōnesis, “[c]onscience gives us
‘something’ to understand; it discloses” (BT 314/269). Like phrōnesis, conscience
discloses through a mode of lōgos or discourse (Rede). Alluding to the common way of
talking about the “voice of conscience” or the “call of conscience,” Heidegger maintains
that conscience is experienced as a call (BT 314/269). Instead of deliberation as the form
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of lōgos that characterizes the disclosure of phrōnesis, Heidegger focuses on the call of
conscience as the mode of discourse that characterizes the disclosure of the conscience.
Again in a way that parallels his interpretation of phrōnesis, Heidegger begins by
considering the phenomenon of conscience at a more general level (BT 312/267-325/280)
and then proceeds to consider in greater detail what exactly is disclosed by the conscience
and how exactly the conscience brings about this disclosure (BT 325/280-348/301). At
the general level, conscience discloses what Heidegger calls our “ownmost potentialityfor-Being [eigenstes Seinkönnen]” (BT 318/273, 322/277, 324/279). He then proceeds
to work out in greater detail what exactly this ownmost potentiality-for-Being is and how
it is disclosed by conscience through his analysis of guilt and resoluteness. Our first task
is try to come to a better understanding of what Heidegger means by “ownmost
potentiality-for-Being” as it comes up in his more general discussion of conscience.
There seem to be two main senses in which Heidegger uses the term ‘own’ (eigen) or
‘ownmost’ (eigenste) here. Eigen can mean ‘proper’ in the sense of being appropriate or
it can mean ‘own’ in the sense of “I would like to sleep in my own bed”.
Let us start by considering the first meaning of eigen as what is proper. In
Heidegger’s consideration of the general conception of phrōnesis, we see the term
employed in this way, as Heidegger states that the deliberation of phrōnesis is concerned
with the “right and proper way to be Dasein,” which is Heidegger’s explication of the
Greek eū zēn, living well. We saw above how phrōnesis and conscience as ordinarily
understood can be seen as disclosing what we take to be the best, or most proper, way of
living. Something similar is retained in Heidegger’s conception of conscience. The
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proper way to be Dasein, for Heidegger, is to exist authentically in Heidegger’s sense of
the term. Heidegger says that an “authentic [eigentliches] potentiality-for-Being is
attested by the conscience” (BT 277/234).44 We find again the root eigen in the adjective
eigentlich, which has traditionally (at least within the context of English language
Heidegger scholarship) been translated as ‘authentic’.
We can find clarification of the second sense of eigen as ‘own’ by briefly looking
at Heidegger’s interpretation and appropriation of certain aspects of Kierkegaard’s
conception of conscience in contrast to Heidegger’s interpretation of phrōnesis.45 For
Aristotle, the orthōs lōgos of phrōnesis, its constant directedness towards the good, is
endangered by the possibility of its corruption and distortion by pleasure and pain (NE
1140b17-18). Heidegger reads this possible distortion of phrōnesis by pleasure and pain
as potentially covering over our being, i.e. keeping the structure of our being as agents
from being disclosed in phrōnesis (PS 36). We can see easily how this might happen.
There are many occasions in our everyday activity in which we fail to do something that
we know we should do (i.e. we do not pay attention to our conscience) because doing the
right thing seems painful or there is a more pleasant option.
In Being and Time, Heidegger focuses not on the potential distortion of
conscience by pleasure and pain, but instead shifts to the potential covering over of our
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John van Buren provides a helpful clarification of what Heidegger means by ‘attests’ here. According to
van Buren, in the context of early Christianity, the conscience “leads to the ‘manifestation’ of what was
‘hidden’ and thus performs the function of bearing witness or attesting.” See his The Young Heidegger
(Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1994), 183. When Heidegger says that conscience attests to
our authentic potentiality-for-Being, this is another way of saying that conscience discloses how we can
exist in an authentic manner.
45
I am relying here on van Buren’s account of this interpretation. See his The Young Heidegger, 184-185.
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being due to our tendency to lose ourselves in the superficial ways of understanding
ourselves and the world that dominate the public sphere of our everyday existence. It is
this focus on the distorting and concealing effect of the public sphere, the sphere of ‘the
One’ (das Man) that Heidegger seemingly gets from Kierkegaard. Consider the
following characterization of Kierkegaard’s conception of conscience from John van
Buren:
For Kierkegaard, it is the conscience that leads the
individual from ‘being closed off’ to ‘becoming manifest,’
from ‘dispersion’ to self-recuperation, from objective to
subjective truth, from the anonymous publicness to the
secret of hidden inwardness.46
This helps us understand what Heidegger means when he says things like:
And to what is one called when one is thus appealed to [by
the call of conscience]? To one’s own Self. Not to what
Dasein counts for, can do, or concerns itself with in being
with one another publicly, nor to what it has taken hold of,
set about, or let itself be carried along with (BT 317/273).
Conscience, for Heidegger, calls us back to our own selves in the sense that it
calls us to understand ourselves not in terms of what we do publicly or in terms of
prevailing ways of understanding our being. Conscience calls us to understand our own
being in a manner that stems from and is appropriate to our being itself.
We can make a connection here between Heidegger’s interpretations of Kant and
Aristotle. The call of conscience calls us to our most proper way of existing. This
parallels the manner in which phrōnesis reveals to us what we take to be the proper way
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Van Buren, 184.
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to live in general. In the course of his interpretation of Kant, Heidegger identifies the
most proper way of being human as being self-responsible. We can a further connection
in the etymology of the German ‘eigen’ when taken to mean ‘own’. Becoming
responsible is a matter of coming to own one’s actions.
The next task is to explain how the call of conscience discloses the structure of
our being in greater detail. Heidegger begins by considering our everyday understanding
of conscience and the call of conscience. He plausibly maintains that the call of
conscience tells us that we are guilty (BT 326/281). From this starting point, Heidegger
proceeds to analyze what is really at the core of our normal understanding of guilt. He
isolates two main ways in which we (or at least German speakers) understand being
guilty. The first common meaning of being guilty is captured by ‘owing something’ or
‘having debts’ (BT 327/281).47 The second common meaning is ‘being responsible for
something’, in the sense of causing something to happen or bringing something about
(BT 327/282). Together these two common meanings give us the general idea of
“coming to owe something to Others”, whether this be by breaking a law, coming to be
indebted to other people or being responsible for something done to other people (BT
327/282). It is easy enough to find experiential corroboration for this idea. We often feel
guilty when we realize that we have done something that violates some norm or law, or
when we realize that we are responsible for doing something that harmed someone else.
Heidegger does not stop here. He attempts to abstract from these normal ideas of
being guilty to reach the underlying, unifying essence of what it means to be guilty. In
47

This works better in German. The adjective ‘schüldig’ means ‘guilty’, and ‘Schulden’ means ‘debts’.
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other words, he tries to identify the formal structure of guilt. His first pass at a more
formal conception of what it means to be guilty is: “Being-the-basis for a lack of
something in the Dasein of an Other...This kind of lacking is a failure to satisfy some
requirement which applies to one’s existent Being with Others” (BT 328/282). The idea
is that when we feel ourselves to be guilty, there is a sense of a debt that has not been
fully repaid or a rule that has not been followed. When we are addressed as guilty by our
conscience, we are brought to an awareness of a certain lack in the way we are acting
with respect to other people.
Heidegger wants to further push his conception of guilt past the common ways of
conceiving it in order to bring out what is essential to the experience of guilt at the
ontological level. He makes this clear by stating that the “idea of guilt must not only be
raised above the domain of that concern in which we reckon things up, but it must also be
detached from any relationship to any law or ‘ought’” (BT 328/283). Bearing in mind the
prior understanding of being guilty as showing some lack in one’s interaction with others,
Heidegger defines the existential idea of guilt as “ ‘Being-the-basis for a Being which has
been defined by a ‘not’—that is to say, as ‘Being-the-basis of a nullity’” (BT 329/283).
Here talk of violation of laws or norms or incurring debts with others is dropped, and
Heidegger strips the concept of guilt down to what he sees as the essential core of being
guilty—being the basis of a nullity or lack. Every time we feel guilty, we feel that we are
responsible for (i.e. we are the basis or ground for) some lack or nullity stemming from
our violating a norm or law, incurring a debt or doing something that harmed another.
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This existential definition of guilt requires further explication. Heidegger does
this by moving further beyond the common understanding of guilt by examining the three
aspects of our existence—thrownness, projection and falling—and finding in each an
essential nullity that is not related to the lack of compliance with moral norms. With
regards to thrownness, Heidegger says: “As being, Dasein is something that has been
thrown; it has been brought into its ‘there’, but not of its own accord” (BT 329/284). By
this Heidegger is emphasizing the fact that we come into the world that is not of our own
making, and we do so through no choice of our own. Furthermore, “[a]s being, it
[Dasein] has taken the definite form of a potentiality-for-Being which has heard itself and
has devoted itself to itself, but not as itself” (BT 329-330/284). Not only are we thrown
into a world without our choice, but also we are always already existing in a certain way
before we can actively choose how we want to exist. For example, I was already thrown
into being a middle-class American child in the late Twentieth-Century before I was
capable of choosing what sort of person I wanted to be. Heidegger makes it clear that we
can never go back behind this initial thrownness and appropriate it in such a way that the
nullity inherent in it is removed. The socio-historical situation into which we have been
thrown is the basis for our being. No matter how we decide to move forward, anything
that we do will have been done on the basis of the situation in which we find ourselves.
This leads Heidegger to conclude that, “‘Being-a-basis’ means never to have power over
one’s ownmost Being form the ground up”, and furthermore, this “‘not’ belongs to the
existential meaning of ‘thrownness’” (BT 330/284).
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Nevertheless, this does not mean that we are completely determined by the
situation in which we find ourselves. As we have seen in the preceding chapters, we do
have to take up one (or several) of the possible ways of living and understanding
ourselves that are provided by the situation into which we are thrown. Heidegger asks:
“How is Dasein this thrown basis?” He answers: “Only in that it projects itself upon
possibilities into which it has been thrown” (BT 330/284). Having grown up in middleclass, late Twentieth-Century America provided me with a range of possible ways of
living and ways in which I can understand and define my life. Insofar as I have to
understand my life in some way, I am limited to the range of possibilities provided by the
situation in which I have been thrown. However, it is still the case that “Dasein is its
basis existently—that is, in such a manner that it understands itself in terms of
possibilities” (BT 331/285). This means that our being is such that we are pushing
forward into future possibilities that go beyond the situation in which we find ourselves.
Heidegger’s use of the term ‘exist’ and related terms such as ‘existently’ is meant to
emphasize the way in which we always are projecting ourselves out beyond the current,
actual state of affairs (the prefix ex- is used here for this purpose).
Heidegger then turns to the consideration of the nullity essentially involved in this
projective aspect of our existence. Here Heidegger says, “in having a potentiality-forBeing it [Dasein] always stands in one possibility or another: it constantly is not other
possibilities, and it has waived these in its existentiell projection” (BT 331/285). What
Heidegger is saying here is that in any given situation, we take up a certain course of
action or type of life to live and do not take up other ways of acting or being. At every
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given moment there are possible ways of being that we are not taking up. This nullity is
contained in the very essence of the projective aspect of our existence. According to
Heidegger, we must always “take over Being-a-basis” (BT 330/284), i.e. it is the nature
of being human that we must always appropriate or take over the situation into which we
have been thrown by taking up certain possible ways of being provided by the situation.
The nullity of projection is essential to our ability to take over the thrown basis of our
being. This appropriation of the situation is only possible on the basis of taking up
certain, concrete possible ways of being, while excluding others. To return to our
example, suppose one finds oneself growing up in late Twentieth-Century America. This
is a situation into which one has been thrown, without having had a prior say about the
matter. Nonetheless, one is obligated to make something of situation, to make something
of one’s life by taking up one way of living or another. For example, one could be a
lawyer or an engineer, but in doing so one would be excluding the possibility of say
being a professional athlete. In a more general way, one could be cynical and anti-social,
excluding the possibilities of being optimistic and outgoing. In every way of taking over
the situation, there is essentially a nullity.
Finally, Heidegger takes up the third aspect of our existence, falling. With
regards to this he says: “In the structure of thrownness, as in that of projection, there lies
essentially a nullity. This nullity is the basis for the possibility of inauthentic Dasein in
its falling” (BT 331/285). Earlier in Being and Time, Heidegger describes falling as our
inherent to tendency to be absorbed in the world of our everyday concerns, and thus to
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“fall” away from our authentic mode of existence (BT 220/175). Here there is obviously
nullity involved. Insofar as we are falling, we are not ourselves.
Now let us try to bring this discussion of guilt back into connection with the
preceding discussion of conscience. As we know from our ordinary experience of
conscience, the call of conscience is not normally experienced voluntarily (BT 334/288).
That is, we usually do not and cannot willfully ascribe guilt to ourselves. Most of the
time, feelings of guilt come upon us during or after action. This means, for Heidegger,
that we cannot will ourselves to disclose the structure of our being to ourselves through
the experience of the call of conscience. The best we can do is to be “ready to appealed
to” by conscience (BT 334/288). Heidegger characterizes our state of being in which we
are ready to be appealed to as resoluteness (Entschlossenheit); i.e. resoluteness is
“wanting to have a conscience” (BT 343/296). Something needs to be said here about the
German term ‘Entschlossenheit’. It comes from the past participle (entschlossen) of the
verb ‘entschließen,’ which means to resolve. Entschlossenheit would then mean
something like being resolved or “resolvedness,” so resoluteness works as a translation.
However, the root of the original verb ‘entschließen’ is ‘schließen,’ meaning ‘to close’.
By adding the negative ‘ent-’ prefix, the original meaning is negated, so that entschließen
can also be thought of as meaning ‘to open’. It is this latter meaning of entschließen that
Heidegger is employing in his initial introduction of the concept of resoluteness (although
we will see below that the first meaning of being resolved will be important for
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Heidegger as well).48 Bearing this in mind, resoluteness can at least partially be thought
of as an openness to hearing the call of conscience.
It is wrong, however, to attempt to understand resoluteness as a passive
withdrawal from acting that merely waits for the call of conscience. The first meaning of
resoluteness as being resolved or decided, something which leads to committed action, is
also essential here. Heidegger makes this clear by stating that “[t]o hear the call [of
conscience] authentically, signifies bringing oneself into a factical taking-action” (BT
341/294) and that “[a]s resolute, Dasein is already taking action” (BT 347/300). If we
pause to reflect on this, we can see that this makes sense. Our primary experience of the
call of conscience occurs during action itself. As we gain more experience, we may
experience the call of conscience before or after acting, but the experience of the call is
always related to some concrete taking action.
Heidegger further clarifies what he means by wanting to have a conscience by
saying that, “this [wanting to have a conscience] is a way a letting one’s ownmost Self
take action in itself of its own accord in its Being-guilty, and represents phenomenally
that authentic potentiality-for-Being which Dasein itself attests” (BT 342/295). In
resoluteness, we are acting in such a way that we simultaneously hold ourselves open to
hearing the voice of conscience, i.e. we hold ourselves open for understanding ourselves
as guilty. This shows how the structure of resolute action can be understood in terms of
the general conception of action developed in the first chapter. Remember that on the
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For a more detailed breakdown of this dual character of resoluteness, see Bret W. Davis’s Heidegger and
the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007), Chapter 2.
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Heideggerian conception of action developed in the first chapter, action involves being
drawn toward something that matters to us (the passive aspect) and having a selfunderstanding that allows these things to matter to us (the active aspect). In resolute
action, we allow the call of conscience to draw us to understand ourselves as guilty.
Can we provide a more concrete understanding of what Heidegger means by
acting in such a way that we understand ourselves as guilty? The prior discussion of
Heidegger’s interpretation of phrōnesis might be of help here. We attempted to illustrate
above how the concrete structure of action is disclosed by the deliberation of phrōnesis in
the form of the practical syllogism. Phrōnesis has the “for-the-sake-of-which” of the
action in view and discloses the situation of action on the basis of this “for-the-sake-ofwhich”. This disclosing of the situation on the basis of the for-the-sake-of-which leads to
the action. We also saw above how this might be work in a concrete example by
considering the married man talking to a woman at the bar. In this example, phrōnesis
(or conscience) discloses the concrete structure of the particular action. That is, it
discloses the way in which the man’s understanding of himself as a devoted husband (the
for-the-sake-of-which here) discloses the situation in all of its particularity and leads to
his breaking off the conversation or leaving the bar.
What gets disclosed in Heidegger’s conception of being guilty is not only the
concrete structure of this particular action, but also the formal structure of our being as
agents as such. When understanding ourselves as guilty in Heidegger’s sense, we grasp
not only the particular situation of action as it is disclosed by a particular for-the-sake-ofwhich. We grasp the way in which we find ourselves in situations that not of our making
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and are not in our control. “What one has in view here,” Heidegger says, “is a ‘not’
which is constitutive for this Being of Dasein—its thrownness” (BT 330/284). This
experience of nullity here is grasping the fact that thrownness is constitutive for our
existence. In other words, acting in such a way that we understand ourselves as guilty
discloses to us that thrownness is an aspect of our being. As we have shown in the first
chapter, to say that thrownness is an essential aspect of our being can be understood as
saying that in all of our actions, there is a passive aspect. That is, before we make any
decisions, we always already find ourselves in a situation to which we must respond and
in the context of which things matter to us.
Similarly, we grasp not only the particular for-the-sake-of-which towards which
we are projecting ourselves. Instead, we grasp our being in its general structure as
essentially projection out towards certain possibilities. We understand this projective
ability as a nullity in the sense that we are always pushing out beyond the concrete
situation in which we find ourselves and that this projective ability is constitutive for our
existence. We find ourselves obligated to appropriate the situation, to take it over by
taking up some particular possibility of being that it provided by it. What is disclosed to
us here by acting while understanding ourselves as guilty is that our being is constituted
not only by thrownness, but also by our taking up of possibilities provided by the
situation, which Heidegger calls understanding. When we take up these possible ways of
understanding ourselves, we allow things and activities encountered in the situation into
which we are thrown to matter to us. In this way, when understanding ourselves as
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guilty, we reveal to ourselves the active aspect of human agency, through which things
are allowed to matter to us on the basis of the possible self-understanding that we take up.
Finally, we grasp the way in which this dynamic structure of our being is covered
up in our everyday existence by our reliance on the common way of understanding things
and ourselves as static and purely present-at-hand. That is, we come to grasp our
tendency to “fall” into the superficial, prevailing ways of understanding ourselves and
our tendency to become absorbed in our everyday concerns and activities. In other words,
we grasp how we are not properly ourselves in our everyday existence insofar as we do
not properly disclose the structure of our being to ourselves. Insofar as we do this, we
come to understand that one constitutive aspect of our existence is what Heidegger calls
falling.
It is not enough, however, to understand resoluteness as wanting to have a
conscience in the sense of being open to understanding oneself as guilty. Heidegger goes
on to say that resoluteness is also constituted by “anxiety as the way of being attuned”
(BT 343/296). Once again, a comparison with phrōnesis can help us see how anxiety fits
into Heidegger’s conception of resoluteness and why “being attuned” by anxiety is
important for resoluteness. As mentioned above, phrōnesis can be distorted by pleasure
and pain. According to Aristotle, temperance (sophrosūne) preserves phrōnesis from
being corrupted by pleasure and pain (1140b11). Heidegger takes this to mean that
sophrosūne “preserves it [phrōnesis] against the possibility of being covered over” (PS
36).
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We can think of anxiety performing a similar function in Heidegger’s conception
of resoluteness. As we have seen for Heidegger, when acting inauthentically, we fail to
understand our own being properly because we are either directed outwards towards
things and people in the world of our everyday concerns or fall into the tendency to
understand ourselves in terms of the prevailing, superficial understandings of our being.
This means that when acting inauthentically, we fail to hear the call of conscience, i.e. to
fail to properly disclose our being to ourselves. During the experience of anxiety the
“totality of involvements of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand discovered withinthe-world, is, as such, of no consequence” (BT 231/186). In other words, when
experiencing anxiety, all of the normal daily activities in which we usually involve
ourselves come to be seen as completely insignificant. Anxiety thus brings us out of our
tendency to understand ourselves “in terms of the ‘world’ and the way things have been
publicly interpreted” (BT 232/187). In this way anxiety can be said to properly attune us
so that we are ready to hear the call of conscience, ready to understand ourselves as
guilty, insofar as it holds at bay our tendency to cover over the structure of being by
being absorbed in the world of our everyday concern. This is why Heidegger says that
the “call whose mood has been attuned by anxiety is what makes it possible first and
foremost for Dasein to project itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being” (BT
322/277).
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Summary of the Preceding Analysis of Conscience and Resoluteness
Let us briefly outline the steps taken and connections made in the preceding
interpretation. In his interpretation of phrōnesis, Heidegger is looking for a way of
existing, a way of acting in which our being is revealed to us in the appropriate way.
That means this way of acting should allow us to adequately grasp the dynamic nature of
our being in its concreteness, thereby avoiding the inevitable distortion associated with
the traditional philosophical method of cognitive, conceptual reflection. In addition to
this, when acting authentically, our focus should be brought back from the external aims
of everyday action onto our own being.
Phrōnesis reveals the aspects of any particular action—the good towards which
the action is directed, the situation of action and the way in which the situation is
disclosed in terms of this good. Phrōnesis does this in a way that transcends lōgos in the
ordinary sense and instead makes use of a practical form of noūs, the ability to purely and
simply grasp the archē and situation of action. As we have seen, lōgos in a very basic
sense is operative in the disclosure of the situation in terms of the for-the-sake-of-which
of the action. This means that phrōnesis discloses the structure of action in a way that is
pre-conceptual and pre-theoretical. We then endeavored to show how this interpretation
of phrōnesis can be connected with our normal understanding of conscience. The aim of
phrōnesis is also the being of the agent himself, unlike in our productive activity during
which we are focused on the accomplishing of external goals.
Heidegger transforms the ordinary understanding of conscience in such a way that
responding to the call of conscience (i.e. understanding oneself as being guilty) comes to
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be understood as acting in such a way that the general structure of our being is revealed
to us in the proper way. Being guilty comes to be understood as being the basis a nullity,
a nullity that permeates and is in fact constitutive of the three aspects of our being—
thrownness, understanding and falling. By acting in such a way that we understand
ourselves as guilty, we come to understand how our being as agents is constituted by a
passive aspect, an active aspect and our tendency to “fall” into whatever activities and
ways of understanding ourselves that are currently prevalent. This disclosure of our
being takes place at the experiential, pre-conceptual level in the moment of acting itself.
In this way, Heidegger has developed an account of a way of acting in which we
overcome the obstacles to properly understanding our own being that are encountered in
inauthentic action and finds the phenomenological attestation for the possibility of
authentic existence, i.e. authentic being-towards-death.

The Connection between Conscience, Resoluteness and Death
Now we are faced with the challenge of explaining how exactly Heidegger
connects the phenomena of death, conscience and resoluteness and showing how these
phenomena can be put together in an account of authentic action.
As we saw above, it is the conscience that is supposed to attest to an authentic
way of existing. This means that conscience points us towards (i.e. reveals to us) our
most proper (ownmost) way of existing. We have seen that conscience points us towards
understanding ourselves as guilty as our ownmost way of existing. When we understand
ourselves as guilty, we reveal to ourselves the nullity that is inherent in the three
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ontological aspects of our being (disposition, falling, and understanding). Our ownmost
possibility for being is one in which the structure of our being is revealed to us. Beingtowards-death is also supposed to be our ownmost potentiality for being. This would
imply that the concrete, phenomenological experience of authentic being-towards-death
is the understanding of oneself as guilty. The way of acting in which we understand
ourselves as guilty is resoluteness. The task is to show how being-towards-death is
authentically experienced in resoluteness.
According to Heidegger, the only way of experiencing death, in the sense of
being-towards-death, is in the resolute understanding of oneself as guilty. Why is this?
When we act in such a way that we understand ourselves as guilty, we experience the
way in which our being is permeated by nullity. What is death but the nullity of our
existence? When we experience the nullity of our existence when acting resolutely, we
find the only possible way to experience our own mortality. Heidegger states:
We have conceived death existentially as what we have
characterized as the possibility of the impossibility of
existence—that is to say, as the utter nullity of Dasein.
Death is not ‘added on’ to Dasein at its ‘end’; but Dasein,
as care, is the thrown (that is, null) basis for its death. The
nullity by which Dasein’s Being is dominated primordially
through and through, is revealed to Dasein itself in
authentic Being-towards-death (BT 354/306).
Furthermore, “[a]uthentic ‘thinking about death’ is a wanting-to-have-a-conscience” (BT
357/309).
We can see why Heidegger would make this claim when we remember the earlier
discussion of the seeming impossibility of ever experiencing our own death. We must
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also remember that Heidegger re-conceives death as a possibility, namely, the “possibility
of the impossibility of any existence at all” (BT 307/262). When we are engaged in
resolute action, we act with an acute understanding of the way in which our choice of one
possible course of action necessarily closes the possibility of taking another course of
action. When considered at the everyday, mundane level, such a consideration appears to
be trivial, but when considered from the point of view of an entire lifetime, Heidegger’s
connection of resoluteness and being-towards-death becomes much more plausible. As
we grow older, certain possibilities are no longer available to us. For example, it might
have been possible at one time that I could someday become a professional athlete, but
unfortunately that is no longer a possibility for me. As we become older still, the scope
of possible actions and ways of living becomes narrower and narrower. What is dying
but this closing down of possibilities?49 Whenever we act with this understanding of the
way our current action necessarily closes off the possibility of other courses of action, we
act with an understanding of our own mortality. In other words, we achieve authentic
being-towards-death.
It might be asked what exactly authentic being-towards-death adds to the
conception of authentic action worked out just in terms of conscience, guilt and
resoluteness. To begin with we must remember that a strong sense of responsibility for
our actions requires there to be some possible self-understanding that is drawn purely
from our own being as individual agents and not from the surrounding social context. We

49

Here I am indebted to Taylor Carman’s interpretation of Heidegger’s account of death in his Heidegger’s
Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse and Authenticity in Being and Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003), 276-284.

174

find this possibility in death, but as we have seen, we must still show how authentic
being-towards-death can be experienced concretely. Furthermore, Heidegger is clear that
authentic being-towards-death, thought of as running ahead (Vorlaufen), is the necessary
completion of resoluteness. He says, “[o]nly in resoluteness that runs ahead is the ability
to be guilty understood authentically and wholly,” and “only as running ahead does
resoluteness become a primordial Being towards Dasein’s ownmost ability to be” (BT
354/306, translation modified). Why does Heidegger claim that resoluteness only
becomes authentic when combined with running ahead towards death? The following
passage provides some explanation:
What if resoluteness, in accordance with its own meaning,
should bring itself into its authenticity only when it projects
itself not upon random possibilities which just lie closest,
but upon that uttermost possibility which lies ahead of
every factical potentiality-for-Being of Dasein, and, as
such, enters more or less undisguisedly into every
potentiality-for-Being of which Dasein factically takes
hold? (BT 349-350/302)
If in resoluteness we are not projecting ourselves towards the possibility of death,
we run into the problems associated with grasping our being in its totality that Heidegger
outlines in his discussion of death. If in resoluteness we are still directed towards the
normal everyday ways of understanding ourselves (e.g. as philosophers, teachers,
husbands, etc.), our actions are still directed out towards something beyond ourselves,
and we do not grasp our being in its totality.
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Conclusion
Let us now try to summarize the steps taken to develop an account of authentic
action in this chapter and the previous chapter. Based on Heidegger’s interpretation of
Kant’s practical philosophy from the previous chapter, we determined that in order to be
responsible for our actions in the strong sense, there had to be some possible selfunderstanding that was drawn from our own individual existence and not from the social
context. For Heidegger, this one possibility is the being-towards-death. We also saw
how Heidegger, when discussing Kant’s conception of pure willing, found this way of
being responsible for our actions in the consciousness of our being bound by the moral
law and also being authors of the moral law. Specifically, responsible action occurs in
the performative act of binding oneself by the moral law. This binding of oneself
requires knowledge of the moral law (i.e. the ability to represent the moral law to oneself)
and the knowledge that the moral law is grounded in one’s own faculty of reason.
In this chapter we saw how Heidegger conceives of authentic being-towards-death
as a form of self-knowledge in which we understand ourselves as being bound by the
limits of the situation in which we find ourselves and yet also being the ultimate ground
for the possibility of anything encountered in the world mattering to us in any way
whatsoever. We also showed how this formal understanding of authentic being-towardsdeath can acquire some phenomenological concretion in the experience of the conscience
and in resolute action. We can now go a step further in clarifying why resolute action is
responsible action in the strong sense. Resolute action is the performative act of binding
oneself to the prescription for action given by the self-understanding one takes up and the
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situation in which one finds oneself. As we have seen from Heidegger’s interpretation of
phrōnesis, resolute action involves a clear knowledge of that for the sake of which one is
acting (i.e. the self-understanding that guides the action), the situation of action and the
way in which one’s self-understanding articulates the situation of action. Kant’s binding
of oneself to the moral law is transformed into the giving of oneself over to the demands
of situation as articulated by the self-understanding one has taken up.
Let us return to the Luther example to better illustrate what this would look like in
a more concrete sense. We can analyze Luther’s action according to the Heideggerian
conception of authentic action as follows. Luther is acting with a clear understanding of
the situation in which he finds himself and a clear knowledge of his understanding of
himself as a Christian of a certain sort. This knowledge leads him to realize what action
the situation demands of him. He achieves responsibility in the strong sense when he
allows himself to be bound by what is prescribed by the situation and his selfunderstanding. Luther need not explicitly formulate this knowledge conceptually or
propositionally. Rather, as we have seen in Heidegger’s discussion of phrōnesis, this
knowledge involved in acting is initially pre-conceptual and pre-thematic. Furthermore,
the content of the action is unimportant when considering whether or not the agent is
responsible for her action in the strong sense. Rather, the action that determines
responsibility in the strong sense is the way in which the agent gives herself over to the
demands of situation in a clear-sighted way. It is also important to stress that for Luther
to be responsible for his action in the strong sense, he must act with knowledge of the
way in which it is his projection towards a particular self-understanding that allows for
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the demands of the situation to have any claim on him. If Luther feels himself to be
completely at the mercy of larger social and historical forces, then he fails to achieve
responsibility in the strong sense in his action.
With this example, we finally see the various considerations in our discussion of
authentic action coming together. We see here how responsibility in the strong sense
requires the proper sort of self-knowledge and how Heidegger develops his account of
acting with this self-knowledge through his analysis of death, conscience and
resoluteness.
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DISSERTATION CONCLUSION

In the Introduction, I claimed that the aim of this project was to develop an
interpretation of the conception of action found in Heidegger’s early thought that was
more faithful to Heidegger’s writings from this period and was a more plausible
conception of action than either of the two prevalent interpretations—the Dreyfusian and
existentialist interpretations. The problems with the Dreyfusian understanding of action
as skillful coping are that this interpretation focuses almost exclusively on Heidegger’s
account of inauthenticity in Division I of Being and Time, ignoring or failing to
adequately accommodate Heidegger’s account of authenticity in Division II, and that the
understanding of action as skillful coping unreflectively guided by impersonal social
norms provides no clear way of giving an account of how we can have ownership of our
actions or become responsible for our actions. The account of Heidegger’s conception of
action that I have put forward here provides a solution to these problems by showing how
Heidegger’s conception of authenticity from Division II of Being and Time, coupled with
Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s practical philosophy from The Essence of Human
Freedom, can give us a way of understanding how we can be responsible for our actions
on the Heideggerian conception of action.
The existentialist interpretation is in some ways the mirror image of Dreyfus’s
interpretation. The existentialist interpretation uses sections of Division II of Being and
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Time to argue that action for Heidegger, or at least truly authentic action, takes place
when the individual agent breaks free of the arbitrary constraints of social norms and
determines her actions purely through her own will. This account of Heidegger’s early
conception of action largely ignores Heidegger’s focus on the passive aspect of human
action, both in his early lectures and in Being and Time. As we have seen, acting
authentically is not a matter of overcoming the constraints placed on the individual by
situations of action, but is rather understood as acting with knowledge of the way in
which one’s actions are necessarily constrained and the way in which one’s own being
makes this constraint possible. The Heideggerian conception of action put forward here
also provides a way of understanding how agents can be responsible for their actions
without this strong sense of responsibility collapsing into the decisionism of the
existentialist interpretation.
If it is accepted that the Heideggerian conception of action developed here avoids
some of the problems associated with the Dreyfusian and existentialist interpretations, the
general plausibility of this conception of action considered in its own right, i.e. not
merely as an interpretation of Heidegger’s thought, is still an open question. Although it
is beyond the scope of my current project to consider this question in detail, I would like
to conclude this project by making some very preliminary suggestions about how this
Heideggerian conception of action might be extended beyond Heidegger’s thought and be
used as a basis for developing a general conception of human action.
In the last century, there have been two main ways of understanding human
action. This is, of course, an over-simplified story of the development of the
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philosophical and scientific understanding of action, but it will do for our purposes here.
In the first half of the Twentieth-Century, the dominant way of understanding human
action, at least in the social sciences, was behaviorism. Behaviorism in its most general
form is the view that all human actions can be understood as responses to stimuli
encountered in the surrounding environment. Behaviorism has its roots in the attempt to
understand and explain behavior in terms of objective and quantifiable phenomena that
are empirically verifiable and conform to causal laws. Speaking for proponents of
making behavior an object of this sort of scientific study, B.F. Skinner says:
We are concerned, then, with the causes of human
behavior. We want to know why men behave as they do.
Any condition or event which can be shown to have an
effect upon behavior must be taken into account. By
discovering and analyzing these causes we can predict
behavior; to the extent that we can manipulate them, we
can control behavior.50
With this aim in mind, behaviorists attempt to explain behavior without recourse
to unobservable subjective phenomena such as desires, the will, intentions, etc. The
earliest forms of behaviorism attempted to analyze behavior in terms of a fairly simple
stimulus/response model, according to which an external stimulus applied to an organism
causes the organism to respond in a certain way. This combination of a stimulus and
corresponding response is called a reflex, a name which in Skinner’s words is used “on
the theory that the disturbance caused by the stimulus passed to the central nervous
system and was ‘reflected’ back to the muscles”51. The overall picture, then, is that an
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organism receives some stimulus through its nervous system. This stimulus causes a
responsive movement of the muscles of the organism, which is understood as behavior.
Notice that everything is accounted for at the physiological, observable level without
requiring recourse to subjective, internal phenomena.
In the middle of the century, after devastating critiques had been leveled against
behaviorism, we find the resurgence of causal theories of action in the Analytic tradition
that focus on understanding human action as being caused by our mental states or mental
events (e.g. beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.). The specific version of the causal account
that I would like to focus on here is that given by Davidson in his essay, “Actions,
Reasons, and Causes.”52 I realize that there have been many other sophisticated and
influential versions of the causal account since this essay was first presented in 1963, and
that Davidson modified and supplemented his account in later writings. However, it was
this essay that first established the current dominance of the causal account and outlined
the basic framework which has guided the debate in the philosophy of action for the last
forty plus years.
Davidson’s view of action is not novel or terribly complex, which he readily
admits. He begins by carefully defining some important terms that he believes will help
us get clear about what we mean we say someone had a reason for doing something.
Doing something for a reason amounts to “having some sort of pro-attitude towards
actions of a certain kind” and “believing (or knowing, perceiving, noticing, remembering)
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that [an] action is of that kind.”53 Pro-attitudes are things like desires, wants, urges, etc.
Davidson’s view then is that when someone is said to have a reason for performing a
particular action, she has a desire (want, urge, etc.) to perform a certain kind of action and
she has a belief (knowledge, perception, etc.) that the action under consideration is of the
desired kind. Davidson goes on to define the combination of a pro-attitude with the
related belief as the primary reason for an action. It is the primary reason that is the
cause of an action. If we can give the primary reason for an action, then we will have
explained the action.
At first glance it seems that it might be possible to collapse the Heideggerian
conception of action developed here into one of these two general ways of understanding
action. The behaviorist might say that what this Heideggerian conception of action really
amounts to is saying that we are socially conditioned to respond to certain stimuli in
certain ways. Conversely, the Analytic philosopher of action that focuses on the causal
efficacy of our mental states when explaining action might say that Heidegger’s
conceptions of disposition and understanding can really be cashed out in terms of mental
states and their causal powers. For instance, we could return to our earlier example of
being a philosopher and being drawn towards publishing journal articles and explain this
activity according to Davidson’s causal theory of action. We could explain this on the
Davidsonian view by saying that I have a desire to be a philosopher and a belief that
publishing articles in respectable journals is an action that will lead to the satisfaction of
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this desire. This combination of belief and desire is what causes me to write articles and
submit them.
As we have endeavored to show through the previous chapters, the Heideggerian
conception of action found in his early thought is not reducible to behaviorism. While
the Heideggerian conception of action developed here incorporates the behaviorist claim
that our actions are often triggered by things we encounter in the situation of action, we
have also maintained that this response to environmental stimuli is made possible by our
capacity to understand ourselves and the situation of action in certain ways, thereby
allowing things to matter to us or affect us. It is a little more difficult to show why the
Heideggerian conception of action developed here is not reducible to the mental
causation theory of action. We can say, with Dreyfus, that mental causation theories of
action focus too much on the role of explicit mental states in our actions. This strategy
does not seem to be completely satisfactory, since it remains difficult to account for cases
of explicit deliberation if the role of mental states is completely marginalized.
In the first chapter, we briefly tried to show how explicit deliberation can be seen
as a more sophisticated and abstract form of the articulation of the situation of action that
is often performed by our largely tacit self-understandings. In this case the deliberation
and the accompanying mental states are determinative for the action insofar as they let
things matter to us, i.e. the process of explicit deliberation makes it possible for things
and activities to matter to us. I have suggested throughout (especially in the fourth
chapter in the discussion of the two types of causality found in Kant’s practical
philosophy) that this capacity to let things matter to us is something different than
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straightforward, efficient causality. Taking this approach does not necessarily show that
the Heideggerian conception of action cannot be reduced to the mental causation
conception of action. Rather, it shows how the mental causation theory of action can be
incorporated into the Heideggerian conception of action, albeit in slightly modified form.
In effect, the burden of proof would be shifted to the supporter of the mental causation
theory to show how much of our seemingly unreflective activity is best understood by the
mental causation approach and how mental states can be thought of as causes for our
actions.
This leads us to an interesting and important way of distinguishing the
Heideggerian conception of action from both behaviorist and mental causation
understandings of action. The key conceptual similarity for behaviorist and mental
causation theories of human action is that both make use of (at least in their simplest
form) a certain conception of causality, namely, efficient causality. In its most basic
form, this conception of causality holds that all events are determined by some prior
event(s). It is typically thought that all explanation of human action (and indeed all
proper explanation of anything) must ultimately come down to a causal explanation of
this sort. The behaviorist would hold that human action can ultimately be understood as
responses that are caused by prior environmental stimuli. The proponent of a mental
causation theory of action would hold that all proper human actions are caused by prior
mental events. For the behaviorist, the causality operative in human action works from
the bottom up. By that I mean physical stimuli encountered in the environment are
perceived or sensed by us, and then the resulting perception or sensation triggers a
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response at the mental level. For the mental causation theorist, the process is reversed.
According to the mental causation theorist, the causality operative in human action works
from the top down. At the mental level, we form certain belief, desires, intentions, etc.,
and then these mental events bring about our actions. Both behaviorists and proponents
of mental causation employ what can be called a linear conception of causality.
The Heideggerian conception of action developed here is different because, as we
have seen, action is to be understood as a reciprocal interdependence of active and
passive aspects that seems to involve a very different understanding of causality, if it can
even be called causality at all.54 The Heideggerian position is not the self-contradictory
view that our actions are efficiently caused by being drawn towards certain things and
activities available in a situation and simultaneously efficiently caused by the selfunderstandings that we take up. Our being drawn towards certain activities can be
understood as something like a response to our environment, and as such, can be
understood in terms of efficient causality. However, the way in which we articulate the
situation of action through taking up various ways of understanding ourselves is not to be
understood as a competing form of efficient causality. As we have shown, this
articulation is better understood as letting things matter to us.
We find then that this Heideggerian conception of action might allow us to
combine what seems intuitively right about both behaviorism and mental causation
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theories of action without feeling obliged to reduce one to the other to alleviate worries
about conflicting causal explanations. The Heideggerian conception of action
incorporates the behaviorist view that much of our activity can be understood as a
response to our environment that takes place without explicit mental awareness. This
Heideggerian conception of action can also incorporate the mental causation theorist
view that our actions are not completely determined by our environmental setting and
that there is a way of understanding actions as being grounded in the individual agent.
Much more would need to be said to strengthen and expand this general Heideggerian
conception of action, but I would like to think it offers an alternative way of
understanding human agency, which has been largely neglected in the past century.
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